Applying the current regulatory framework for abuse of superior bargaining position to abusive conduct (gapjil in Korean) by digital platforms presents two key challenges: identifying harmed parties (victims) and incorporating efficiency considerations. Requiring the identification of each harmed party imposes significant procedural burdens in handling platform abuse cases and may be inadequate to remedy actual harm. In addition, given the intermediary nature of platform services, unfair trading practices may yield direct benefits for other user groups besides victims. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the relevant systems to reduce the burden of identifying victims and to examine possibilities for efficiency gains. - Concern over platform abuse runs high, yet regulatory frameworks premised on the superior bargaining position of traditional firms fail to capture the inherent nature of platform businesses, which generate both economic harm and efficiency gains. - Discussions on platform regulation have increasingly focused on ex-ante solutions. However, given the complementarity between new and existing frameworks, strengthening ex-post enforcement against abuse of superior bargaining positions remains crucial to reflect the distinctive characteristics of digital platforms. - In assessing superior bargaining position, key factors are the extent of dependence by the counterparty (Party B) on the superior firm (Party A) and disparities in their scale or capacity. - The superior data capabilities of digital platforms increase the potential for abuse of superior bargaining position. - The rapid pace of market change amplifies the risk of abuse through expanding monopsony power. - Conversely, the smaller scale of platform-specific investment mitigates the risk of abusing bargaining position. - Whereas market-dominant position is absolute, allowing firms to change trading terms regardless of counterparties, bargaining position is relative, varying with counterparties. - Earlier rulings under the Large Retail Business Act imposed a lighter burden in identifying counterparties(Party B) when establishing a superior bargaining position, but the Seoul High Court has recently required individual specification of harm for each victim. - For platforms, the authority to set and revise transactional rules substantially amplifies the potential for abusing their bargaining position through changing trading terms, but their role as general rulesetters limits their ability to exploit counterparties individually. - Mandating the specification of Party B in cases involving abuse of a superior bargaining position by platforms is misaligned with the economic realities of platforms with general rule-setting authority. - The intermediary role of platforms broadens the scope of direct stakeholders in platform transactions, creating the possibility that conduct seemingly exploitative toward certain users may instead yield direct and substantial benefits for users on the opposite side or in related positions. - Because abuse of superior bargaining position by platforms can cause widespread harm across many parties, the burden of identifying harmed parties should be eased when common circumstances among them are sufficiently established. - When harm among users becomes widespread, regulation should consider the impact on the trade practice to ensure that it reflects real economic conditions. - Given the possibility for directly affected third parties to benefit from abusive practices by platforms, efficiency-enhancing effects should be examined during case review. - Because the authority of platforms to set and revise general rules endows the absolute dominant position, it will be necessary to shift toward regulating abuses of market-dominant positions in the long term.

This report analyzes the superior bargaining position of digital platform companies and their exploitation of this advantage. Two key characteristics underpin this position: (i) their advanced capacity for data collection and utilization compared to traditional firms, and (ii) their role as rule-setters within the marketplaces they have established. Existing literature identifies three primary sources of their bargaining power: (i) information asymmetry, (ii) demand-side monopoly power, and (iii) hold-up arising from relationship-specific investments. Due to their superior data collection and utilization capabilities, platform firms are better positioned than traditional firms to exploit information asymmetry, thereby abusing their bargaining position. Additionally, the dynamic nature of platform markets often magnifies demand-side monopoly power. Despite a small market share, platforms can still exert significant market influence depending on user behavior. However, hold-up concerns over relationship-specific investments are less pronounced because platforms, which typically offer standardized terms of trade, find it challenging to enforce customized contract terms tailored to individual business users. Under customized contracts, the likelihood and severity of exploitation through hold-ups become most acute. Theoretical model analysis reveals that platform firms may have incentives to refrain from using even the information they have acquired to capitalize on their superior bargaining position. Regarding relationship-specific investments, the inability to adopt customized contracts can encourage business users to invest despite the absence of a binding commitment mechanism―in sharp contrast with existing studies on relationship-specific investments and investment delays. In concludion, this analysis highlights several critical issues that must be addressed to improve the short-term effectiveness and long-term consistency of regulatory measures targeting the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platform firms. First, discussions are needed on victim identification and the impact on the trade order. Current legal precedents requiring the identification of specific victims could hinder efforts to regulate the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platforms. For platforms that set rules for a wide range of counterparties, mandating counterparty specification could significantly limit the regulatory scope for addressing the abuse of superior bargaining positions. In the short term, therefore, it is advisable to alleviate the burden of identifying specific counterparties while still requiring evidence of adverse impacts on the trade oreder, consistent with the Geumbo Development precedent. Moreover, given the multi-sidedness of digital platforms, it is important to consider efficiency-enhancing or pro-competitive effects that may arise in adjacent markets or on the opposite side of the platform when examining instances of superior bargaining position abuse. In the long term, it would be preferable to transition toward regulation through competition law enforcement, such as addressing abuses of market-dominant positions. Acts that harm the trade order against unspecified counterparties are inherently subject to competition law. However, the current reliance on market share as a proxy for market dominance should be replaced by direct measure of market power, and legislative reforms, such as amendments to presumptive provisions, may also be necessary. Finally, to deter and promptly detect abuses of superior bargaining positions by platforms, it is essential to establish a dedicated, permanent oversight bodyendowed with the authority to access data or algorithms as needed.

Digital platforms have boosted consumer welfare and driven innovation and competition by integrating diverse technological advancements. These online platforms facilitate easier business transactions, instant information and content sharing, and the introduction of new products and services. However, as economic agents increasingly depend on them, concerns are growing about the excessive concentration of economic power in a limited number of platforms. As a result, in the past few years, competition policy related to digital platforms has gained more attention, prompting vigorous discussions for improvement. Globally, competition authorities have conducted numerous investigations, and there have been several lawsuits regarding the abuse of market power by digital platforms, along with active merger reviews. In addition, major jurisdictions, including Germany, the EU, and the US, have taken legislative actions to bolster regulations over their market dominance outside the purview of current competition or antitrust law. This policy shift stems from recognizing the limitations of existing competition policies, as enforcing such laws against the anti-competitive behaviors of digital platforms becomes increasingly challenging, and there is criticism about the asynchronicity in ex-post regulatory approaches. Against this backdrop, this report puts forth directions for competition policy reform to effectively address anti-competitive behavior by digital platform firms. The focus is on the abuse of market power and mergers that contributed to acquiring and strengthening their dominance. This report consists of four chapters as follows. The first two chapters deal with the unilateral conduct of digital platforms. Chapter 1 analyzes self-preferencing practices resulting from their dual roles, drawing out appropriate regulatory improvement measures based on their categorization, a review of their economic effects, and empirical analysis results. Chapter 2 examines the issue of platform fees, which has become a significant social concern. While exploring desirable approaches, this chapter assesses whether this issue can be viewed from the perspective of price abuse when？high platform fees are？problematic by reviewing price abuse cases. The next two chapters include studies on platform mergers, focusing on vertical and conglomerate mergers, which are receiving increasing attention as they are actively used to form platform ecosystems and diversify businesses. Chapter 3 analyzes how to consider the potential for self-preferencing by platforms in the merger review process. Self-preferencing is possible only when a platform has a dual role, securing its own or affiliated firms that compete with its business users, and non-horizontal mergers are a primary means of acquiring this dual position. Based on literature reviews and theoretical analysis, this chapter identifies considerations for non-horizontal merger reviews related to self-preferencing. Lastly, Chapter 4 investigates the formation and reinforcement of entry barriers due to platform mergers. Through theoretical analysis and reviews of past cases, this chapter provides recommendations for effectively evaluating entry barrier issues in merger reviews. The collective conclusions can be summarized in two points. Firstly, competition policy reform should fully reflect the unique characteristics of digital platforms. The analysis of their typical unilateral conduct and mergers indicates that their economic effects and pathways are not fundamentally different from those of traditional companies. However, the distinct features of digital platforms can lead to new or multiple forms of anti-competitive behavior, make certain actions more pronounced or severe, and heighten the complexity and technical challenges in analyzing and judging their anti-competitive effects. Secondly, caution is needed when introducing or strengthening antitrust regulations that extend beyond existing legal frameworks. This report emphasizes the importance of better market monitoring and industry-led discussions on active regulatory intervention on platform fees. For self-preferencing and platform mergers, it highlights the value of case-by-case reviews with assessment criteria for effectiveness. Without sufficient consideration for the dynamism of the digital market, where rapid technological change and innovation lead to emerging business models and blurred market boundaries, regulations may？end up hindering innovation incentives, ultimately hurting competition in the long run. Digital platform competition policy should achieve a delicate balance between reducing the harms of monopolies and protecting the incentives for innovation and healthy competition. At present, a flexible response approach to competition law is deemed necessary, tailored to the specific context of each case, while enhancing enforcement through improved timeliness and effectiveness.

[Call for Papers] Navigating Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Global Rules, Industrial Policy, and the New Architecture of Cross-border Trade and Finance The KDI Journal of Economic Policy is now inviting submissions for a conference on “Navigating Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Global Rules, Industrial Policy, and the New Architecture of Cross-border Trade and Finance” scheduled to take place in Seoul, Korea, on June 17, 2026. Papers that are accepted and presented at the conference are automatically submitted to the KDI Journal of Economic Policy (http://www.kdijep.org/). The conference aims to bring together research that investigates the consequences of rising geoeconomic fragmentation and explores effective policy responses at both national and corporate levels. We welcome papers in international trade, finance, and macroeconomics. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to: -  Recent trends in trade and cross-border financial flows amid the heightened geoeconomic fragmentation risk -  Tariffs, subsidies, capital flow management measures, and industrial policies as drivers or tools of global imbalances  -   Efficiency-resilience trade-offs in managing supply chain reconfiguration  -   Multinational corporations’ sourcing, sales, and financing strategies  -   Global investors’ portfolio reallocations -   Digital sovereignty, digital trade barriers, and digital platform regulation -   The impacts of policy uncertainty on trade, investment, and firm performance  -   Bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation Preference will be given to research with implications for the Asian economy. The KDI will cover the following for each presenter: (i) roundtrip economy airfare; (ii) two nights of hotel accommodation; (iii) an honorarium of KRW 500,000 (approximately USD 360), and an additional honorarium upon paper acceptance for publication in the KDI Journal of Economic Policy. Please submit a 2 to 5-page proposal outlining your research and including some preliminary empirical or theoretical results. If you have a preliminary version of your paper available, you may include it with your submission. Send your proposals by December 31, 2025, to guest editor JaeBin Ahn at jaebin.ahn@snu.ac.krwith “KDI JEP conference submission” in the subject line. Authors will be informed by January 15, 2026, if their paper is selected. Please note that only selected authors will be contacted. Preliminary drafts of accepted papers should be completed one month before the conference, as discussants will be assigned to all presentations at the conference.

From September 5 to 6, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF), in conjunction with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Korea Development Institute (KDI), held the 8th Global Fiscal Forum under the title “Towards Fiscal Innovation in the Platform Era” at Millenium Seoul Hilton.   Under the recognition that the paradigm of policy building and resource allocation must be transformed in line with the transition towards the platform era, this forum focuses on the followings;   ⅰ) policy operation system based on openness and convergence, ⅱ) fiscal investment and restructuring to uphold economic and industrial innovation, and ⅲ) proactive responses to evolving employment structure.   Session 1 discussed on “Open Innovation Networks to Optimize Resource Allocation.”   Presenters from the UK and Sweden explained their experience with policy lab* through which a number of policy consumers and field experts from various sectors can participate in the process of policy building.   * Policy lab is an institution or organization designed to encourage policy consumers and field experts from various sectors including industry and academia to actively involve in or lead the process for policy planning and building beyond their conventional role as an advisor and information provider.   Presenters from Korea explained policy cases showing Korean government’s efforts to adopt the principles of openness, participation and convergence to the budgeting process in the form of participatory and agenda-specific budgeting.   Session 2 discussed on “Fiscal Innovation for Efficiency and Effectiveness” in response to social changes and economic innovations. Presenters from international organizations including the OECD introduced their innovative fiscal investment cases for economic and industrial reform as well as diverse efforts to remove inefficient investment.   Discussants from Korea explained that the Korean government’s budget plan for 2020 contains a huge increase in data, network and artificial intelligence, shortened to ‘DNA,’ three key infrastructures needed to stimulate the platform business.   Session 3 discussed on “Future of Work and the Role of Fiscal Policy” expected in the platform era.   Presenters from international organizations including the OECD stressed that investment in human capital can prevent people from falling behind in the fast-changing society.   Presenter and discussants from Korea explained that the Korean government has made tireless efforts to foster innovative human resources prepared for the platform era as well as to concentrate on fiscal investment to strengthen the vocational ability of those in vulnerable employment.   The sum-up session suggested a model for governmental role and fiscal policy that could lead the platform era.   Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Discussions on Fiscal Innovation to Keep Pace with the Transition towards the Digital Platform Era,” press release, Sep. 5, 2019, p.15 (in Korean). http://www.moef.go.kr/nw/nes/detailNesDtaView.do?searchBbsId1=MOSFBBS_000000000028&searchNttId1=MOSF_000000000029769&menuNo=4010100