BODY CONTENTS

PUBLICATION

Release of medium-to-long term outlook on respective agenda based
on the analysis of pending macroeconomic issues

Macroeconomics and Financial Economics

Policy Study

Corporate Governance of Cartel Firms

Facebook
cover image
  • Author LEE. Hwaryung
  • Date 2015/12/31
  • Series No. Policy Study 2015-06
  • Language Korean
PDF
SUMMARY Firm strategies in a product market are determined by management. Therefore product market competition cannot be free from corporate governance which directly affects the decision-making process of management. To examine the relationship between corporate governance and collusion, a unique data set is collected on cartel case details, board composition and activities, and socio-demographic characteristics of outside directors and CEOs in 155 listed companies in South Korea for 2007-2012. We observed more dissenting votes from outside directors in collusive firms than in competitive firms. Not only that casting a dissenting vote raises the risk of being replaced, the risk increase is found to be significantly larger in collusive firms than in other firms. In addition, CEO turnover sensitivity to relative performance is high in competitive firms while such relationship is not found in collusive firms. Rather, the turnover probability goes down with industry performance in collusive firms. These empirical results suggest that collusive firms have weaker governance than competitive firms.
Related content It is directly correlated to the content.
More from this topicIt deals with the same topic of the content

No data about the same topic

KDI Research Category
Advanced search