

REGULATION, COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY CONVERGENCE¹

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of product market regulations on the international diffusion of productivity shocks. The empirical results indicate that restrictive product market regulation slows the process of adjustment through which best practice production techniques diffuse across borders and new technologies are incorporated into the production process. Given differences in the stance of product market regulation across countries, the cross-country dispersion of productivity levels is found to increase in the wake of positive shocks to the world productivity frontier. These results suggest that the emergence of new general-purpose technologies over the 1990s could partially explain the observed divergence in productivity trends in OECD countries, despite a degree of recent cross-country convergence in product market regulation. The paper also investigates different channels through which anti-competitive regulations might affect a country's overall productivity performance. These include the influence of anti-competitive regulation on the adoption of information and communications technology, the entry rates of new firms, and the location decisions of multi-national enterprises.

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1. Introduction, summary and conclusions

1. Product market regulation in the OECD area has generally become less restrictive of competition over recent years. This has led to a degree of convergence in regulatory policies, but nonetheless, the productivity performance of OECD countries has become increasingly disparate. Indeed, according to some measures, the growth rates and levels of labour productivity have recently begun to diverge.

2. Against this background, this paper investigates the link between anti-competitive product market regulations and labour productivity growth. As well as looking at the *prima facie* evidence of a link, the paper also investigates different channels through which regulations that curb competition might affect a country's overall productivity performance. These include the influence of anti-competitive regulation on: the speed of catch-up to best practice production techniques, the adoption of information and communications technology (ICT), the entry rates of new firms, and the location decisions of multi-national enterprises. Depending on data availability, the analysis is conducted at both the aggregate business sector and sectoral levels.

3. The empirical results indicate that restrictive product market regulation slows the process of adjustment through which positive productivity shocks diffuse across borders and new technologies are incorporated into the production process. In some of the more restrictive OECD countries the loss of adaptability that occurs as a result of anti-competitive regulation can be sizeable. For example, estimates suggest that the improvement in domestic productivity that arises in these countries as a result of a one-off positive shift in the world productivity frontier can be up to 25% smaller than in a country in which product market regulation is the least restrictive in the OECD in each sector. In all the countries included in the study the detrimental effect of anti-competitive regulation is larger in sectors that are intensive in ICT. This is because the regulatory barriers to technology diffusion tend to be higher in these sectors in comparison to the rest of the economy and weak competitive pressures also directly curb incentives to enhance productivity. As a result, in these sectors the gap in productivity improvement in restrictive countries following a shift in the world productivity frontier can be as high as 40% relative to the most liberal countries.

4. Because relatively liberal countries tend to incorporate best practice production techniques and improve productivity in ICT-intensive sectors more easily than countries with more restrictive policy regimes, the cross-country dispersion of productivity levels is found to increase in the wake of positive shocks to the world productivity frontier. In times of rapid improvements in the productivity frontier the positive effect of pro-competitive regulations on the speed of catch-up is amplified, increasing the dispersion of productivity levels across countries in which the stringency of product market regulation differs. These results suggest that the emergence of new general-purpose technologies over the 1990s could partially explain divergent productivity trends, despite a degree of recent convergence in product market regulation across countries.

5. On the basis of conservative assumptions about the pace of growth in the world productivity frontier the results of simulating the productivity model suggest considerable scope for gains from further product market reform, especially in countries that operate at some distance from the world productivity frontier. For example, if countries adopted the regulatory stance of the least restrictive OECD country in each sector the increases in annual productivity growth in the ten years following reform due to faster catch-up are estimated to range from 0.04 percentage points in the United Kingdom – which has one of the least restrictive regulatory environments according to OECD indicators – to 1.3 percentage points in Greece. In a number of countries, the average increase in annual productivity growth from implementing sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition is estimated to be greater than 0.5 percentage points, implying substantial long-run gains in productivity levels. These gains are even larger in ICT-intensive sectors of the economy, where product market regulation is also found to have a direct impact on labour productivity growth.

6. The analysis in the second part of the paper finds that the link between product market regulation and productivity can be traced to several factors. Overall, product market regulation is found to be a significant determinant of investment in ICT, with relatively liberal countries more successful at incorporating ICT into the production process than relatively restrictive countries. In the United States since the mid-1990s, for example, ICT investment as a share of total investment is estimated to have been more than four percentage points above the OECD average of 15% as a direct result of the relatively liberal regulatory environment. On average across countries for which data exist, estimates suggest that ICT investment as a share of total investment would increase by around 2.5 percentage points if countries adopted the regulatory stance of the least restrictive OECD country in each sector. For some countries the additional investment in ICT that would result from such a move represents a substantial increase in the existing stock.

7. Confirming previous findings (OECD 2003a, Nicoletti *et al.*, 2003) there is also evidence that a restrictive regulatory stance curbs the creation of new firms and the establishment of foreign affiliates of multinationals, thereby inhibiting the process of factor reallocation from less to more efficient uses and the diffusion of technology. Although the percentage of the cross-country variation in firm creation explained by product market regulation is found to be relatively small, implementing the sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition among OECD countries would still result in modest increases in firm entry. The regulatory environment is found to have a substantial impact on multinational investment and ongoing reform of product market and foreign direct investment regulation is estimated to considerably increase the activity of foreign affiliates in some countries.

8. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines recent developments in product market regulation and labour productivity in the OECD area. Section 3 presents the model that is used to test the influence of product market regulation on productivity growth, the results of the estimation, and some illustrative simulations. In Section 4 additional panel data regressions are used to investigate the

effect of product market regulation on the three potential transmission channels mentioned above.

2. Product market regulation and labour productivity in the OECD: convergence and divergence?²

Regulation

9. In the empirical work that follows two sets of indicators are used to measure product market regulation at the economy-wide and sectoral levels respectively:

- An aggregate indicator of regulatory conditions in seven non-manufacturing sectors – covering transport (airlines, railways, road freight), energy (gas, electricity), and communications (post, and telecoms) – is used as a proxy for economy-wide product market regulation. While this indicator misses important aspects of economy-wide regulation, it includes some of the sectors in which anti-competitive regulation is concentrated in OECD countries, given that manufacturing sectors are typically lightly regulated and open to international competition. In addition, this indicator is highly correlated with the cross-section indicator of economy-wide product market regulation in the years in which they overlap, confirming that the former is a reasonable proxy for the latter.³ The indicators for the seven non-manufacturing sectors have been estimated for 21 OECD countries over the period 1975 to 2003 and are therefore well suited to time-series analysis.⁴
- The indicators of anti-competitive regulation in transport, energy and communication, as well as retail distribution and business services are used to compute indicators of the knock-on effects of such regulation at the sectoral level. These indicators, called the regulation impact indicators, are predicated on the notion that anti-competitive regulations in non-manufacturing sectors not only have a direct influence on market conditions in these sectors, but also have a less visible impact on the cost structures faced by firms that use the output of non-manufacturing sectors as intermediate inputs in the production process.⁵ This is especially the case given the large and increasingly important

² This section provides only a very brief summary of trends in product market regulation and productivity in OECD countries. For more on the construction of the indicators used to measure anti-competitive regulation and patterns of regulatory reform in OECD countries please see Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Recent trends in productivity in OECD countries are discussed in detail in a number of sources including OECD (2003a).

³ The economy-wide indicators of product market regulation in OECD countries are described in Conway *et. al.* (2005) and Nicoletti *et. al.* (1999).

⁴ These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.

⁵ As well as intermediate inputs the ‘knock-on effects’ of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors will also propagate through the economy via a number of other channels such as the effect on the price of investment goods and “Baumol disease” effects that act through wages. In

role of the non-manufacturing sector as a supplier of intermediate inputs in OECD countries over recent years. For each sector in a particular country the regulation impact indicator is calculated as a weighted average of indicators of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors. The weights used in the calculation are total input coefficients – derived from (harmonised) input-output tables – that measure the extent to which intermediate inputs from each of the non-manufacturing sectors are used in the final output of the sector. Hence, the regulation impact indicators are a measure of the degree to which each sector in the economy is exposed to anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing sectors. These indicators exist for 39 ISIC rev3 sectors in 21 OECD countries over the period 1975 to 2003.

10. According to the aggregate indicators of regulation in transport, energy, and communications sectors, product market regulation has become more conducive to market mechanisms in the OECD area in recent years as governments have liberalised potentially competitive markets, re-regulated natural monopoly markets establishing pro-competitive regulation where possible, and privatised previously state-owned assets. Given different starting points and patterns of reform, cross-country differences in the stance of product market regulation increased across the OECD in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 2.1). From the late-1990s, however, the dispersion in policy stance has fallen in part because regulation in the Euro area and former transition countries has moved towards that of the more liberal countries. Notwithstanding this convergence, however, product market regulation in the OECD area is still characterised by significant differences across countries (Conway *et al.*, 2005).

[Figure 2.1: Evolution and dispersion in regulatory environments, 1980-2003]

11. One feature of the sectoral regulatory indicators that is germane for the empirical results that follow is that the knock-on effects of anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing sectors is typically largest in sectors in which ICT equipment is used intensively (Figure 2.2). This reflects the fact that these sectors tend to use intermediate inputs from regulated non-manufacturing sectors relatively more intensively than other sectors. The impact of regulation on ICT-using sectors is particularly high in many continental EU countries, Japan, and Canada. In addition, the variation in the regulation impact indicators across countries is also largest in ICT-using sectors.

[Figure 2.2: The impact of regulation in ICT-producing, ICT-using, and non-ICT intensive sectors, 2003]

Productivity

12. In the empirical work that follows, labour productivity at the aggregate level is calculated as the ratio of business sector GDP to business sector employment, while

this context, focusing on the role of non-manufacturing sectors as suppliers of intermediate inputs provides only a lower bound to these propagation effects. It does, however, facilitate their empirical measurement, which is important in the context of the analysis that follows.

at the sectoral level labour productivity is calculated as value added per person employed in each industry.⁶ To ensure comparability across countries, the output values used to estimate labour productivity are converted into prices denominated in a common currency using purchasing power parities (PPP). For both the sectoral and business sector productivity estimates this has been done using aggregate PPPs.⁷

13. As illustrated in detail in OECD (2003a), productivity performances have varied markedly across countries over the past two decades and the process of catch-up has been stalling for several years (Figures 2.3, 2.4). From 1990 only a few high-growth countries have continued to converge towards the productivity levels of the United States (Figure 2.5).

[Figure 2.3: Growth in business sector labour productivity per employee]

[Figure 2.4: The standard deviation of labour productivity across countries]

[Figure 2.5: Change in productivity levels relative to the United States]

14. To some extent these disparities in productivity growth reflect differing degrees of adaptability across countries to recent technology shocks (OECD, 2003b). In the United States a large proportion of the increase in labour productivity in the second half of the 1990s originated in sectors that either produce or intensively use ICT (Figure 2.6). A few other countries – for example, Ireland, Australia, Korea, Finland, Mexico, Portugal, and the United Kingdom – also experienced accelerating productivity growth in these sectors in the second half of the 1990s. In a number of countries, however, the contribution of ICT-producing or using sectors to productivity growth has typically been smaller than in the United States and even declined in several of them over the 1990s.⁸

⁶ Cross-country differences in labour productivity reflect differences in technology in its broadest possible sense including differences in capital intensity, capital quality, human capital, economies of scale, and intangibles such as management techniques. Estimates of multi-factor productivity (MFP) account for some of these additional factors by relating a measure of output to a bundle of productive inputs, making it a more precise estimate of productive efficiency. However, given difficulties inherent in measuring the capital stock and other productive inputs, estimates of MFP tend to be less robust than those of labour productivity, particularly at the industry level. Labour productivity should ideally be calculated using data on hours worked. However, comprehensive cross-country data on hours worked is only available at the level of the aggregate economy and estimates of labour productivity at lower levels of aggregation must be computed using total employment.

⁷ Although this implies the assumption of identical comparative price levels across industries, van Biesebroeck (2005) finds that, overall, aggregate PPPs perform as well as sectoral PPPs, where performance is measured as the correlation with sectoral deflation rates. For some service sectors aggregate PPPs are found to perform better than sectoral PPPs, while for some manufacturing sectors sectoral PPPs perform marginally better. All of the productivity used is derived from the OECD Productivity and STAN databases. Full details on data sources are provided in the annex.

⁸ The role of ICT production and use is discussed in detail in Pilat and Wölfl (2004). Differences in the contribution of ICT-using sectors to productivity growth have also been found to be

[Figure 2.6: Contributions to aggregate labour productivity growth]

15. Thus, although ICT is a ‘general purpose’ technology and readily available in worldwide markets, only a limited number of OECD countries have been reaping its significant potential benefits to the full. This hints at the potential role of policy and institutional factors in explaining the differing abilities of countries to produce ICT and integrate these technologies into the production process. It also suggests a potential explanation for the apparent paradox of diverging productivity trends across countries in conjunction with a degree of regulatory convergence. If restrictive product market regulation raises barriers to technology implementation and reduces the incentive to increase efficiency and innovate, it may slow down productivity enhancements related to the production and the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, regulation may have a stronger influence on productivity patterns in times of rapid technological innovation. The rapid emergence of ICT in the second half of the 1990s may have amplified the effect of remaining cross-country differences in anti-competitive regulation, which were still significant. Indeed, at first glance, countries with a relatively liberal approach to competition have tended to experience a greater acceleration in productivity growth after 1995 (Figure 2.7).

[Figure 2.7: Product market regulation and labour productivity acceleration]

3. Does regulation affect productivity growth?

3.1 *The model*

16. To test the effect of regulation on catch-up to best practice, a model of labour productivity based on the work of Aghion and Howitt (2005) is estimated at both the aggregate business sector and sectoral levels. In this model labour productivity growth in a given country or sector depends on its ability to keep pace with growth in the country with the highest level of labour productivity (the productivity leader) by either innovating or taking advantage of technology transfers. In turn, this possibility is affected by the policy environment in follower countries or sectors. In particular, Aghion and Griffith (2005) stress the role played by institutions that promote (or hinder) firm rivalry and/or entry of new firms in raising (or curbing) incentives to enhance productivity. In the model presented here these institutions are proxied by the OECD indicators of anti-competitive regulations described earlier. The estimated equation is:⁹

$$\Delta \ln LP_{ijt} = \delta(\Delta \ln LP_{ijt}^{leader}) + \sigma(\text{prodgap}_{ijt}) + \gamma PMR_{ijt} + \alpha(PMR_{ijt} * \text{prodgap}_{ijt}) + X'_{ijt}\beta + \text{country/industry/time dummies} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

important sources of productivity divergence between the United States and Europe. See, for example, van Ark *et al.*, (2002).

⁹ This model is a variant of the model developed by Griffith *et. al.* (2004) to test the effect of R&D expenditure on productivity growth. It has also been used by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) to investigate the effect of product market regulation on multi-factor productivity growth.

with $\varepsilon \sim N(0, \Sigma)$

17. In this equation, the indices i, j and t denote countries, industries and periods, respectively; LP denotes labour productivity; *prodgap* is the 'productivity gap' - which is measured as the (log) ratio of the level of productivity in each country or sector relative to that of the productivity leader - and *PMR* is the appropriate indicator of anticompetitive product market regulation. The matrix X contains various control variables. Country, industry, and country-industry fixed effects are included as appropriate so as to account for unobserved time-invariant factors affecting productivity growth in a particular sector or country (e.g., natural endowments or location). Time dummies are also included to control for global productivity shocks in any given year.

18. In this model labour productivity shocks in the leader country or sector can have a direct effect on labour productivity growth in follower countries, the strength of which is measured by the coefficient δ . In addition, this equation also allows for the possibility that the difference in productivity levels between each country or sector and the productivity leader influences labour productivity growth. If the coefficient σ is negative and significant then the further a given country or sector is from the technological frontier the greater the scope for productivity improvements arising from technological catch up.

19. Product market regulation can influence labour productivity growth directly - the strength of which is measured by the coefficient γ - and indirectly by affecting the speed with which countries catch up to the productivity leader. This indirect channel is included in the model by allowing regulation to interact with the technology gap term. This allows for the possibility that by creating barriers to entry or hindering competition amongst incumbents, anti-competitive regulation may reduce incentives to invest and adopt leading production techniques, thereby lowering the speed with which countries/sectors catch up to the productivity leader. A positive and significant value of the coefficient on this term, α , implies that more restrictive product market regulation hinders the diffusion of productivity shocks from the productivity leader.

20. Reflecting data availability, the aggregate business sector model is estimated over the period 1978 to 2003 for the subset of 21 OECD countries for which the aggregate indicator of regulation in seven network sectors exist. The sectoral version of the model is estimated for 20 sectors over the period 1981 to 2003 for the same countries except Ireland given the lack of sectoral productivity data for this country. These estimates also distinguish between the direct impact of regulation on productivity growth in ICT-intensive and non ICT-intensive sectors, reflecting the possibility that weak competition may be particularly harmful for technology-driven productivity improvements in sectors using or producing new technologies.

3.2 *Results*

21. The results of estimating the business sector and sectoral versions of the labour productivity model are given in Table 3.1. In principle, the influence of capital

deepening and factors related to the quality of human and physical capital used in production should already be reflected in the productivity catch up term. However, these factors could also have a direct effect on the ability of an economy (or sector) to respond to shifts in the global productivity frontier. This would be the case, for instance, if a better educated labour force, a higher capital intensity, and/or a deeper familiarity with ICT technologies were to facilitate the transfer of technology from the leader to follower countries in the wake of productivity shocks. To account for this possibility, we include as control variables proxies for aggregate or sectoral human capital, change in the capital stock per employee, and the share of ICT in total investment. Moreover, we also include the output gap in the aggregate model to account for purely cyclical changes in productivity.

22. In terms of these control variables, the output gap, human capital (measured as the average years of education in the population) and, to a lesser extent, the share of ICT investment in total investment are found to significantly influence productivity growth in the business sector version of the model. Growth in the productivity leader becomes insignificant when the ICT-share is included in this regression suggesting that the latter captures the effects of shifts in the productivity frontier.¹⁰ At the sectoral level, the change in the capital stock per employee has a positive and significant effect on labour productivity growth. The proxy for human capital, however, is insignificant and data for ICT shares by sector is too sparse to be used as a control in these regressions.

[Table 3.1: Results of productivity growth regressions]

23. In both versions of the model, labour productivity growth in the productivity leader is typically found to have a positive and highly significant influence on productivity growth in less productive countries and sectors. In addition, the coefficient on the 'productivity gap' is always negative and highly significant. Thus, the importance of international diffusion of best practice production techniques as a source of productivity growth increases the further a country is from the world technological frontier. These results highlight the important role of catch-up as a driver of productivity growth, reflecting a high degree of economic integration in the OECD area and the fact that technological innovation usually occurs in a given region or country.¹¹

24. In both versions of the model, no direct effect of anti-competitive regulation on productivity growth is found. However, when the coefficient on the direct effect of regulation is estimated separately for ICT-intensive and non-ICT intensive sectors, there is evidence of a direct negative effect in the former that is significant at the 5%

10. Note, however, that the inclusion of the share of ICT investment in total investment in the model reduces the number of observations substantially, impairing the comparability of the two aggregate business sector regressions.

11. Keller (2004) notes that "only a handful of rich countries account for most of the world's creation of new technology" and that in most countries "foreign sources of technology account for 90% or more of domestic productivity growth".

level, implying that productivity growth in these sectors is higher the lower the degree of anti-competitive regulation.¹²

25. The regulatory environment is also found to exert an important indirect influence on productivity growth by slowing the speed with which countries or sectors catch-up to the productivity leader. The coefficient of the interaction between regulation and the productivity gap is always positive and significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that well-functioning product markets are an important condition for rapid productivity catch-up, perhaps because they increase the incentive and lower the cost of incorporating new technologies into the production process, as suggested by neo-Schumpeterian growth theories (Aghion, 2005). These results are broadly consistent with those of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) who use a similar approach to study the effect of regulation on multi-factor productivity (MFP).¹³

3.3 *Simulation results*

26. The economic significance of the estimation results reported above can be assessed by simulating the sectoral version of the labour productivity growth model (Table 1B, column 3). These policy simulations are only indicative because they assume that policy changes do not change the estimated average relationships (the Lucas critique) and that these are representative of the relationships in each country (with a possible heterogeneity bias). These simulations may also under-estimate the effect of policies on aggregate productivity to the extent that reform also results in resources moving from relatively unproductive to relatively productive sectors.¹⁴ However, they provide an idea of the order of magnitude of the estimated effects of policies.

27. As a starting point it is useful to use the model to illustrate the effect of current anti-competitive regulations on the diffusion of a global positive productivity shock across OECD countries. To this end, Figure 3.1 graphs the increase in productivity that would occur in each country five years after a one-off outward shift in the world productivity frontier of an equal magnitude in all sectors. To isolate the effect of product market regulation, this simulation is conducted from a steady-state in which the level of productivity in each sector is assumed to be initially equal across all countries. Thus, the initial shock results in the same sectoral productivity gap in all countries, which then close at different speeds depending on the relative stringency of

12. Conway *et. al.* (2006) provide a comprehensive evaluation of the direct effects of anti-competitive regulation on productivity growth.

13. These authors find that restrictive industry-specific product market regulation in manufacturing tends to reduce MFP growth mainly via the process of technological catch-up. They also find evidence of a direct link between a proxy for economy-wide product market regulation and sectoral MFP growth.

¹⁴ In OECD countries productivity growth within industries has been found to make a relatively large contribution to overall productivity growth in comparison to shifts of employment across industries (OECD 2003a). Given that the reallocation of resources across industries has played a relatively minor role in explaining cross-country differences in aggregate productivity growth, the results that emerge from the sectoral-level model may be generalized to explain aggregate patterns.

anti-competitive regulations. The increase in productivity that would arise in response to the shock is expressed as a proportion of the increase that would occur in a country in which product market regulation in each sector is the least restrictive of competition among OECD countries.

[Figure 3.1: The effect of regulation on the diffusion of a positive supply shock]

28. In a few countries – Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand – the influence of anti-competitive regulation on the diffusion of the productivity shock is relatively minor with aggregate productivity increasing by around 95% of the response in a country with the least restrictive product market regulation. In some of the other countries – notably Austria, Greece, and Italy – anti-competitive regulation implies a greater lack of adaptability in the wake of a positive global supply shock with aggregate productivity increasing by around 75% of the response in a country where product market regulation is least restrictive of competition.

29. In all countries the detrimental effect of anti-competitive regulation is larger in ICT-intensive sectors (ICT-using and ICT-producing sectors) given that, as discussed in Section 2 above, the regulatory barriers to diffusion are estimated to be higher in these sectors in comparison to non-ICT intensive sectors. The estimated gap in productivity catch-up in ICT-intensive sectors is particularly sizeable in Austria, Greece, Italy, Germany, Norway, and Belgium, all of which remain 30% to 40% below potential five years after the initial shock. In addition, reflecting larger cross-country heterogeneity in the regulation of ICT-intensive sectors, the dispersion of productivity levels across countries is also larger in these sectors following an improvement in the productivity frontier of an equal magnitude in all sectors (Figure 3.2).

[Figure 3.2: Standard deviation of labour productivity across countries following a global supply shock: ICT and non-ICT intensive sectors]

30. To assess the productivity dividend from faster convergence to the world productivity leader given further reform of product market regulation the steady state assumption is dropped and the model is simulated from the end of the sample period – 2003 – on the basis of the cross-country productivity gaps that prevailed at that time. As before, the benchmark for regulatory reform used in these simulations is the implementation of the regulatory settings of the country with the lowest level of anti-competitive regulation in each sector. For some OECD countries this reform package would be considered ambitious as it would involve an easing of domestic product market regulation to levels that are less restrictive than present policy settings in any OECD member country. However, in the context of recent substantial improvements in product market regulation, this reform package constitutes a continuation of the trend to liberalise product markets, as opposed to a radical shift in policy stance.

31. In this scenario the productivity dividend from product market reform in each year in a given country depends on both the distance from the productivity leader in each sector and the extent of anti-competitive regulation relative to the least restrictive

country. Given that there is no endogenous source of growth in the empirical model, this simulation is conducted on the assumption that the productivity frontier in each sector grows at an equilibrium rate of 1.6% per year, the average rate of productivity growth in the United States from 1970 to 2003.

32. Under this assumption, the average increase in annual productivity growth in the five years following regulatory reform ranges from 0.06 percentage points for the United Kingdom to 1.8 percentage points for Greece (Figure 3.3). In some of the other Continental EU countries – Portugal, Spain, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France – and Norway and Canada the increase in annual productivity growth is more than 0.5 percentage points. Over time, as countries converge towards their long-run productivity levels the detrimental effect of anti-competitive product market regulation on catch-up lessens, dragging down the average annual increase in productivity growth resulting from reform. In all countries except Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom the gains from product market liberalisation are greatest in ICT-intensive sectors, once again reflecting the greater exposure to anti-competitive regulation in these sectors (Figure 3.4).

[Figure 3.3: Increase in average annual business sector productivity growth following a move to sectoral regulation that are least restrictive of competition in 2003]

[Figure 3.4: Increase in average annual productivity growth 10 years after a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition: ICT-intensive and non-ICT intensive sectors]

33. In countries behind the technological frontier the increases in productivity growth from product market reform are relatively large and also last a long time, implying large total benefits from reform. For example, in relatively restrictive countries twenty years after reform the aggregate level of productivity is estimated to be between around 5% (Germany) and 12% (Greece) higher than would otherwise be the case (Figure 3.5).

[Figure 3.5: Increase in the level of productivity following a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition 20 years after reform]

34. It is important to note that the simulations underlying these results are based on the productivity frontier in each sector growing at average rate of productivity growth in the United States since the 1970s. This is a conservative assumption in comparison to frontier productivity growth over more recent years in which OECD countries have been exposed to a sequence of favourable productivity shocks. In times of rapid technological change the impact of anti-competitive product market regulation on productivity catch-up is amplified, implying larger potential gains from reform. For example, if the model is simulated with the productivity frontier in each sector growing at the same rate as average productivity growth in the United States over the period 1995 to 2003 the improvements in productivity levels twenty years after reform increase by up to 1.5 percentage points (Figure 3.6).

[Figure 3.6: Increase in productivity 20 years after reform: alternative leader growth assumptions]

4. Potential transmission channels

35. The results of the previous section indicate that anti-competitive product market regulation has a statistically and economically significant negative effect on labour productivity growth, particularly in countries that operate at some distance from the world productivity frontier. This section investigates this link further by assessing the impact of product market regulation on three potential transmission channels that have been shown in previous work to influence the adoption of best practice production techniques. Specifically, regression analysis is used to test the effect of product market regulation on: investment in ICT, firm entry, and the location decisions of multinational enterprises.

36. These channels are most probably interrelated. For example, ICT-related industries tend to attract a disproportionate share of multinational enterprises and new firms. However, data constraints preclude estimating a generalised model that accounts for all three channels simultaneously and the impact of regulation on each is analysed separately. In all three cases the same panel data regression framework is used. Specifically, the following regression is estimated separately for each of the three potential transmission channels:

$$Y_{ijt} = R_{ijt}\alpha + X_{ijt}\beta + \gamma_i + \tau_t + \delta_j + \zeta_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad \text{with} \quad \varepsilon \sim N(0, \Sigma)$$

The variable Y represents one of the variables of interest – ICT investment share, firm entry rate, or the employment share of foreign affiliates – at time t in sector j of country i. R is a matrix of the appropriate regulatory indicators, X is a matrix of controls that vary across each of the three regressions, and γ_i and δ_j are country, time, and sector-specific fixed effects, which control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The results for each of the three regressions are discussed in turn.

4.1 *The effect of product market regulation on ICT investment*

37. Given its potential for enhancing productivity and rapid price declines over recent years – especially when adjusted for quality – ICT has spread rapidly throughout the OECD. On average across countries for which data exist, the share of ICT investment in total non-residential investment (measured at current prices) has increased from just over 10% in 1985 to just under 20% in 2002 (Figure 4.1).¹⁵ However, rates of ICT adoption have varied considerably across countries. In 2002, the share of ICT investment was particularly high in the United States, Sweden, Finland, Australia, and the United Kingdom. In contrast, ICT investment in some continental European

15. The share of ICT investment in total investment is typically used as a key indicator of ICT diffusion. There are, however, many other indicators that measure the pervasiveness (or otherwise) of ICT technology across countries (see, for example, OECD 2002a). Most of these different indicators are closely correlated and tend to indicate a similar pattern of ICT diffusion.

countries and Japan was substantially lower. Several reasons can be envisaged for these differences, ranging from industry specialisation and first-mover advantage to gaps in workers' skills. However, given the wide availability of ICT and the relative homogeneity of industry features in the OECD area, cross-country differences in ICT uptake provide a useful 'natural experiment' with which to test the effect of product market regulation on the adoption of new technology.

[Figure 4.1: The diffusion of information communication technology]

38. At first glance, there does appear to be a link between the diffusion of ICT and the restrictiveness of product market regulation (Figure 4.2). There are a number of potential reasons why this might be the case. In a competitive environment with low barriers to entry the incentive to invest in ICT so as to increase productivity and retain market share may be stronger than in a more restrictive regulatory environment where incumbents are sheltered from competitive processes. Investment in ICT may help firms increase productivity by, for example, allowing them to expand their product range, customise their services, and respond better to client demands. ICT may also help reduce inefficiencies in the production process by, for example, reducing inventories. In addition, the costs of adjusting the capital stock and firm structure and reorganising the production process, all of which are necessary if new technology is to be successfully integrated, will tend to be lower in a competitive environment. Finally, as pointed out by Alesina *et al.*, (2005) in the context of general-purpose fixed investment, a competitive environment puts downward pressure on the cost of ICT, thereby promoting its diffusion.

[Figure 4.2: Product market regulation and the diffusion of information communication technology]

39. The regression model outlined above (equation 2) is used to test the impact of anti-competitive product market regulation on the share of ICT investment in total private investment.¹⁶ Reflecting data limitations, regressions are performed at the level of the aggregate business sector for 18 countries over the period 1985-2003 and at the sectoral level over the period 1980-2001 for five countries for which data on industry-specific ICT investment exist.¹⁷ As in the productivity regressions, the summary time-series indicator of anti-competitive regulation in seven network industries is used as a proxy for economy-wide regulation in the aggregate model whereas the 'regulation impact' indicators are used in the sectoral model.

40. The aggregate and sectoral regression results are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. A measure of human capital is included as a control variable in the

16. The specification of this model is similar to that used in the work of Gust and Marquèz (2002).

17. The countries covered in the aggregate-level regression are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the sectoral level, only France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States are included in the regression.

aggregate model given that countries with a more educated work force are better placed to benefit from ICT. This variable is marginally significant when country time trends and fixed effects are included in the aggregate regression. Given that a number of ICT-using sectors are services, the share of service sectors in business sector value-added is also included in the aggregate model to control for any effect of economic structure. This variable is found to be highly significant.¹⁸

[Table 4.1: Share of investment in information and communication technology and regulation]

[Table 4.2: Share of investment in information and communication technology and regulation: sectoral regressions]

41. In both versions of the model, the coefficients on the indicators of product market regulation are negatively signed and significant at the 1% level, implying that anti-competitive product market regulation has a strong negative effect on ICT investment. It would seem that firms operating in a relatively liberal regulatory environment are more inclined to incorporate ICT into the production process than firms operating in an environment in which product market regulation is more restrictive. The sectoral results presented in Table 4.2b suggest that the negative effect of regulation on ICT investment is concentrated in sectors that use ICT intensively and non-ICT using sectors. As with the results for the sectoral productivity regression, this may reflect the fact that only a few OECD countries have stable ICT-producing industries for reasons that are often unrelated to regulatory developments.

42. To assess the effect of product market regulation on ICT investment in more detail, a range of indicators that measure specific aspects of regulation or regulation in specific sectors are included in the aggregate and sectoral regressions. When the public ownership component of the regulatory indicators is stripped out and included separately its coefficient is negative but insignificant in the aggregate regression and significantly positive in the sectoral regression, implying that public ownership *per se* need not inhibit the adoption of ICT (Tables 4.1a, last column). In fact, especially in network industries, publicly-controlled firms have in some cases been found to over-invest in new technologies. For example, private telecommunications companies have sometimes abandoned costly plans to expand digital or cable networks in the wake of privatisation. This may explain the positive coefficient on public ownership in the sectoral regression where network industries have a larger impact on average estimates (because regressions are unweighted).

43. Excessive administrative burdens on firms are also found to curb investment in ICT and there is some evidence that financing difficulties due to inappropriate banking regulation may also partially explain cross-country differences in ICT take-up (Tables 4.1b and 4.2b). Finally, in both the aggregate and sectoral regressions

18. The services share is in some sense endogenous to ICT investment. However, regression results for the effect of product market regulation on ICT investment are robust to the exclusion of this variable.

regulation in the retail trade sector is found to have a distinct negative impact on ICT investment.

44. According to these results, product market regulation is a statistically significant determinant of investment in ICT. But is it also an economically significant determinant of observed differences in ICT investment across countries? To answer this question Figure 4.3 graphs the contribution of each of the explanatory variables in the aggregate regression to deviations of ICT investment from the OECD average over the full sample period. Overall, product market regulation explains 12% of the cross-country differences in ICT investment in this regression. In the United States, the share of ICT investment in total investment is found to be more than four percentage points higher than the OECD average of 15% as a result of relatively pro-competitive regulations. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, product market policies are also estimated to have contributed positively to investment in ICT relative to the OECD average. Conversely, in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and France relatively restrictive regulations are estimated to have dragged down ICT investment relative to other OECD countries. In the sectoral model the indicators of product market explain 20% of the variance in ICT investment across the countries in this model.

[Figure 4.3 Contributions to the deviation of the share of ICT in total investment from the OECD average, 1985-2003]

45. In 2003, given a degree of regulatory convergence, the cross-country differences in ICT investment attributable to product market regulation are slightly smaller than over the full sample period, but both the overall picture and the country-specific results remain broadly unchanged (Figure 4.4). The contribution of policy is still noteworthy for some countries, implying that differences in the regulatory environment continue to explain a reasonable proportion of cross-country differences in ICT investment.

[Figure 4.4: Contributions to explaining the deviation of ICT investment from the OECD average, 2003]

46. Finally, the results of model simulations suggest that substantial increases in ICT investment would occur in a number of countries if they were to reform product market regulation to that of the least restrictive OECD country in each sector (Figure 4.5).

[Figure 4.5: Increase in ICT investment share following a move to economy-wide product market regulation that is least restrictive of competition]

4.2 *The effect of product market regulation on firm demographics*

47. Previous work at the OECD has estimated that the entry and exit (net entry) of firms accounted for 20% to 40% of total productivity growth over the 1980s and 1990s in OECD countries (OECD, 2003a). Entry and exit rates have also been found to be highly correlated within sectors in OECD countries providing empirical support for theories of “creative destruction” in which new and innovative firms displace

unsuccessful and/or obsolete firms.¹⁹ Although firm exit has generally been found to make a larger contribution to productivity growth, firm entry is still an important part of the creative destruction process and has been found to significantly boost productivity growth in innovative sectors in which new firms are more likely to adopt state-of-the-art technologies. For example, in the United States, firm entry has been found to make a negative contribution to overall productivity growth for most manufacturing sectors, but a strongly positive contribution in ICT-related sectors (OECD, 2003a). Moreover, Brandt (2004) finds that cross-country variation in firm turnover is greater in narrowly defined ICT-intensive industries.²⁰

48. This section uses the regression framework of equation (2) to examine the effect of anti-competitive product market regulation on firm entry.²¹ Firm entry rates in manufacturing and service industries – calculated as the number of entering firms divided by the total number of firms – are regressed on the regulation impact indicators and a measure of the output gap to proxy for cross-country business cycle variation. Other unobserved determinants of entry are controlled for to the extent possible using country, industry, and time fixed effects. The regression is run over the period 1990-2001.

49. The results of sectoral firm entry rate regressions for manufacturing sectors are presented in Table 4.3a and for a larger set of manufacturing and service sectors in Table 4.3b. In both regressions anti-competitive regulation, as measured by the regulation impact indicators, has a significant negative effect on firm entry, and this result is robust to different model specifications.²² When the public ownership component of the regulatory indicator is included in the regression separately its coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that policies that directly curb competition and market access (*e.g.*, by raising legal barriers or restricting firm choices) are the more damaging for firm entry. Estimating separate coefficients for ICT-using, ICT-producing, and non-ICT intensive sectors suggests that the negative effect of regulation on firm entry is not present in the case of ICT-producing sectors.

[Table 4.3: Firm entry and regulation]

19. On the correlation of entry and exit rates see, for example Bartelsman *et al.*, (2003), Scarpetta *et al.*, (2003), and Brandt (2004). The Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” has been built upon by Jovanovic (1982), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) among others.

20. On the role of new entrants as innovators see, for example, see Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).

²¹ For previous OECD work in this area see Scarpetta *et al.* (2002) and Brandt (2004).

22. Note, however, that the telecommunications and electricity sectors were excluded from the sample in the regression results reported in Table 4.3b. When these sectors are included, the coefficient on the regulation impact indicators typically becomes insignificant. One potential explanation may be that the telecommunications and electricity sectors are characterised by a unique “boom and bust” pattern of firm entry following privatisation in many countries. For more on the evolution of the telecommunications sector see OECD (2003c).

50. In the preferred baseline specification (column 2 in Table 4a) the regulatory environment explains 6% of the cross-country deviation of firm entry rates from the OECD average over the full sample period and 11% of the deviation in 2001. According to this regression, adopting sectoral regulations that are the least restrictive of competition in the OECD area would boost new firm entry as a share of existing firms by more than one percentage point on average across all the manufacturing sectors for which data exist (Figure 4.6).

[Figure 4.6: Increase in firm entry rates following a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition]

4.3 *The effect of product market regulation on the location decisions of foreign affiliates*

51. The establishment of foreign affiliates in a host country is generally considered to be beneficial for domestic productivity growth. Previous empirical work has typically shown that foreign affiliates tend to be more capital and skill intensive and invest more in research and development than domestic firms in the same industry (Keller, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003). As a result, foreign affiliates tend to grow more quickly and make a larger direct contribution to productivity growth in comparison to domestic firms (Criscuolo 2005). Foreign affiliates may also contribute indirectly to domestic productivity growth by generating positive productivity spillovers for local firms. For example, foreign affiliates may speed the diffusion of new technology and management practices across borders or train labour that is subsequently employed by local firms. Across the countries for which data are available, there is substantial variation in the share of foreign affiliates in total employment (Figure 4.7).²³

[Figure 4.7: Employment share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing sectors]

52. As shown in Nicoletti *et al.* (2003), regulatory policies that restrict market access or reduce the potential returns to foreign investment negatively influence the share of foreign direct investment in OECD countries. At first glance, the employment share of foreign affiliates in the manufacturing sector also tends to be higher in countries with relatively liberal product market environments (Figure 4.8).

[Figure 4.8: Product market regulation and the employment share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing, 1995-2003]

53. As in the previous sub-sections, regression analysis within the framework of equation (2) is used to test the effect of product market regulation on the location

23. The data on foreign affiliates are from Criscuolo (2005). The share of foreign affiliate employment in total employment is the preferred measure of the presence of foreign affiliates given a lack of cross-country comparability and gaps in the data for other measures. However, in services sectors these data are typically only available for more recent years and are more sparse than data for manufacturing. Accordingly, the sample is somewhat biased towards the manufacturing sector. Given data limitations cross-country comparisons should be interpreted with caution.

decisions of foreign affiliates. The share of employment by foreign affiliates in total employment at the sectoral level is regressed on the regulation impact indicators and a number of control variables. Specifically, the OECD indicators of FDI restrictions (Golub, 2003), sectoral tariff rates, measures of domestic absorption, human capital, growth in sectoral value added, and R&D intensity are also included in the regression. Tariff rates are included in the model given that the establishment of foreign affiliates may be a way to overcome trade barriers (so-called “tariff jumping”). Domestic absorption accounts for the size of the market accessed by foreign affiliates, and growth in sectoral value added reflects the market potential in each sector.²⁴ R&D intensity captures the degree of innovation intrinsic in each industry. The indicator of regulation impact used in the regression is net of public ownership given that public ownership is included as part of the indicators of FDI restrictions. The model also includes industry-country fixed effects to account for other unobservable characteristics that might influence foreign affiliate employment. A dummy variable for membership in the European Union was also included in the model to reflect the effect of the larger market accessible to foreign affiliates in EU countries. Regressions were performed for 11 manufacturing and seven service sectors in 14 countries from the early 1990s to 2002.

54. Regression results, given in Table 4.4, provide some evidence that sectoral tariff barriers have a positive effect on the employment share of foreign affiliates, suggesting some kind of “tariff-jumping” motive on behalf of multinational enterprises over the sample period. R&D intensity is also found to have a positive and significant effect, indicating that foreign affiliates tend to be attracted by relatively innovative sectors. Somewhat surprisingly, human capital has a significant negative influence on the establishment of foreign affiliates perhaps reflecting the effect of wage costs, which tend to increase with human capital. However, including various proxies for labour costs in the regression yields insignificant coefficients, while leaving the size and significance of the human capital variable unchanged. Finally, membership in the European Union has a significant and positive effect on the share of employment in foreign affiliates suggesting that the absence of border barriers and access to a continental market are factors that influence the location decisions of multinationals.

[Table 4.4: Regulation and employment of foreign affiliates]

55. Regulatory restrictions to competition and FDI are both found to have a significant negative effect on the employment share of foreign affiliates across model specifications. These results support the conjecture that, by raising barriers to entry and/or production costs, anti-competitive product market regulation lowers the expected rate of return and discourages the establishment of foreign affiliates and their propensity to increase employment.²⁵

24. The role of market potential, first introduced by Harris (1954), has recently been stressed in the context of FDI by Head and Mayer (2004).

25. Assessing the effect of product market regulation on the share of foreign affiliate employment in ICT intensive and non-ICT intensive sectors separately suggests that the negative effect of anti-competitive regulation is larger and more significant in non-ICT intensive sectors.

56. Regression estimates imply that product market regulation explains around 10% of the cross-country variation in the data. Direct restrictions on FDI account for a further 13%. Thus, regulatory settings have a relatively large impact on cross-country variability in the establishment of foreign affiliates (Figure 4.9). In this context, aligning sectoral product market policies and FDI restrictions on those of the least restrictive OECD country is estimated to substantially increase investment by multinationals in a number of countries (Figure 4.10).

[Figure 4.9: Contributions to the deviation of the employment share of foreign affiliates from the OECD average, 1995-2003]

[Figure 4.10: Increase in the employment share of foreign affiliates following a move to sectoral regulations and FDI restrictions that are least restrictive of competition]

However, given the sparseness of data coverage, especially in services, this result needs to be interpreted with caution.

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Data Sources:

Labour Productivity Data

57. The aggregate data on business sector labour productivity are derived from national accounts and are calculated as the ratio of GDP to total employment in the business sector. GDP in the business sector is calculated by subtracting the value added of the government sector from total GDP, while employment in the business sector is the difference between total employment and employment in the government sector. GDP figures are made comparable across countries and over time by converting nominal values to 2000 purchasing power parities.

58. Sectoral labour productivity measures are derived from the data contained in the OECD STAN database for industrial analysis. Labour productivity is calculated as the ratio of sectoral value added to sectoral employment. As discussed in the text, aggregate purchasing power parities were used to make the sectoral productivity data comparable across sectors, countries and time. As for the aggregate measures, the base year chosen for the conversion of value-added is 2000.

ICT Data

59. The aggregate ICT dataset used in this analysis consists of OECD data on gross fixed capital formation for eighteen countries over 1985-2001, with data for some countries through to 2003. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. The variable used in regressions, ICT share of total investment, is calculated as investment in hardware, software, and computer equipment divided by total investment.

60. The sectoral ICT data are obtained from the University of Groningen and are described in detail in Inklaar, O'Mahoney, and Timmer (2003). These data cover five countries France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States, over 1980-2001, and are disaggregated to the two digit ISIC Rev.3 level.

Firm Entry Data

61. The firm demographics dataset used in the analysis merges and harmonizes data from the OECD Firm Level Database that covers ten countries (United States, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Portugal) over 1980-2001 with Eurostat Structural Business Statistics data on ten countries (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Finland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and United Kingdom) over 1997-2001, and data from the New Zealand Business Demographics Statistics Database.

62. There are some differences in data from different sources. The OECD and Eurostat give data for different size classes of firms (where size is the number of employees per firm), with Eurostat providing data for smaller size classes than the

OECD. To be consistent, firms were re-classified as having less than or greater than 20 employees. The other significant difference between the two datasets is the identification of “one year” firms - identified separately in OECD but not in Eurostat data. To be consistent, these firms were thus included in both datasets.

63. The variation in coverage over time, across countries, and across sectors has led to an unbalanced panel with end years that vary across countries. Sensitivity analysis was performed to ensure that results were not influenced by heterogeneity of data from different sources. A dummy variable indicating the data source (OECD versus Eurostat) was included in the regressions. While its coefficient was statistically significant, the signs and significance of coefficients on other variables were robust to the inclusion of the dummy.

64. Attention was restricted to the smallest firms (less than twenty employees), since these constitute the majority of new entrants and are likely to be most exposed to the costs imposed by restrictive regulation.²⁶ The time period used in the regressions was 1990-2001. The sectoral dimension used a two-digit ISIC Rev.3 level of disaggregation.

Foreign Affiliates Data

65. The data used for the construction of variables concerning the activity of foreign affiliates are derived from three OECD databases: the STAN productivity database; the AFA database, which contains information on activity of foreign affiliates in the manufacturing sector and the FATS database, which contains information on activity of foreign affiliates in the service sector. Both the Activity of Foreign Affiliates (AFA) and the Foreign Affiliates in Trade and Services (FATS) are survey based data collected by the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. Survey questions include employment, output, input and importing/exporting activity of foreign affiliates at the sectoral level. The countries covered in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, over the period 1977-2002, although coverage is most extensive in the 1990s.

66. Some issues arise with foreign affiliates' data. Firstly, STAN, which is used for the construction of sector totals, is based on national accounts, and therefore on several sources, establishment data being the most important. Reported information on the activity of foreign affiliates in AFA and FATS, on the other hand, is at the enterprise rather than the establishment level. This implies that the statistics concerning foreign affiliates might incorporate secondary activity and may not, therefore, be fully comparable with the sectoral totals derived from STAN. Secondly, the definition of foreign direct investment in both databases on the activity of foreign affiliates is based on the concept of controlling interest, which differs across countries. Thirdly, the definition of foreign owned firms within countries might have changed over time. Finally, statistics on foreign presence in some sectors are only provided for recent years.

²⁶ The focus on small firms led to excluding Canada from the regressions, due to lack of data.

67. Three possible measures of the presence of foreign affiliates are available: the share of turnover, the share of value-added, and the share of employment. The latter is the preferred measure of the presence of foreign affiliates given lack of cross-country comparability and gaps in the data for other measures.

Data for other control variables

68. The **output gap** is calculated as the difference between actual and potential output, based on national accounts and on the OECD Economic Outlook database. Aggregate **human capital** is calculated as the average years of education. As in Scarpetta and Tressel (2002), sectoral human capital is based on skill and wage data. It is calculated as the log of the wage ratios of high-skill to low-skill blue-collar and white-collar workers, weighted by the proportion of skilled workers in total employment. A measure of sectoral **border barriers** was calculated as a simple average of sectoral tariff and non-tariff barriers (from the TRAINS database) and FDI restrictions (Golub, 2003). Data on **R&D expenditures** are derived from the OECD ANBERD database.

The classification of ICT-producing, ICT-using, and non-ICT intensive sectors


69. Empirical measures of ICT use by sector are available for several countries, based on capital flow matrices and capital stock estimates. Work using data for the United States implies that investment in ICT equipment is concentrated in service sectors. For example, McGuckin and Stiroh (2001) report that 78% of total business investment in ICT in the United States is undertaken in the wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate sectors. Manufacturing, on the other hand is found to be responsible for only 17% of ICT investment. The classification of ISIC rev.3 sectors into ICT-producing (P), ICT-using (U), and non-ICT intensive (N) sectors used in this paper follows Inklaar, *et al.*, (2003) and is as follows:

<i>ISIC code</i>	<i>Industry</i>	<i>ICT classification</i>
15-16	Food Products, beverages and tobacco	N
17-19	Textiles, textiles products, leather & footwear	N
20	Wood except furniture	N
21-22	Pulp, Paper, paper products, printing & publishing	U
23-25	Chemical, rubber, plastics & fuel products	N
26	Other non-metallic mineral products	N
27-28	Basic metals and fabricated metal products	N
29	Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.	U
30-33	Electrical and optical equipment	P
34-35	Transport equipment	N
36-37	Furniture; recycling	U
40-41	Electricity, gas and water supply	N
45	Construction	N
50-52	Wholesale and retail trade; repairs	U
55	Hotels and restaurants	N
60-63	Transport and storage	N
64	Post and telecommunications	P

65-67	Financial intermediation	U
70	Real estate	N
71-74	Renting of M&EQ and other business activities	U

Figure 2.1. **Evolution and dispersion in regulatory environments, 1980-2003**¹

The scale of the indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive




1. Box plot of the summary indicators of regulatory conditions in seven non-manufacturing sectors. The horizontal line in the middle of the box is the median value of the indicator across the 21 OECD countries for which these indicators exist. The edges of the box are the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of the cross country distribution. The two whiskers are the extreme values and the dots represent outliers (the United States in 1980 and 1985 and Greece in 2000 and 2003).

Source: OECD international regulation database

Figure 2.2. **The impact of regulation in ICT-producing, ICT-using, and non-ICT intensive sectors, 2003¹**


The scale of the indicators is 0-1 from least to most restrictive



1 These data are the simple averages of the 'regulation impact' indicators for the individual industries included in ICT-producing, ICT-using, and non-ICT intensive sectors in 2003. The classification of sectors as ICT-using, ICT-producing, and non-ICT intensive is discussed in the data annex. The data is ordered according to the indicator values for ICT-using sectors.

Source: OECD international regulation database


Figure 2.3. Growth in business sector labour productivity per employee¹



¹ Average annual growth rates, based on cyclically-adjusted series of business sector output and employment (Hodrick-Prescott filter, lambda=100, data extended to 2006 using OECD medium-term projections to mitigate the end-point problem inherent with this filter). Countries are ordered according to productivity growth in the 1990s.

Source: OECD


Figure 2.4. The standard deviation of labour productivity across countries¹



¹ Calculated using cyclically-adjusted series of output and employment in the business sector for 21 OECD countries and output and hours worked for 18 OECD countries based on data availability (Hodrick-Prescott filter, lambda=100, data extended to 2006 using OECD medium-term projections to mitigate the end-point problem inherent with this filter).

Source: OECD


Figure 2.5. Change in productivity levels relative to the United States¹



¹ Based on cyclically-adjusted series of business sector output and employment (Hodrick-Prescott filter, lambda=100, data extended to 2006 using OECD medium-term projections to mitigate the end-point problem inherent with this filter). The productivity gap is the (log) difference between business sector labour productivity per employee in each country and the United States. Countries are ordered according to the change in the productivity gap in the most recent period.

Source: OECD

Figure 2.6. Contributions to aggregate labour productivity growth¹




¹ Annual average contributions to the growth of total value added per person employed, in percentage points. The residual reflects adding up differences in aggregating from sectoral to the aggregate economy level. Countries are ordered according to labour productivity growth in the most recent period.

Source : Pilat, Lee, van Ark (2002) (updated)


Figure 2.7. Product market regulation and labour productivity acceleration

The scale of the indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive




Source: OECD and OECD International regulation database

Figure 3.1. The effect of regulation on the diffusion of a positive supply shock¹




1. The increase in the level of aggregate and sectoral productivity 5 years after a positive supply shock to the world technological frontier of an equal magnitude in each sector. The data are expressed as a percentage of the response that would occur in a country with regulation that is least restrictive of competition.

Figure 5.2. Standard deviation of labour productivity across countries following a global supply shock:
ICT and non-ICT intensive sectors¹




1 The standard deviation of the level of labour productivity across countries following a positive supply shock in 2003.

Figure 3.3. Increase in average annual business sector productivity growth following a move to sectoral regulation that are least restrictive of competition in 2003¹




1. Data are the average increase in annual business-sector productivity following an easing in regulation to the least restrictive of competition in OECD countries in each sector. Productivity the 'technological leader' in each sector is assumed to grow at 1.6%. The business-sector results are calculated as weighted averages of the sectoral productivity increases using value added weights.

Figure 3.4. Increase in average annual productivity growth 10 years after a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition: ICT-intensive and non-ICT intensive sectors ¹




1. Data are the average increase in annual business-sector productivity following an easing in regulation to the least restrictive of competition in OECD countries in each sector. Productivity in the productivity leader in each sector is assumed to grow at 1.6%. The results are calculated as weighted averages of the sectoral productivity increases using value added weights.

Figure 3.5. Increase in the level of productivity following a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition 20 years after reform




1. Increase in level of business-sector productivity following a move to regulations that are least restrictive of competition. Productivity growth in the productivity leader in each sector is assumed to grow at 1.6%. The aggregates are weighted averages of the sectoral productivity increases using value added weights.

Figure 3.6. Increase in productivity 20 years after reform: alternative leader growth assumptions



1 Increase in level of business-sector productivity following an easing in regulation to the least restrictive in the OECD in each sector. Results are based on growth in the technological leader in each sector of 1.6% and 2.2%. The aggregates are weighted averages of the sectoral productivity increases using value add weights.

Figure 4.1. **The diffusion of information communication technology¹**
 (share of ICT investment in total non-residential fixed capital formation)




1 Countries ordered according to ICT share in the most recent period.

Source: OECD, Database on capital services



Figure 4.2. **Product market regulation and the diffusion of information communication technology**¹

The scale of the indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive



¹ The indicator of regulation in ICT-using sectors is the simple average of the 'regulation impact' indicators for the individual industries included in these sectors. The construction of the regulation impact indicators is described in Box 2 and Annex 2


Figure 4.3. Contributions to the deviation of the share of ICT in total investment from the OECD average, 1985-2003¹




Average contributions in the OECD area

¹ These contributions have been calculated using the results of the aggregate ICT regression reported in column 4 of Table 4.1a. Numbers in parenthesis report actual shares once the contribution of other factors (including country fixed effects) has been accounted for. Countries are ordered according to the sum of the different contributions.

Figure 4.4. Contributions to explaining the deviation of ICT investment from the OECD average, 2003¹



- Regulation
- Human capital
- Business service shares
- Other factors





Average contributions in the OECD area

1 These contributions have been calculated using the results of the aggregate ICT regression reported in column 4 of Table 4.1a. Numbers in parenthesis report actual shares once the contribution of other factors (including country fixed effects) has been accounted for. Countries are ordered according to the sum of the different contributions.

2. The results for Portugal and Sweden are derived using data for 1999 due to a lack of more recent data.


Figure 4.5. Increase in ICT investment share following a move to economy-wide product market regulation that is least restrictive of competition¹



1 These results have been calculated using the aggregate ICT regression reported in column 4 of Table 4.1a. The United Kingdom is estimated to have the lowest overall level of anti-competitive regulation in 2003 according to the aggregate indicators of regulation in seven non-manufacturing industries used in this simulation.

2 Estimated percentage point increase in countries for which data on ICT investment are not available. These estimates are based on the assumption that the average coefficients estimated for the countries in Panel A are representative of the reaction of the ICT investment share in countries outside the estimation sample.


Figure 4.6. Increase in firm entry rates following a move to sectoral regulations that are least restrictive of competition¹



1 Derived using the regression results reported in Table 4.3a (Column 2), the figure shows the effect of a loosening in regulation to the level of the least restrictive country in all sectors. The numbers in this graph are the weighted averages of the sectoral increases in firm entry over the sectors for which data exist in each country. Because of limitations in the coverage of the underlying data these results should be treated as indicative.

2 Estimated percentage point increase in countries for which data on firm entry rates are not available. These estimates are based on the assumption that the average coefficients estimated for the countries in Panel A are representative of the reaction of firm entry in countries outside the estimation sample.


Figure 4.7. **Employment share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing sectors**¹



¹ Weighted average for manufacturing based on the employment shares in the OECD STAN sectoral database. Due to missing data at the sectoral level cross-country comparisons should be interpreted with caution. See Annex 2 and Criscuolo (2005) for a description of this data.


Source: OECD

Figure 4.8. **Product market regulation and the employment share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing, 1995-2003**




1 Simple average of the regulation impact indicators for manufacturing sectors
Source: OECD

Figure 4.9. Contributions to the deviation of the employment share of foreign affiliates from the OECD average, 1995-2003¹



- Regulation impact
- FDI restrictions
- Other factors




Average contributions in the OECD area


1 These contributions have been calculated using the results of the foreign affiliate regression reported in column 5 of Table 4.4. Numbers in parenthesis report actual shares once the contribution of other factors (including country fixed effects) has been accounted for. Countries are ordered according to the sum of the different contributions.

Figure 4.10. Increase in the employment share of foreign affiliates following a move to sectoral regulations and FDI restrictions that are least restrictive of competition¹

Panel A: Countries for which data on employment shares are available



Panel B: Countries for which data on employment shares are missing²



1 Derived using the regression results reported in column 5 of Table 4.4, the figure shows the effect of a loosening in regulation and FDI restrictions to the level of the least restrictive country in all sectors. The numbers in this graph are the weighted averages of the sectoral increases in the employment share of foreign affiliates over the sectors for which data exist in each country. Because of limitations in the coverage of the underlying data these results should be treated as indicative.

2 Estimated percentage point increase in countries for which data on foreign affiliates are not available. These estimates are based on the assumption that the average coefficients estimated for the countries in Panel A are representative of the reaction of foreign affiliates in countries outside the estimation sample.

Table 3.1. Results of productivity growth regressions:

Panel A: Aggregate business sector¹

Dependent Variable: Growth in labour productivity per employee

Constant	-0.191*** [0.058]	-0.326*** [0.087]
Change in productivity in the technology leader	0.249*** [0.075]	-0.126 [0.418]
Gap in productivity levels (lagged 1 year) ²	-0.295*** [0.052]	-0.399*** [0.077]
Product market regulation ³	0.002 [0.004]	0.005 [0.004]
Effect of regulation on catch up (interaction of regulation and productivity gap) (lagged 1 year)	0.017** [0.009]	0.026** [0.011]
Output Gap ⁴	0.092** [0.036]	0.097* [0.051]
Human capital ⁴	0.012** [0.005]	0.023*** [0.009]
ICT investment (as a share of total non-residential investment) ⁴		0.131* [0.069]
Country fixed effects (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes
Country-Industry fixed effects (jointly significant: F)		
Country time trends (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes
Industry time trends (jointly significant: F)		
Time dummies (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes
Observations	518	288
R-squared	0.27	0.429

Note: Robust SE in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. The aggregate business sector model is estimated for 21 OECD countries over the period 1978 to 2003.

2. Measured as the difference in the (log) level of productivity in each country/sector relative to the productivity leader. The productivity leader is allowed to change over time and across sectors.

3. Regulation is measured as the average of the indicators of regulation in seven non-manufacturing industries.

4. Data definitions are given in the data annex.

Table 3.1. Results of productivity growth regressions:

Panel B: Sectoral¹

Dependent Variable: Growth in labour productivity per employee

Constant	-0.035** [0.016]	-0.066 [0.046]	-0.405*** [0.110]	-0.019 [0.025]
Change in productivity in the technology leader	0.091*** [0.012]	0.104*** [0.014]	0.109*** [0.017]	0.106*** [0.015]
Gap in productivity levels (lagged 1 year) ²	-0.097*** [0.007]	-0.126*** [0.011]	-0.096*** [0.010]	-0.093*** [0.008]
Product market regulation ³	0.014 [0.020]	-0.016 [0.028]	0.012 [0.026]	
Product market regulation ICT-intensive sectors ³				-0.076** [0.038]
Product market regulation non-ICT-intensive sectors ³				0.004 [0.031]
Effect of regulation on catch up (interaction of regulation and productivity gap) (lagged 1 year)	0.061*** [0.017]	0.097*** [0.030]	0.052** [0.024]	0.049** [0.022]
Human capital ⁴		0.034 [0.034]		
Change in capital per worker ⁴			0.029*** [0.008]	
Country-Industry fixed effects (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry time trends (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time dummies (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	6404	3742	4525	6439
R-squared	0.301	0.395	0.208	0.187

Note: Robust SE in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. The sectoral model is estimated for 20 OECD countries over the period 1981 to 2003. It is estimated for 21 ISIC rev. 3 sectors.

2. Measured as the difference in the (log) level of productivity in each country/sector relative to the productivity leader. The productivity leader is allowed to change over time and across sectors.

3. Regulation is measured using the regulation impact indicators described in Conway et al (2006).

4. Data definitions are given in the data annex.

Table 4.1. Share of investment in information and communication technology and regulation

A: Baseline aggregate regressions: 18 Countries, 1985 - 2003

Dependent variable: ICT share in total investment

	OLS	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects
Constant	-0.072 (0.045)	0.08 (0.068)	0.076 (0.062)	-0.168 (0.119)	-0.13 (0.119)
Human capital	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.021** (-0.01)	0.018* (0.010)
Business services share	0.602*** (-0.076)	0.384*** (-0.11)	0.357*** (-0.097)	0.45*** (-0.104)	0.439*** (-0.102)
Regulation¹	-0.012*** (-0.003)	-0.021*** (-0.003)	-0.021*** (-0.003)	-0.021*** (-0.003)	
Regulation net of public ownership¹					-0.015*** (-0.003)
Public ownership¹					-0.006 (0.004)
Country fixed effects (jointly significant: F)	no	yes	no	yes	yes
Country time trends (jointly significant: F)	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Test Ho: Homoskedasticity (chi2)	1.97				
Prob > chi2	0.160				
Breusch Pagan LM (chi 2)		1001.49			
Prob > chi2		0.000			
Hausman Test Fixed vs. Random Effects (chi2)		0.40			
Prob > chi2		0.940			
Observations	289	289	289	289	289
R-squared	87%	56% (within)	56% (within)	84% (within)	85% (within)

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. Summary time-series indicator of anticompetitive regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors including or isolating the public ownership component.

Table 4.1 (cont.)

B. Random effects regressions including time-invariant Indicators of regulation in additional service sectors
Aggregate Regressions: 18 Countries, 1985 - 2003

Dependent variable: ICT share in total investment

Constant	-0.081*	-0.009	-0.09*	-0.036	-0.116***
	-0.045	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Human capital	0.000	-0.003**	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Business service share	0.664***	0.566***	0.635***	0.593***	0.784***
	(0.084)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.061)
Regulation (time-varying)¹	-0.012***	-0.006**	-0.009***	-0.009***	
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
Banking regulation (2003)²	-0.021*				
	(0.013)				
Retail regulation (1998)²		-0.017***			
		(0.002)			
Professional services regulation (1998)²			0.001		
			(0.003)		
Administrative burdens (1998)³				-0.015***	
				(0.005)	
Economy-wide regulation (1998)³					-0.035***
					(0.008)
Country time trends (jointly significant: F)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	289	272	256	289	289
R-squared	67% (within)	72% (within)	66% (within)	68% (within)	67% (within)

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. Summary time-series indicator of anticompetitive regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors including or isolating the public ownership component.

2. Regulation data for individual service sectors that are available for only one or two periods (see OECD 2005a, 2005b).

The earliest available observation has been used as a regressor.

3. Regulation data in broad areas that are available for only one or two periods (See Conway *et al.*, 2005). This indicator incorporates regulation in network sectors, retail, professional services and administrative burdens.

Table 4.2. Share of investment in information and communication technology and regulation: sectoral regressions¹

A. Baseline sectoral regressions

Dependent variable: Share of ICT in total investment

	OLS	Robust	Random effects	Fixed effects	Fixed effects	Robust fixed effects	Robust fixed effects	Robust fixed effects
Constant	0.16*** (0.008)	0.16*** (0.007)	0.183*** (0.009)	0.15*** (0.009)	0.115*** (0.008)	0.084*** (0.009)	0.079 (0.008)***	0.073*** (0.007)
Regulation impact²	-0.141*** (0.011)	-0.141*** (0.010)	-0.182*** (0.011)	-0.122*** (0.012)	-0.059*** (0.011)	-0.068*** (0.012)	-0.059*** (0.011)	
Regulation impact net of public ownership²								-0.124*** (0.011)
Public ownership²								0.1*** (0.014)
Industry trends (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies (jointly significant: F)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country trends (jointly significant: F)	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Ho: Homoskedasticity (Chi2)	385.62				233.17			
(Prob > Chi2)	0.000				(0.000)			
Breusch Pagan LM (Chi2)				7197.48				
(Prob > Chi2)				(0.000)				
Hausman (Chi2)			286.91					
(Prob > Chi2)			(0.000)					
Observations	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954
R-squared	73%	73%	68% (within)	68% (within)	77% (within)	75%	79%	79%

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. Countries: France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States. Period: 1980 - 2001. 19 manufacturing and service sectors, see Annex 2 for details.

2. See Box 2 and Annex 2 for a description of regulation impact indicators.

Note: Human capital was omitted to avoid loss of degrees of freedom and due to insignificance.

Table 4.2 (cont.)

B. Impact of regulation in particular sectors (ICT intensive versus non-intensive, retail sales)

Dependent Variable: Share of ICT in total investment

	Robust fixed effects	Random effects
Constant	0.122*** (0.009)	0.17*** (0.010)
Regulation impact ICT-using²	-0.07*** (0.012)	
Regulation impact ICT-producing²	-0.121 -0.082	
Regulation impact non- ICT²	-0.097*** (0.013)	
Regulation impact net of regulation in retail distribution²		-0.064*** (0.012)
Regulation in retail distribution (1998)³		-0.017*** (0.001)
Industry trends (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes
Country dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	No
Test Ho: Regulation impact differs: ICT using vs. producing vs. non-ICT (F)	2.30	
(Prob > F)	0.100	
Hausman (Chi2)	28.64	
(Prob > Chi2)	(0.8036)	
Observations	1954	1570
R-squared	78% (within)	76% (within)

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. Countries: France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States. Period: 1980 - 2001. 19 manufacturing and service sectors, see Annex 2 for details.

2. See Box 2 and Annex 2 for a description of regulation impact indicators.

3. See Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001).

Table 4.3. Firm entry and regulation

A. Sectoral regressions for manufacturing sectors¹

Dependent variable: (number of new entrants/total number of firms)						
	Fixed effects			Robust fixed effects		
Constant	0.115*** (0.009)	0.115*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.117*** (0.009)	0.114*** (0.009)	0.148*** (0.013)
Output gap	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.001** (0.001)
Regulation impact	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.054*** (0.019)	-0.051*** (0.019)			
Regulation impact net of public ownership				-0.048*** (0.017)		
Public ownership				-0.043 (0.028)		
Regulation impact- ICT using					-0.059* (0.030)	
Regulation impact- non ICT					-0.053*** (0.019)	
Regulation impact- ICT producing					0.087* (0.049)	
Regulation impact net of banking						-0.255*** (0.086)
Banking regulation(net of public ownership)*dependence on external financing ²						-0.013** (0.006)
Country dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country specific trends (jointly significant: F)	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Ho: Homoskedasticity (Chi2)	235.06					
(Prob > Chi2)	0.000					
Test Ho: Regulation impact (no ownership) differs from ownership (F)				0.02		
(Prob > F)				0.883		
Test Ho: Regulation impact differs: ICT using vs. producing vs. non-ICT (F)					4.29	
(Prob > F)					0.014	
Observations	1911	1911	1911	1911	1911	1180
R-squared (within)	72%	72%	72%	72%	73%	61%

Standard errors or robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

1. Countries: United States, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand. Period: 1990 - 2001. Sectors: 32 at 2 or sometimes 1 digit ISIC Rev. 3 level. See Annex 2 for details on data.

2. Note: The regression using the banking regulation indicator (last column) is based on a more limited set of sectors that may be less-finely disaggregated due to lack of data on dependence on external financing for different sectors.

This indicator is produced in conjunction with OECD (2005a).

Table 4.3 (cont.)

B. Sectoral firm regressions for services and manufacturing sectors (telecommunications and electricity excluded)¹

Dependent variable: (number of new entrants/total number of firms)

	Robust Fixed Effects			
Constant	0.121*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.121*** (0.008)	0.120*** (0.008)
Output gap	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
Regulation impact	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.011)		
Regulation impact net of public ownership			-0.038*** (0.011)	
Ownership			-0.024 (0.016)	
Regulation impact- ICT using				-0.044*** (0.014)
Regulation impact- Non ICT				-0.045*** (0.013)
Regulation impact- ICT producing				0.079* (0.048)
Country dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Country specific trends (jointly significant: F)	No	Yes	No	No
Test Ho: Regulation impact-no ownership differs from ownership (F) (Prob >F)			0.48 0.490	
Test Ho: Regulation impact differs: ICT using, producing, non-ICT (F) (Prob >F)				3.48 0.031
Observations	2239	2239	2239	2239
R-squared (within)	73%	72%	73%	73%

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

1. Countries: United States, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand. Period: 1990 - 2001. Sectors: 36 at 2 or sometimes 1 digit ISIC Rev. 3 level.

See Annex 2 for details on data.

Table 4.4. Regulation and employment of foreign affiliates¹

Dependent variable: (Share of employment of foreign affiliates in total sectoral employment)

	Fixed effects		Robust Fixed Effects			
	Constant	0.192 [0.153]	0.192 [0.153]	0.587*** [0.046]	0.444*** [0.041]	0.299*** [0.043]
EU15 dummy	0.068*** [0.005]	0.068*** [0.005]	0.083*** [0.001]	0.071*** [0.006]	0.062*** [0.015]	0.043*** [0.009]
Domestic absorption (C+I+G) at PPP			0.000 [0.000]		0.000 [0.000]	
Sectoral human capital			-0.322*** [0.039]		-0.489*** [0.055]	
Sectoral VA growth					-0.024 [0.061]	
Sectoral R&D intensity: share of R&D in sectoral VA					0.787*** [0.250]	
Regulation impact net of public ownership²	-0.118*** [0.034]	-0.118*** [0.034]	-0.385*** [0.069]	-0.373*** [0.060]	-0.281*** [0.103]	-0.390*** [0.085]
Sectoral FDI restrictions³	-0.223*** [0.032]	-0.223*** [0.039]	-0.270*** [0.050]	-0.268*** [0.047]	-0.575*** [0.075]	-0.510*** [0.074]
Sectoral tariff barriers³			0.024 [0.023]		0.078** [0.032]	
Industry dummies (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry specific trends (jointly significant: F)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ho: Homoskedasticity (Chi2)	321.32					
(Prob > Chi2)	0.000					
Observations	1331	1331	838	838	396	396
R-squared (within)	51.3%	51.3%	63.1%	60.4%	72.4%	64.5%

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1. Countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.

Period: 1997 - 2002. 11 manufacturing and 7 service sectors. See Annex 3 for details on data.

2. See box 2 and Annex 2 for a description of the regulation impact indicators.

3. Golub (2003). See Annex 2 for details.