


G20 Global Financial Stability Conference 2023



Meeting the global climate challenge: The role of financial incentives

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
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Climate policy landscape: a tale of gaps and opportunities

- Gaps
 - Ambition gap
 - Finance gap
 - Clean energy cost gap
 - R&D support gap
 - Fossil energy pricing gap
- Opportunities
 - for mitigation and adaptation to enhance growth
 - for better-aligned pricing of emissions and energy to enhance public finance and crowd in private finance

Growing macroeconomic challenges of physical climate change

Increasing frequency and cost of extreme weather events




Source: World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

- Investment risks
- Damage to physical capital
- Trade and supply chain disruptions
- Lost hours worked, output
- Diversion of resources to reconstruction and replacement
- Public debt pressures of disaster response
- Migration

Ambition gap

To keep larger impacts of climate change in check, we need to decarbonize more rapidly and more completely

Comparison of scenarios assessed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report with projected total and per capita global emissions according to nationally determined contributions



Source: Nationally Determined Contributions Synthesis Report by the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Finance gap

“... reaching climate objectives will require climate investment to increase at least seven times by the end of this decade...”

LANDSCAPE OF CLIMATE FINANCE IN 2019/2020

Global climate finance flows along their life cycle in 2019 and 2020. Values are average of two years' data, in USD billions.

653 BN USD ANNUAL AVERAGE

Government funds to other public sources are not estimated



SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARIES

Which type of organizations are sources or intermediaries of capital for climate finance?

PUBLIC **PRIVATE**

INSTRUMENTS


What mix of financial instruments are used?

USES


What types of activities are financed?

SECTORS


What is the finance used for?



Investment/spending needs for climate action per year by 2030




2009 climate finance commitment: mobilize \$100 billion per year for developing countries by 2020



- Not met, and \$100bn is still far short of what is needed


Additional investment needs for resilient and low-carbon development



Low-carbon energy cost gap

Figure S.1 Change in competitiveness of solar and wind by country based on global weighted average LCOE, 2010-2022

Good news:
Renewable energy has become cost-competitive, but work still needed on storage, integration, and system balancing




Note: The global weighted average LCOE data by technology and the fossil fuel LCOE data used to derive this chart is presented in detail in Chapter 1; RE = renewable energy.

Source: IRENA (2023). The analysis excludes government incentives and system balancing costs.

R&D gap


Figure 5. Global low-carbon patenting efforts have declined recently



Note: Data refer to families of patent applications filed in the United States that are identified using the “Y02” classification code developed by the International Patent Classification (IPC). The Y02 classification code includes climate change mitigation technologies such as energy efficiency, production or processing of goods (Y02P), in transport, and energy generation related to greenhouse gas emissions (Y02C).

Source: OECD, STI Micro-data Lab: Intellectual Property

Figure 12. Low-carbon public RD&D expenditures in GDP across IEA countries, 1974-2020



Not to mention a tech-transfer gap

Note: The “Others” category includes Carbon capture and storage, Hydrogen and fuel cells, Other power and storage technologies, and Other cross-cutting technologies and research. See <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/energy-technology-rd-and-d-budget-database-2>

Source: IEA Energy Technology RD&D Budgets database, December 2022.


Pricing gap

Efficient pricing includes not only supply costs, but also external costs:

- climate change
- air pollution
- (for transport fuels) traffic congestion.

User prices are supply costs net of tax/subsidy interventions


Figure ES1. Gaps between efficient prices and user prices for fossil fuels by country, 2020



Source. IMF staff.

[Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies](#)


State and Trends of Carbon Pricing (2023): Tracking Direct Carbon Pricing




73 initiatives (39 national),
covering 23% of global emissions

Dispersion in price levels and coverage

FIGURE 3
PRICES AND COVERAGE ACROSS ETSs AND CARBON TAXES






- Data for **direct** carbon prices from World Bank's Carbon Pricing Dashboard
 - nominal rates and coverage for each ETS and carbon tax.


- Data for **indirect** carbon pricing compiled using a price-gap approach
 - $net\ fuel\ tax = retail\ price - supply\ cost - VAT\ payments - upstream\ carbon\ price$
- Annual average retail prices mostly from IMF and World Bank
- Supply costs
 - Petroleum products from IEA
 - Natural gas based on hub, import or net-back export prices
 - Coal inferred using method from Parry et al., (2021)
- VAT deviations (the difference between the overall VAT rate and the VAT rate applying to a specific fuel) based on IMF database

- Covers sectors, fuels, and aggregates for 142 countries over the period 1991 to 2021


GLOBAL TRENDS IN TOTAL CARBON PRICING (TCP)

- Direct carbon pricing: carbon tax, ETS
- Indirect carbon pricing: fuel taxes net of subsidies






A. Fuels



- diesel
- coal
- ▲ kerosene
- ◆ gasoline
- ✱ natural gas
- ▼ lpg




B. Sectors



- transport
- power
- ▲ residential
- ◆ services and PA
- ✱ industry

Prices and the competitiveness of coal




LCOE of newly commissioned utility-scale solar PV, onshore and offshore wind

Source: Handley, Slesinski, & Hsu (2021)

Relative costs of greening electricity without carbon pricing

Cost of Policy Scenarios Relative to Emissions Price




Fischer, C. and R.G. Newell. 2008. Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*. 55 (2): 142–162.

Climate policy should be a mix—to address other market failures—but with greater reliance on carbon pricing

Figure 10. Average climate policy stringency across OECD countries, 1990-2020

Developed countries rely heavily on subsidies and regulations; not clear this mix is as affordable or feasible in developing countries



Source: (Kruse et al., 2022^[19]).




World Bank Group

COUNTRY CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT

Macroeconomic impacts of climate policies would be low or positive

GDP impacts of climate action



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DEVELOPMENT
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Potential for low-cost low-carbon policies

- Leveraging financial incentives through broad-based market-based mechanisms is more cost-effective than other approaches
- Removing fossil fuel subsidies and raising carbon prices improves public finance and macroeconomic efficiency
 - Raises revenues
 - Compared to traditional taxes, carbon pricing has less interaction with labor market distortions and informality, leading to potential “double dividend”
 - Reduces need for reliance on costly subsidies to crowd in private finance
- Improved air quality from climate mitigation enhances growth
 - Improved productivity
 - Lower healthcare costs
- Infrastructure investments can make the total effect of carbon pricing progressive

Government commitments to address climate change can attract foreign banks with strong preferences for green assets

[“Global Bank Lending Under Climate Policy”](#)

IMF Economic Review

Strengthening of climate policy

By **host** country

By **other** countries

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| GREEN GLOBAL BANKS | ↑ | — |
| BROWN GLOBAL BANKS | — | ↑ |
| GREEN DOMESTIC BANKS | — | — |
| BROWN DOMESTIC BANKS | — | — |

Heterogeneity across banks

- 1 SD ↑ in climate policy: 5.2% ↑ credit of **green** global banks
- **Brown** global banks do not exit countries implementing climate policies
- No effects on domestic banks

Spillover effects

- **Brown** global banks appear to expand their presence in countries with relatively weaker climate regulation

Opportunities

- Strong role for finance ministries to play in supporting climate-friendly development
- Central banks can play supporting role to facilitate green finance
- Big need to scale up international climate finance to developing countries
- Domestic policies are needed to align market incentives and attract private finance
- Growing trade preferences for low-carbon goods



Summary: levers for transformative climate finance

Figure 4: Eight levers for transformative climate finance

