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Corporate Governance And Capital Markets in Korea

페이스북
커버이미지
  • 저자 임영재(林暎宰)
  • 발행일 2009/12/31
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요약 Prefacections
Contentsions
Introductions

Chapter 1 The Evidence on Securities Class Actions
 1. Introduction
 2. Theoretical Issues with Shareholder Class Actions
 2.1. Frivolous Lawsuits
 2.1. Plaintiff's Attorney Agency Problems
 3. Empirical Evidence
 3.1. The Incidence of Frivolous Lawsuits
 3.2. Class Action Incidence
 3.3. Plaintiffs’ Attorney Agency Problems
 3.4. Other Issues
 4.Implications for Korea
 4.1. The Size Effect
 4.2. Regime Choices
 4.3. Institutional Structure
 4.4. Class Actions in Korea
 5. Conclusion
Comments on “The Evidence on Securities Class Actions”
Comments on “The Evidence on Securities Class Actions”

Chapter 2 Market Reaction to Public Disclosure on Related Party Transactions in Korea
 1. Introduction
 2. Capital Market Monitoring and Public disclosure
 3. Why do we care about related party transactions?
 4. Hypotheses
 5. Empirical Study on equity investment in affiliated firms
 5.1. Estimation of market reaction
 5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Comments on “Market Reaction to Public Disclosure on Related Party Transactions in Korea”

Chapter 3 Predicting Firms’ Corporate Governance Choices: Evidence from Korea
 1. Introduction
 2. Related Literature
 3. Data and Construction of Corporate Governance Index
 3.1. Sample and Data Sources
 3.2. Construction of the Corporate Governance Index
 4. Overview of Regulatory, Industry, and Firm Factors
 4.1. Regulatory Factors
 4.2 Industry Factors
 4.3 Firm-Level Factors: Overall Importance and Omitted Variables Issues
 4.4 Results for Firm-level Economic Variables
 4.5 Results for Subindices and Reduced Indices
 4.6 Results for Subsamples
 5. Further Investigation of Selected Firm-Level Variables
 5.1. Firm Growth and Growth Opportunity
 5.2. Firm Profitability
 5.3 Equity Finance Need and External Finance Need
 6. Conclusion; Avenues for Future Research

Chapter 4 Designing a Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds in Korea: Empirical Study on Corporate Bond Indentures
 1. Introduction
 2. The Korean Bond Market before and after the 1997 Crisis
 2.1. Government Bonds
 2.2. Corporate Bonds
 3. Cost of Debt before and after Introduction of the Standard Indenture
 3.1 Data Description
 3.2. Types of the Bond Indenture
 3.3. Cost of Debt before and after Introduction of the Standard Indenture
 4. Institutional Data regarding Corporate Bond Indentures
 4.1. Dispersion of Bondholders
 4.2 Potential Conflict of Interest for an Indenture Trustee and Underwriter
 4.3 Fees of Indenture Trustees
 5. Determinants of the Bond Indenture
 5.1 Measuring the Degree of Restrictions in Covenants
 5.2. Determinants of Covenant Agreements
 5.3. Regression Results
 6. Conclusion
Comments on “Designing a Governance Structure of Corporate Bonds in Korea"

Chapter 5 Enforcing Corporate Governance Structure through Court: The Korean Experience
 1. Introduction
 2. Case 1: The Korea First Bank [Jeil Bank]
 3. Case 2: The Samsung Electronics
 4. Cases That Might Have Been Brought to Court, But Not (Yet?)
 5. Conclusion
Comment on “Enforcing the Corporate Governance Structure through Court: The Korean Experience”

Chapter 6 Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The Case of Korea
 1. Introduction
 2. Outside Director Liability in the United States
 3. Outside Director Liability Outside the United States
 4. The Korean Situation
 4.1. Recent Legal Changes
 4.2. Sources of Director Liability
 4.3. Indemnification
 4.4. D&O Insurance
 5. Implications

Chapter 7 In Praise of Korea’s Approach to Regulating Stock Buybacks
 1. Introduction
 2. Share Repurchases in Korea
 2.1 The Use of Share Repurchases in Korea
 2.2. The Tax Benefit of Share Repurchases for Korean Shareholders
 3. Share Repurchases: Insider Trading Against The Firm’s Own Shareholders
 3.1. The Insider-Trading Effect of a Repurchase
 3.2. Managers’ Use of Repurchases for Insider Trading
 3.3. The (at-best) Zero-Sum Nature of Insider Trading
 3.4. Distorted Payout and Disclosure Policies
 4. Korea’s Better Approach to regulating share repurchases
 4.1. Disclosure
 4.2. Restrictions on Insiders’ Own Trading
 5. Conclusion
Comments on “In Praise of Korea’s Approach to Regulating Stock Buybacks”
Comments on “Regulating Stock buybcacks”

Chapter 8 Measuring Share Price Accuracy
 1. Share Price Accuracy
 1.1. Precise definitions of actual value and share price accuracy
 1.2. The core determinants of share price accuracy: the existence of information and its reflection in price
 1.3. Speculative noise versus fundamental information
 2. Share Price Informedness
 2.1. The concept
 2.2. Relationship of share price accuracy to price movement
 3. The R2 Methodology
 3.1.Preliminary theoretical considerations
 3.1.Indirect evidence that R2 is a good inverse proxy for share price accuracy
 3. 3. Direct test of R2 as a proxy for share price accuracy
 4. Conclusion
Comments on “Measuring Share Price Accuracy”
Comments on “Measuring Share Price Accuracy”

Chapter 9 Introduction of Consolidated Financial Regime and Management of Conflict of Interests Problems
 1. Issues
 2. Rationale for Consolidation and Proposed Consolidated Regime
 2.1. Rationale for Consolidation
 2.2. Proposed Consolidated Regimes
 3. Conflicts of Interests in Financial Institutions
 3.1. In-house Conflicts in “Independent” Firms under the Current Institutional Regulation
 3.2. Conflicts arising in “Member” Firms in Financial Group Context
 3.3. Conflicts in “Member” Firms under Holding company structure
 3.4. Conflicts in Financial Conglomerates under Proposed Consolidated Regime
 4. Ways of Conflict Managements
 4.1. Conflict Management under the Current Institutional Acts
 4.2. Conflict Management under the Proposed Regime
 5. Conclusions
Comments on “Introduction of Consolidated Financial Regime and Management of Conflict of Interests Problems”

Chapter 10 Boards: How A Korean Comparison Clarifies Understanding
 1. Some U.S. History, 1950-2000’s

Chapter 11 Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia
 1. Introduction
 2. Puzzle: The Role of NPOs in East Asian Corporate Governance
 2.1. Korea
 2.2. Taiwan
 2.3. Japan
 3. Theory: NPOs, Public Goods, Trust, and Social Entrepreneurship
 4. Application: NPOs as Investor Protection
 4.1. Corporate Law Enforcement as a Public Good
 4.2. Corporate Law Enforcement in East Asia: Demand and Supply
 4.3. Explaining Cross-Country Diversity in NPO Shareholder Activism
 4.4. Summary
 4.5. Culture as an Alternative Explanation?
 5.Implications
 5.1. For Comparative Corporate Governance Literature
 5.2. For Corporate Law Enforcement in Transition Economies
 6. Conclusion
Comments on “Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia ”

Chapter 12 Ineffective Derivative Suits in Korea
 1. Introduction
 2. Theoretical Importance of Derivative Suits
 2.1. Ex Post Liability v. Ex Ante Monitoring
 2.2. Ineffective Ex Ante Monitoring
 2.3. Ineffective Market for Corporate Control
 3. Legal Framework: Comparison
 3.1. Who Can Bring a Suit?
 3.2 How Can the Board Interrupt?
 3.3. Litigation Costs
 4. Social Desirability of Derivative Suits
 4.1. Why Not Common in Korea?
 4.2 Activating Derivative Suits in Korea
 4.3. Criticism: Collusive Settlement
 5. Conclusion
Comments on “Ineffective Derivative Suits in Korea”
Comments on “Ineffective Derivative Suits in Korea”
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