KDI 한국개발연구원 - 경제정책정보 - 국내외연구자료 주제 - 경제일반 - 법·제도 경제 -



유관기관의 다양한 자료를 한 곳에서 살펴보실 수 있습니다.


Corporate governance in the presence of active and passive delegated investment

CEPR 2020.09.25
We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are endogenously determined. Funds‘ ownership stakes and asset management fees determine their incentives to engage in governance. Whether passive fund growth improves aggregate governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even if accompanied by lower passive fund fees, whereas in the latter case, it improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors‘ returns too much. Regulations that decrease funds‘ costs of engaging in governance may decrease total welfare. Moreover, even when such regulations are welfare improving and increase firm valuations, they can be opposed by both fund investors and fund managers.

가입하신 이동통신사의 요금제에 따라
데이터 요금이 과다하게 부가될 수 있습니다.

파일을 다운로드하시겠습니까?
KDI 연구 카테고리