20세기 말부터 시작된 세계화와 지식정보화로 인하여 세계경제의 발전패턴이 근본적으로 변화하고 있으며 각국에는 경제구조 개편의 압력이 가중되고 있다. 우리 경제도 예외는 아니어서 동북아경제권에 함께 속한 중국의 급속한 산업화로 인해 우리 경제의 양극화를 포함한 산업구조조정이 진행되고 있다.

더욱이 우리 경제는 개발연대 이후 불균형적 성장전략을 지속적으로 추구한 결과 최근의 경제환경 변화에 대한 대응력에서 부문 간 격차가 다른 나라에 비해 더욱 크게 확대되고 있는 실정이다.

우리 경제는 성장의 동력을 요소투입의 증대에서 찾는 개도국형 성장방식을 1980년대 말에 종료하고 1990년대에 들어서는 대기업 등 일부 부문이 혁신주도형 경제로 진입하기 시작한 반면 중소기업 등 낙후부문은 아직 혁신주도형 단계로 진입하지 못하고 중국 등 개도국과 경쟁을 하는 혼재된 양상을 보이고 있다. 이로 인해 양극화가 다른 나라보다 더욱 심하게 나타나고 있다.

중국과의 교역 확대, 특히 수입 확대가 우리의 산업구조에 미친 영향을 실증분석한 결과 중국제품의 수입증가는 중소기업의 신규창업을 둔화시키고 기존 중소사업체의 퇴출을 증가시킨 것으로 나타났다. 또한 업종전환시 많은 중소기업들이 중국 기업의 위협이 적은 곳으로 진출하였고 노동집약적인 중국 업체들과의 경쟁에 대응하여 자본집약도를 증가시키지 못한 것으로 나타났다.

최근의 경제환경 변화가 제조업 전반의 구조변화에 미친 영향을 분석해 보면 중소기업의 영세화가 지난 10년간 빠르게 진행되었음을 알 수 있다. 영세 사업체의 고용비중은 1980년대 후반까지 10% 내외에 불과하였으나 그 후 지속적으로 증가하여 2003년에는 27.3%로 증가하였다. 생산액 및 부가가치 등에서도 유사한 결과가 도출되었다.

그에 비해 대기업과 중소기업 간 자본집약도는 시간이 흐를수록 격차가 확대된 것으로 나타났다. 1980~2003년간 대기업의 실질 자본스톡 증가율은 연평균 10.4%였으나 중기업 7.9%, 소기업 7.3%, 영세기업 5.4%로 기업규모가 작을수록 자본스톡의 증가가 낮아 자본집약도의 격차가 확대되었음을 보여주고 있다. 이로 인해 기업규모 간 노동생산성 격차가 확대되었다. 같은 기간에 대기업의 노동생산성 증가율은 연평균 11.4%였으나 중기업 9.3%, 소기업 7.7%, 영세기업 6.1%로 나타났다.

이를 시계열적으로 나누어 분석해 보면 1980년대까지는 중소기업의 노동생산성 증가율이 대기업보다 높았으나 1990년대부터는 대기업의 증가율이 높아졌고 경제위기 이후에도 이러한 추세는 계속되고 있다. 분석지표를 바꾸어 총요소생산성 기준으로 측정해 보아도 동일한 결과가 도출되었다.

마이너스 부가가치율, 즉 생산액이 중간투입액에 미치지 못하는 비율로 성과를 비교해 보아도 대기업에서는 생산액의 5~7%임에 비해 중소기업은 12~15%를 보여 중소기업의 성과가 더 낮음을 보여주고 있다.

이처럼 혁신주도형 경제로 변화해 가는 경제환경을 맞아 대부분의 중소기업들은 부진한 적응력을 보이고 있지만 혁신기업 육성을 위한 정책적 시사점을 찾기 위하여 고성장을 지속하는 중소기업들을 추출하여 그들에 내재된 특성을 분석하여 보았다. 고용을 기준으로 3년 연평균 성장률이 상위 10% 이내에 드는 고성장 중소기업들은 기술수준이 높은 산업에서 비중이 높게 나타나기는 하였지만 산업 전반에 걸쳐 있는 것으로 나타났다. 1990~2003년의 분석기간 동안 연속적으로 고성장업체를 유지한 경우는 극히 드물었다.

고성장 중소기업은 인적자원이 고도화되어 있고 연구개발 및 수출이 활성화된 특성을 보였다. 업체별 회귀분석결과에 의하면 비생산직 종업원, 산업의 연구개발, 자본장비율, 산업의 해외투자, 산업의 수출증가율 등이 고성장을 결정하는 주요 요인으로 파악되었다.

개별 기업의 차원에서는 기술직의 구성비 및 자본장비율 등이 주요 요인이 되지만 그 중소기업이 속하는 산업의 연구개발, 수출, 해외생산 등이 고성장을 결정하는 주요 요인으로 작용하는 것은 중소기업의 기업 간 분업화, 즉 클러스터의 중요성을 다시 한번 보여준 것이라고 할 수 있다.

중소기업의 연구개발 행태를 보다 집중적으로 분석해 보면, 우선 경제위기 직후부터 2001년에 이르는 기간 동안 벤처붐에 힘입어 중소기업의 연구개발투자가 급증하였다가 이후에 정체된 모습을 보였다.

중소기업의 R&D 투자를 분석해 보면 기업규모가 작을수록 투자자금에 대한 탄력성이 높게 반응한 것으로 나타나 중소기업의 기술개발을 저해하는 주요 요인이 자금부족에 있는 것으로 나타났다.

새로워진 환경에 적응하지 못하는 중소기업들의 정리가 신속히 이루어지고 고성장 중소기업들로 자원유입이 확대되는 여건이 조성되어야 하겠지만 중소기업들이 직면하고 있는 실제 현실은 그렇지 못한 것으로 나타나고 있다. 단적인 예를 부실 중소기업에 대한 워크아웃 운용에서 찾을 수 있다.

현재 부실징후가 보이는 중소기업에 대해서 채권금융기관 중심으로 공동워크아웃보다는 자체워크아웃이 주류를 이루고 있다. 이는 부실징후 중소기업에 대한 채권자가 신용보증을 포함하여 다수가 될 수 있음에도 주 채권은행 주도라서 구조조정보다는 채권회수의 수단으로 운용될 수 있음을 의미한다.

또한, 공동워크아웃의 실제 운용도 이미 부실이 심화되어 자본이 완전 잠식되고 부채가 자산을 상회하게 되어야 비로소 실시되는 사례들이 대부분이다. 그리하여 이미 생산주체로서 기업조직이 손상된 후에 워크아웃에 착수하므로 만기연장 또는 이자감면 등과 같은 소극적 채무조정에 그치고 기업조직에 축적된 혁신역량을 회생시킬 수 있는 신규여신 공급이나 출자전환 등 적극적 구조조정은 기대하기 어렵게 되어 있다.

따라서 중소기업의 구조조정과정에 신용보증기금의 적극적 참여가 필요하고 공동워크아웃중인 기업의 사업전환에 신규자금이 필요한 경우 중소기업진흥공단이나 신용보증기금을 통한 정책자금을 지원하여 줌으로써 은행의 신규여신 손실 위험을 보전하여 주고 은행의 요주의 기업에 대한 조기 워크아웃을 유도할 수 있도록 기업신용위험의 상시평가기준을 강화하고 요주의 기업의 부도율을 은행 임직원에 대한 감독 및 인사상 제재와 연동시킬 필요가 있다.

중소기업의 원활한 구조조정을 위한 또 다른 정책수단으로서 인력훈련제도의 효율적 작동이 중요하다. 중소기업은 근로자의 잦은 직장이동으로 인해 인적자원에 대한 투자유인이 적고, 규모의 불경제 등으로 인해 능력개발에 대한 투자가 적다. 현재 고용보험의 능력개발사업은 선훈련-후지원 방식이고, 동시에 기업주를 지원하는 방식이어서 중소기업 근로자의 능력개발에 대한 시장실패를 극복하는 데 한계가 있다.

따라서 중소기업 친화적인 능력개발체계를 개발하여 중소기업 종사 근로자들의 능력개발역량을 향상시켜, 원활한 구조조정이 이루어질 수 있도록 뒷받침해야 할 것이다. 예를 들어, 대기업과 협력생산관계에 있는 중소기업들에 대해서는 대기업과의 훈련컨소시엄을 구축하여 대기업에게 중소기업 근로자의 능력개발에 대한 책무성을 부여하는 중소기업직업훈련컨소시엄사업의 확산이 필요하다. 또한 중소기업 근로자의 학습을 우대 지원하거나, 이동훈련 및 e-learning 등 중소기업 특성에 부합되는 훈련방식의 개발 역시 중소기업 친화적인 능력개발 노력으로 볼 수 있다.

우리 사회에서 혁신형 중소기업의 대표적 사례로 간주되는 벤처기업의 성장요인에 관해 분석해 보면, 기업 대표자의 이전 근무지가 대학이거나 고학력 근로자 비중이 높은 기업일수록 성장률이 낮고, 연구개발집약도가 높을수록, 업력이 짧을수록, 정책자금 활용도가 높을수록, 수도권에 입지한 기업일수록 성장률이 높은 것으로 나타났다.

이에 따라, 벤처기업의 성장을 위해서는 연구개발 등에 대한 지원이 효과적일 것인데, 그동안 벤처기업 확인제도의 선별능력에 대한 논란이 있어 왔으므로 새로운 개편방안이 제시된 바 있다. 그러나 새로운 제도에서도 여전히 정부산하기관의 선별비중이 높을 수 있고 국가연구개발 지원대상과 유리되어 지원의 효율성이 낮아질 수 있는 문제점이 있으므로 이에 대한 개선이 필요하다.

혁신형 중소기업의 비중이 높아지기 위해서는 신기술 창업이 활성화되어야 할 것이다. 창업보육센터를 통한 조직적이고 체계적인 지원은 그에 대한 답이 될 수 있다. 실제로 창업보육센터에서 보육서비스를 받았던 업체들은 일반 창업기업에 비해 생존율이 월등히 높으며 입주업체 대표들의 학력수준도 벤처기업에 비해 뒤지지 않는 수준이라서 잠재력이 높다고 평가된다.

그러나 창업보육센터는 자체 재원이 없어 장래성이 높은 입주업체들을 선별하여 투자할 수 없음은 물론 창업보육에 관하여 전문성이 높은 운영인력을 채용하기조차 어려운 여건에 있다. 운영인력은 입주업체들에게 외부의 기술 협력진을 연결시켜주고 개발된 제품의 수요처를 알선하여 주는 등 외부와의 관계를 맺어주는 매개기능을 수행하여야 하는 창업보육센터의 핵심 요건이다.

그러므로 정부의 재정적 보조도 물론 필요하지만, 지원의 효율성을 높이기 위해서는 창업보육의 성과에 연동되어 지원의 지속성 및 규모가 결정되는 유인체계를 구축함으로써 성과가 우수한 창업보육센터의 사업 확대를 돕는 한편 부실한 센터의 정리도 함께 유도할 수 있을 것이다.

지역혁신체제 및 혁신클러스터 조성은 중소기업의 혁신능력을 배양하여 새로운 성장동력의 창출과 국가균형발전에 기여하는 유용한 정책도구가 될 수 있다. 선진국에서는 1980년대 이래 혁신능력의 결핍으로 단순하청생산단계에 머물던 중소기업들을 기술력 배양을 통해 환경대응단계로 끌어 올리고 더 나아가 외부환경을 자신들에게 유리하도록 능동적으로 대처하는 능력을 가진 전략경영단계로 육성하는 데 지역혁신정책이 기여한 바가 컸음이 입증된 바 있다.

우리나라에서도 1999년 4대 지역(대구, 부산, 경남, 광주)을 시작으로 다른 9개 지역까지 지역혁신정책이 추진중에 있다. 지역혁신정책을 통해 기술개발 지원을 받은 중소기업들을 대상으로 한 설문조사에 의하면, 조사대상의 60% 정도가 지원을 받은 후 기술수준이 더 높은 연구과제로 이동한 것으로 나타나 지원이 효과적이었음을 보여주고 있다.

그러나 기술적 난이도가 낮고, 제품화 단계의 연구과제에서 상향이동이 많았으며, 기술적 난이도가 높으면서 원천기술의 성격을 갖는 연구과제(중기거점과제 이상)로 이동한 비율은 7%에 불과한 것으로 나타났다.

따라서 앞으로 산업계 인력수요와 인력공급, 특히 석?박사급 연구인력의 양성이 일치되어야 하며, 연구시설 및 설비에 대한 지원은 대체로 충족되었으므로 기업지원서비스 등으로 전환되어야 하고 지역 내 지원기관 간 연계가 강화되어야 할 것이다.

Introduction
The purpose of this study is to seek answers to these important questions: What is the role of SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises) when the Korean economy enters the stage of innovation-driven economy? How can the existing SMEs equip themselves with innovation capability? And what kinds of policies could boost the quality
of current SMEs?

The report consists of three parts. Part I gives the overview of the trend of SMEs’ structural change as the introduction. The results of empirical analysis on the structural
change are reported in Part II. Finally, policy agendas focused on the measures of soft-landing SMEs’ restructuring and promoting their innovation are discussed in Part III.


1. Overview: Restructuring and Promotion of Innovation of SMEs | Joo-Hoon Kim

As the labor-intensive industries lost their competitiveness in the 1990s, serious attention has been paid to the competitiveness of technology-intensive industries. It was mainly in the 1990s that large firms began launching their independent R&D projects in order to catch up with global competition and in turn change their strategy on technology source. In fact, the production share of laborintensive industries such as textiles and footwear has reduced, while that of technology- intensive industries including electronic apparatuses, automobiles and machinery has grown tremendously.

The electronic apparatus and automobile industries on which the Korean economy is mainly dependent are mostly characterized by assembly lines of parts and components. Thus, the competitiveness of large assembling companies heavily depends on small suppliers. Recently, large firms have reduced their in-house production and increased outsourcing from small firms for the sake of maintaining their cost advantage.

Due to an unbalanced access to financial resources in the 1990s, only large firms could install laborsaving production equipment and enter into IT industries. However, small firms found ways to enter into technology-intensive industries by changing their products to high-tech items. Indeed, what has changed is just the types of products, and not their technologies. They failed to employ highly educated human resources and launch R&D activities due to limited resources. Consequently, the productivity gap between large firms and small firms has been widened in the 1990s. Up to the early 1990s, the gap had been stable. The productivity gap of Korean industries is thought to be very severe, compared with other industrialized countries.

Prior to the economic crisis of 1997, there was a vigorous restructuring among industries, that is, a great number of exits from labor-intensive industries have been seen and at the same time a large number of entries were observed in technology industries. However, after the crisis, restructuring took a different shape. Between-industry restructuring was replaced by within-industry restructuring which took place among different firm-size classes. As mentioned earlier, the production share moved out of large firms into small firms that employ low wage rate workers. In other words, the driving force of restructuring became the main tool for maintaining competitiveness
of cost advantage. In fact, the most rapidly increasing number of firms are those with 5 to 10 employees where the wage rate of workers is lowest.


The Penetration of China into Korean Market and Its Impact on Korean SMEs | Yong-Seok Choi.MoonJoong Tcha

China has grown to be one of the most important and influential economies in the world, achieving about 10% of annual economic growth for the last 20 years. As of
2004, China absorbed 19.6% of Korea’s total exports, and supplied 13.2% of Korea’s total imports, which ranked the nation the largest export destination and the second largest import source of Korea.

The surge of China has two-fold implications for Korea: An opportunity and a challenge. This paper investigates how China is a challenge to Korea. More specifically, this
study concentrates on the impact of China’s penetration into Korea to entry and exit rates of Korean SME plants in each industry, and [survival-closing down-conversion] probability of each SME.

Using two sets of data, from 1997 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2003, this study quantitatively analyzes the effect of China’s penetration into the Korean domestic market on
entry and exit rates of plants in each industry. Further the study also analyzes how the probability of closing down plants or converting industries was affected by the China’s penetration. Plant characteristics and industry characteristics are employed together in explaining China’s impact on SMEs’ decision.

Five major results and implications can be drawn from the analysis. First, the penetration of China into the Korean market significantly affected industrial entry and exit rates, and also [survival-death] and [survival-conversion] decisions of each plant. The penetration of China decreased entry rate and increased exit rate. In addition, plants appeared to move into industries with less competition from China when they converted their industries during the periods of analysis.

Second, capital-labor ratio of a plant played a significant role when a plant made a decision whether to survive, close down or convert. In general, a plant with high capital
intensity was more likely to survive.

Third, in addition to plant specific characteristics, some industry-specific characteristics such as the industry’s capital intensity were also found to affect a plant’s decision.
More specifically, a plant in a more capitalintensive industry appears to be more likely to survive.

Fourth, it appears that the Korean economy failed to achieve industrial restructuring by utilizing [survival-conversion] or [survival-closing down] decision influenced by China’s penetration. In general, SMEs failed to increase their capital intensity, and when they converted industries, they could not move into those with higher capital-labor ratio.

Fifth, the export effect was found. In other words, plants in an industry with higher exposure to foreign competition, in general, have higher probability of closing down or
conversion, compared to those in an industry with lower exposure.

Conclusively, it is shown that China’s impact existed. It affected entry and exit rates of plants in industries. It also affected [survival-conversion] and [survival-closing down] decisions of plants. Plant characteristics and industry characteristics are found to be important in a plant’s decision. However, the Korean economy does not seem to have
achieved industrial restructuring. There is no evidence that plants increased capital intensity when they changed industries and their major products. In contrast, it was found that they moved to industries where competition from China was less intense.

This study looked into the effect of China’s penetration into Korea’s domestic market, which has not been analyzed previously, and found some important facts and
implications. Nevertheless, it needs further investigations whether this effect is dominant in Korea and whether it applies to largescaled plants, as well as SMEs as we analyzed in this paper.


3. Empirical Study on the Polarization in the Manufacturing Sector | Dongseok Kim

Manufacturing sector in Korea played a crucial role during the export-driven rapidgrowth era until the 1980s, with increasing portions in terms of value added and employment. Since the 1990s, however, its portion in terms of employment has slowly declined, from 27.8% in the late 1980s down to slightly below 20% in recent years, while the portion in terms of value added has stayed at stable levels, between 25% and 30%. Underlying this phenomenon is the rapid productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, higher than in other sectors. Perworker value added in the manufacturing sector was at the same level as in the service sector until the early 1990s, but exceeded that of the service sector in 1993, and recorded 1.64 times of that in the service sector in 2004.

On the other hand, a steady and rapid polarization is under way in the manufacturing sector. The term ‘polarization’ refers to the widening gaps in characteristics among sectors, variables, economic agents, etc., and has been one of the prominent phenomena in the Korean economy in recent years. A few examples are the recent expansion of the manufacturing sector due to rapid growth of export and the stagnation of the service sector due to weak domestic demand, and the widening gaps between large and small firms.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the polarization in the manufacturing sector, in which the focus is on the widening gaps among firms by various sizes, using the
National Income statistics, input-output tables, and Manufacturing Survey data.

Changes in the size distribution of the manufacturing sector were studied first. According to the Manufacturing Survey data for 1980~2003, the portion of large plants (with 300 or more workers) in terms of the number of plants has steadily decreased from 3.3% in 1980 to mere 0.6% in 2003, and those of mid-size (with 50 to 299 workers) and small (with 20 to 49 workers) have also been steadily decreasing since the late 1980s. The portion of petty plants (with less than 20 workers), on the other hand, stayed at
57~60% until the mid-1980s, but has rapidly increased since the late 1980s, registering 75.9% in 2003, which has caused the rapid decrease in the average number of workers per plant in the manufacturing sector.

Rapid changes in the portions of plants by size can be found not only in terms of number of plants, but also in almost every aspect, for example, labor input, capital accumulation, gross output, value added, and so on.

In this chapter we analyzed the polarization in the manufacturing sector in terms of various characteristics such as factor inputs, gross output, production cost and productivity. For this purpose, we computed and compared the average values of these variables for the plants with various sizes, using the Manufacturing Survey data.

First, the average nominal labor income per worker in large plants increased from 2.0 million won in 1980 to 44.3 million won in 2003, with the average annual growth rate
being 14.4%. The growth rates of mid-size, small and petty plants for the same period were computed as 12.7%, 11.9%, and 11.0%, respectively. In other words, the smaller the plant size, the smaller the growth rate of the labor income, implying the widening gaps in terms of average labor income among plant sizes.

Second, widening gaps among plant sizes are the most prominent in average capital stock. The average real capital stock of large plants increased from 17.4 billion won (in
2000 price) in 1980 to 162.6 billion won in 2003, with the average annual growth rate of 10.2%, while those of mid-size, small and petty plants were computed as 7.9%, 7.3%, and 5.4%, respectively.

It was also found that the larger the plant size, the higher the capital equipment growth rate. The average real capital stock per worker in large plants increased from 17.8 million won in 1980 to 174.7 million won in 2003, with the average annual growth rate of 10.4%, while those of mid-size, small and petty plants were computed as 8.7%, 7.5%, and 5.2%, respectively. It was also found that the gaps among plant sizes started increasing since the mid-1990s.

Third, increasing gaps in capital equipment ratio has resulted in increasing gaps in labor productivity. The average real value added per worker of large plants increased from 11.4 to 136.9 million won during the period 1980~2003, with the average annual growth rate of 11.4%, while those of mid-size, small and petty plants were computed as 9.3% (from 7.0 to 54.0 million won), 7.7% (from 6.2 to 33.7 million won), and 6.1% (from 6.8 to 26.6 million won), respectively with the gaps among plant sizes steadily widening.

Fourth, gaps in capital income ratio (CIR) - ratio of capital income to gross output - among plant sizes are also widening. It was found that the CIR of large plants exceeded those of all other sizes during the entire period, and that the gaps started widening in the early 1990s and even faster since the economic crisis.


4. Empirical Study on the Productivity Gap by Plant Size in Manufacturing Sector | Dongseok Kim

This chapter is a sequel to the previous chapter, and analyzed the widening gaps in productivity among various plant sizes. Labor productivity and total factor productivity
were used for this purpose. Capital income ratio and value-added ratio were also used as indirect measures of profitability. These productivity and profitability measures can be interpreted as the underlying variables of the primary indices discussed in the previous chapter.

In addition to computing these measures by plant sizes, their distributions were also analyzed so that the polarization could be studied more closely. In the previous chapter
and in the first part of this chapter, the variables are computed by regarding the plants in the same size category as one big plant. There must be considerable difference among the plants in the same category, however, and a closer analysis becomes possible by studying their distributions.

Productivity measures used in this chapter are labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). Labor productivity is measured as the output per worker, in which real
gross output and real value added were used as the measures of output. TFP is a measure of productivity where all production factors are considered simultaneously, and is computed by dividing the output measure by the composite input measure, which is the weighted average of the input measures of production factors with their income shares as the weights. We used growth accounting and multilateral index methods in this study.

Higher productivity implies more output with same amount of input, and thus higher profitability. The Manufacturing Survey data do not provide enough information necessary
for computing profitability measures, and we computed capital income ratio and valueadded ratio as indirect measures of profitability.

The following are the major findings of this empirical study using the Manufacturing Survey data for 1980~2003. First, labor productivity of large plants (with 300 or more
workers) recorded lower growth rate than that of smaller plants until the 1980s, but recorded much higher rates since the 1990s and the gap expanded since the economic
crisis in 1998. In addition, it was found that the distribution of labor productivity of large plants, unlike that of smaller plants, started becoming more dispersed in the right tail
with the appearance of many plants with extremely high labor productivity.

Second, it was found that until the 1980s, the smaller size of the plant meant the higher TFP growth rate as in the case of labor productivity, which reversed in the 1990s.
Contribution of TFP growth to the growth of real value added was computed as 50~60% for smaller plants since the 1990s, while that for large plants exceeded 100% since the economic crisis in 1998. This implies that the growth of large plants has depended solely on TFP growth, with decreasing absolute amount of factor input.

Third, TFP growth rate by the multilateral index method was similar to the results by the growth accounting method. It was found, however, that the distribution of TFP levels of large plants started becoming more dispersed in the right tail with the appearance of many plants with extremely high TFP levels, while those of smaller plants only showed a stable change. It was also found that the share of plants with extremely low TFP level is decreasing among large plants, while that is still high among smaller plants.

Fourth, negative CIR implies that the revenue only covers the labor cost and intermediate input, and hence indirectly implies poor profitability. The average CIR of the manufacturing sector was around 10% in 1990, with almost no gaps among plant sizes. The gaps started widening since the 1990s, however, with the average CIR levels of large, mid-size, small and petty plants being 15%, 12%, 9%, and 8%, respectively in 2003. Furthermore, the portion of plants with negative CIR has rapidly decreased in the group of large plants, registering 14.8% in 2003, while that in the group of smaller plants is still at around 30%.

Fifth, value-added ratio (VAR) refers to the ratio of capital and labor income to gross output, and negative VAR implies that the revenue only covers intermediate input cost, and hence implies worse profitability than negative CIR. Studying the distribution of VAR in various plant sizes, the share of plants with negative VAR in the group of large plants was computed as 5~7% in terms of gross output in recent years, while that in the group of smaller plants as 12~15%, implying a large portion of plants with extremely low profitability.


5. An Empirical Analysis on Entry and Growth of SMEs | Sanghoon Ahn

This chapter analyzes entry and growth of Korean SMEs using micro data in the Annual Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey by Korean National Statistical Office
(1994~2003). Main findings from the analysis are summarized as follows.

First, basic indicators related to ‘firm dynamics’ (such as entry, exit, survival, and growth of establishments) were calculated. The entry rates (based on the number of
entrants) usually stayed above 20% most of the time except during the financial crisis. The entry rates peaked at 31.1% in 1999 but then fell below 20% since 2002.

Second, it is found that the ‘mortality rate’ of new entrants is very high, which is consistent with findings from earlier studies in other countries. Tracking entry cohorts each year revealed that survival rates of entrants (2 years after the entry) ranged from 42% to 59%. It means that around 50% of new establishments do not survive the first 2 years after entry. Once overcoming barriers-to-survival, however, surviving entrants usually showed faster growth than mature establishments.

Third, this study identified highest 10% establishments in terms of 3-year average employment growth rates as ‘high-growth SMEs’ and looked into their industrial distribution and their characteristics. High-growth SMEs are observed in high-tech industries more frequently, but they are observed in other industries, as well. High-growth SMEs tend to be more productive, more human-capital intensive, and more active in R&D and exporting.

Fourth, according to the results of regression analyses on individual establishments’ growth rates, factors contributing to establishment growth include: Non-production to
production workers ratio (establishmentlevel), R&D intensity (industry-level), capital- labor ratio (establishment-level), outbound FDI growth rate (industry-level), export growth rate (industry-level), and export intensity (establishment-level and industry-level). It is also found that overall outbound FDI has positive effects on employment growth and productivity growth, while outbound FDI to China tends to have negative effects on both.

Findings from this study offer some policy implications as follows. of human resources at the individual establishment level turns out to be very important for future growth. Second, R&D expenditures at the individual plant level do not show direct positive effects on the plant’s performance, while industry-level R&D expenditures show strong positive effects on the average growth of plants belonging to the industry. This finding underlines the importance of collective efforts in R&D as well as the high risks accompanying innovation at the individual level. Third, capital-labor ratio at the plant-level turns out to be important for growth, confirming that well-functioning financial markets are crucial for healthy growth of promising SMEs.


6. Analysis of SME R&D Investment and Policy Implications | Joonghae Suh

The decreases in physical capital investment that the Korean economy has experienced over the recent years have raised strong concerns from academics and policy circles. The decreases are on the one hand conceived as an inevitable consequence of the structural changes, as the Korean economy is entering a more matured stage of development. But, on the other hand, there are policy concerns that the decreases in physical capital investment would undermine the long-term growth potential of the Korean economy should there be no countervailing or complementing forces.

The first part of the chapter tries to establish the patterns of changes in investments in plant facility and R&D, contrasting SME (small- and medium-sized enterprise) with
LE (large enterprise). With two data sources, the financial data from KIS (Korea Investors Service Co.), a Korean corporate credit rating company, and R&D statistics from MOST (the Ministry of Science and Technology), the chapter confirms that, despite the decreases in facility investment, there have been sizable increases in R&D investment. But the size of increases in R&D investment is not comparable to the decreases in facility investment. The investment patters show differences between SME and LE with additional category of whether performing R&D or not. R&D-performing LE shows higher ratio of R&D investment to facility investment than R&D-performing SME, but both groups of companies have shown increasing trend of the ratio since 1995.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the differences in R&D investment between SME and LE. Korea’s industrial R&D is led by LE: LE took 79% of industrial R&D
expenditures in 2003. The dominance of LE had been decreasing after 1997, but the trend is reversing since 2002. The trend of SME share in industrial R&D expenditures
is the opposite to that of LE. There are two forces interacting to this trend. First, those LEs were hit by the financial crisis and underwent restructuring thereafter. As the restructuring process came to an end, LEs changed their business strategy by strengthening technological innovation, which led rapid increases in R&D spending in recent years. For SMEs, the surge of R&D spending some years after the financial crisis had been possible through two forces: One is the “venture boom” and the other, increases in technologybased firms many of whom were spun off from LEs or government research institutes. As the “venture bubble” fizzled, the surge of SME R&D spending became lowered. Despite, however, the debates on the pros and cons over venture business policy that had been excessively pursued by the government, the industrial restructuring processes for the post-crisis years have resulted in much higher numbers of R&D-intensive SMEs.

The last part of the chapter tried to test the hypothesis that SMEs face higher financial costs than LEs in R&D financing. With panel data composed of 496 firms with 9 year observations from 1995 to 2003, the chapter divided these firms into four groups: Small firms with less than 100 employees, mediumsized firms from 100 to 299 employees, large firms with 300 to 999 employees, and largest firms of 1,000 and above employees. The econometric estimation results show that only the smallest cohort of SME shows statistically significant estimates of the sensitivities almost to unity. The estimation results confirm the theory of SMEs’ R&D financing that the smaller the size, the higher the cost.

The chapter draws some policy implications from the empirical findings. One general implication is that the Korean economy is under the process of transforming its economic structure from the previously dominating input-driven to more R&D-intensive one. The slowdown of growth for the transition period is an inevitable process, since the increases in R&D investment are not big enough to compensate or complement the decreases in facility investment. This statement is, however, a kind of proposition that requires further in-depth study about the impact of the changes of investment patterns on, for example, the productivity effect. The fact that SMEs face less favorable conditions in R&D financing than LEs offers a rationale of government policy that alleviates the extra burden of SMEs. Under the current situation in Korea where innovation financing seems not working as expected or desired, improving expertise of the financial institutions is a critical element that the government should pay keen attention to.


7. Corporate Workouts on Distressed SMEs | Dongsoo Kang

The policymakers in Korea pay considerable attention to the distress in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have shown declining performance in productivity and profitability relative to large enterprises (LEs) since the early 1990s. Despite their importance in national employment and business innovations, Korean SMEs confront serious challenges domestically and abroad. Emergence of fiercely growing competitors like the Chinese counterpart has eroded their sales shares in both domestic and foreign markets. Also, weak domestic consumption lowers the demand for their goods and services. Under these circumstances, the Korean government
initiated the workout program in which creditor financial institutions lead corporate rehabilitation as well as debt collection toward SMEs. This chapter investigates the
performance of the working-out SMEs and suggests the policies to facilitate the collaborative SME workouts.

Since most of Korea’s SMEs are provided with bank loans guaranteed by public credit guarantee funds (KCGF and KOTEC) and borrow from at least a few banks, they tend to have multiple creditors. This debt structure should ask for collaborative workouts once SMEs are financially distressed, but so far most restructuring has proceeded
in the form of individual workouts led by a main bank, which has advanced considerable share of loans to the borrowers. The dominance of individual workouts over collaborative ones implies that the current SME restructuring may target for simple debt collection rather than corporate rehabilitation. Inaddition, once the restructuring is aimed at corporate turnarounds from the long-term economic perspective, policymakers should consider more active restructuring tools such as debt-to-equity conversion and fresh loan supply for business turnarounds rather than passive debt relief in the workouts. Compared with collaborative workouts, the individual ones, however, do not embed enough incentives from the main banks which should recognize most losses in the course of active debt restructuring. In this sense, collaborative workouts in which all creditor banks and guarantee funds participation should be more widely used for improving fairness among creditors and efficiency and efficacy of SME restructuring.

The financial statements of the SMEs under workouts show a severe financial distress when the program was activated. In many cases, the paid-in capital was completely
depleted so that their liabilities exceeded the assets. Or, sales had tumbled down for a few years before the commencement of workouts, thus significant operating losses incurring. Because the workouts have begun too late for these firms, there exists little hope of successful turnarounds. In fact, as of the end of September 2005, only three
firms have successfully graduated from collaborative workouts out of 32 cases with eight cases suspended.

Sluggish performance in workouts originates from the passive attitude of financial institutions toward corporate rehabilitation of distressed SMEs. On top of the low expectation on success, loss burdens ensuing on debt restructuring and institutional straightjackets limit their active participation in workouts.

This study suggests the following policy recommendations. First, it is foremost impor-tant that public credit guarantee funds play more active role in SME workouts, since they should bear the largest part of credit risks. For their participation, the government should include the SME workout performance among the evaluation list of the funds.
Second, the government should supply financial assistance through public credit guarantee funds or other SME-related agency like Small Business Corporation to the workout companies which agree to the plan of changing main business lines. Even in such a public assistance, the government should design the scheme where the government bails in the creditor financial institutions. Third, financial supervisory authority put more weights on the initiation and performance of SME workouts when examining the banks’ risk management system.

SME restructuring deserves attention in that it minimizes not only creditors’ losses but also taxpayers’ burden, for government budgets should shoulder the credit guarantee funds’ losses. Furthermore, in order to boost growth momentum, it is necessary to promote innovation-oriented SMEs, which could be obtained through harsh restructuring. Finally, policymakers should recall the importance of successful SME restructuring that could lead a more balanced growth by relieving polarization of performance between LEs and SMEs.


8. Policy Agenda on the Job Training of SMEs | Soobong Uh

It is not easy for SMEs to provide wages attractive enough to employ skillful workers. Their little investment towards job training of workers has put SMEs in a weak position
when it comes to restructuring. In particular, the high mobility of their workers deprives SMEs of the incentive to invest in job training. The present manpower development
program of the employment insurance is applied to firms, not to individual workers and thus it is more liable to market failure

Therefore, it is very important to introduce manpower development, which is more suitable to SMEs for the sake of restructuring. For example, the program of Job Training
Consortium of Large Firms and SMEs is effective for such SMEs that are subcontractors for large firms since large firms more actively monitor the performance of training
in such cases. Such programs as mobile job training, e-learning, and customized programs for SMEs are considered most appropriate for SMEs. Public job training programs should be developed in such a manner as well.

Similar public job training programs implemented by each government authorities should be integrated and rearranged. It is necessary for these programs to be linked to
local universities because they are well informed on the needs of local firms. Furthermore, if local governments are also linked for support, the end result would be more effective.

Finally, in order to prevent moral hazard problems which may be caused by a free or subsidized public training program for SMEs, it is necessary to develop a program to incorporate incentive-compatible mechanism which requires SMEs’ self-help.


9. Proposals to Improve the Korea’s Support Policy for Small Innovative Firms | Jinha Jeong

Strengthening the competitive edge of SMEs has become one of the most important economic issues in Korea as polarization between large firms and SMEs has deepened. Accordingly, small innovative firms (referred as ‘venture firms’ in Korea) attract keen attention both from policymakers and academia. Also, we can sufficiently observe how the growth environment for venture firms has evolved, since it has been almost ten years after the Korean government started its support policy for venture firms. Considering this, now is the appropriate time to carry out an analysis on venture firms. From this point of view, we analyzed the business performance of venture firms as well as looking at their growth factors. From the findings of the analysis, we finally derived some policy measures to improve the support policy for venture firms.

Foremost, we developed a performance index which is composed of profit rate, growth rate, and R&D intensity. Venture firms are classified into three types in Korea:
Type 1 are venture firms invested by venture capitals, Type 2 are venture firms with high R&D intensity, and Type 3 are venture firms which mainly use new technologies or ideas. In terms of the index, venture firms showed better performance than non-venture firms. And, among venture firms, Type 1 showed better performance than Type 2 or Type 3.

Second, we empirically analyzed the growth factors for venture firms to draw out policy implications. The empirical analysis showed interesting results. Venture firms
with the following features all showed higher growth rates: Firms with high R&D intensity, younger firms, bigger firms, firms using more policy loans, and firms located in
the capital region.

Finally, based on the results of above two analyses we drew out proposals to enhance policy effectiveness. Six basic rules adopted to draw out the proposals are as follows: ⅰ) maximizing the efficiency of the private sector, ⅱ) establishing a system which makes resources concentrated to the technologically promising venture firms, ⅲ) support-ing younger firms, ⅳ) making a linkage to S&T policies, Ⅴ) restricting discrimination by industry, and ⅵ) reducing moral hazards. Based on these six rules, we made the following definition of ‘Candidates for Small Innovative Firms.’

“SMEs which meet two qualifications: ⅰ) the firm deals with technologies or ideas which can be applied to the leading national R&D project (NRDP); and ⅱ) the age of firm is less than or equal to 7 years (in case firm’s age is more than 7 years, the sales amount originated by new technology must be greater than a certain rate, and
in case the firm is a manufacturing company, the R&D expenditure per sales must be greater than a certain rate).”

Based on the new definition, we can envision the division of labor between the government and the private sector. Government agencies are in charge of the first-round evaluation of the firms whether they satisfy the two qualifications or not. Thereafter, private financial institutions such as venture capitals and commercial banks select firms that will receive the investment funds or loans. Combining the expertise of the public and private institutions, the government focuses on improving the support system and managing government funds to make sure that the ‘candidates’ can have more benefits.

In order to be effective, the proposal requires additional policy initiatives. First, the system for managing government funds must be improved. Second, the expertise of
the government evaluation agencies should be raised. Third, the government should provide market-friendly environment where venture capitals play a leading role and thereby strengthen the competitiveness of venture capitals. Fourth, legal and institutional framework should be streamlined in a way to produce best effects of policy
measures. Fifth, the government’s additional effort is necessary to increase the investment capability of private sectors through, for example, activating private equity funds.


10. Policy Agenda on Business Incubators | Joo-Hoon Kim.Suil Lee

This chapter consists mainly of three parts: 1) the performance evaluation of business incubators in Korea using the data from Business Incubator Network System; 2) the
behavior analysis of business incubators and tenant firms using survey data; and 3) the suggestion of several reform measures based on the performance evaluation and behavior analysis.

The first part of the chapter explains the distribution of business incubators in Korea by host institution, by business sector, and by region, and then evaluates the general
performance of the business incubators on the following criteria: 1) survival rate of graduate firms; 2) number of jobs created; and 3) increased sales of tenant firms. It also
analyzes the characteristics of the founders of tenant firms and the managers of the business incubators. In Korea, the survival rate of graduate firms is approximately 71% as compared to 5 or 6% of new firms in general. An average tenant firm has experienced an increase of the number of employees and sales by 0.5 person and
110 million won, respectively, after moving into a business incubator. The comparison of the business incubators by host institution shows that business incubators hosted by public research institutions are much more successful in achieving their goals than ones hosted by universities or local governments.While the founders of tenant firms have similar potential capabilities as the founders of venture firms, the data from Business Incubator Network System indicate that the business incubators have difficulties in hiring eligible incubator managers and strengthening the expertise of managers and staff members.

We performed a survey analysis for 1,009 tenant firms, of which the objective is to investigate the behavioral aspects of business incubators and tenant firms regarding the following three categories: 1) the types of services provided by the incubators and the degree of satisfaction of the tenant firms on those services; 2) the degree of internal and external networking of the tenant firms; and 3) the degree of innovativeness of the tenant firms. The second part of the chapter summarizes the results of the survey analysis. At first, the survey shows that the provision of services by the incubators does not meet the needs of the tenant firms in all types of services. In particular,
marketing assistance and financing assistance fall significantly behind the needs of the tenant firms. Regarding the internal and external networking of the tenant firms, we find that approximately 40% of the tenant firms in the sample cooperate with other tenant firms in the same incubator and about 61% of the tenant firms have business relationship with outside firms at close range. 55% of the total sample have also executed or are in the middle of carrying out joint researches with host universities or host
research institutions. On average, a tenant firm conducts interviews with professors and researchers for technical support and gives advice on 15 occasions, annually. These findings indicate that the tenant firms have well established all of three types of networking, that is, internal networking between tenant firms, external networking with outside firms, and industry-university-research institution cooperation. Finally, according to the survey, the tenant firms in Korea seem to be relatively innovative. Approximately 20% of the tenant firms in the sample answered that there would be no competitor in related markets for a while. Grouping the tenant firms by their founders and comparing the innovativeness of each group, the tenant firms founded by university professors and researchers seem to be the most innovative.

Based on the performance evaluation and behavior analysis of business incubators and tenant firms in the previous parts, we suggest several remedies for improving the
effectiveness of business incubation in the third part of the chapter. First, we should put policy priority on the expansion of services provided by the business incubators
and the effective formation of networking of innovative small- and medium-sized firms, thereby accelerating the inauguration of technology-based startups. Second, each
business incubator should hire managers and staffs specialized in business incubation in order to meet the needs of tenant firms on supporting services, in particular, on
marketing assistance and financing assistance. Third, additional funds should be injected into the business incubators to support and maintain the tenant firms’ efforts
in developing new items and opening up new markets. Finally, to help business incubators hire eligible managers and fill up the shortage of funds of the tenant firms, we
can consider a new method of supporting business incubation projects with financial funds as follows: The government provides incubators with financial funds, and each
incubator invests those funds to its tenant firms, and each invested firm, after graduating, pays its incubator a certain amount of its revenue as royalty payments.


11. Innovative Clusters and Enhancing Innovative Capabilities of SMEs | Yoon-Gyu Yoon

Building innovative clusters has been constituted as one of the central elements in industrial policies in advanced countries since the 1990s. The Korean government
has also been implementing a variety of cluster-based industrial policies since the late 1990s to search for new driving forces to boost economic growth. Hence, SMEs
gradually raised their innovative capabilities in the development process of industrial clusters, but in general, SMEs are vulnerable to the negative effects of market failures
compared with their counterpart, the large firms. For this reason, the main objective of cluster-based industrial policies in advanced countries has focused on enhancing the innovative capabilities of SMEs gradually, that is, in assisting their upward movement from being non-technology firms to technology followers, and finally to innovative technology leaders. In particular, it is important that the policy goal should be on encouraging technology followers to grow into innovative technology leaders. Korea’s cluster-based industrial policies have contributed to significantly improving the innovative capabilities of SMEs, though their performance has not yet been realized sufficiently. According to a survey on SMEs, about 60% of the surveyed firms show upward movement in higher-level R&D projects for the past 5 years, implying that
a considerable number of SMEs have improved their innovative capabilities through continuously participating in the government’s R&D projects. However, the proportion of firms moving towards the highest-level R&D projects turns out less than 10% for the same period, indicating that it takes much longer than expected for SMEs to evolve into innovative SMEs. As shown evident in the experiences of advanced countries, long-term policies are necessary in order to turn SMEs into innovative firms then in turn
building of innovative networks and clusters will follow. To gradually enhance the innovative capabilities of SMEs, it is desirable for the government to implement the followings, instead of direct policy interventions: i) strengthen incentive systems to supply human resources, thereby meeting the needs of SMEs, ii) establish ORT
(On-the-Researc h - Training) system in which graduate students can participate in R&D projects as their degree requirement and then the student can be hired by the firm after conpleting degrees, iii) integrate and connect various innovation facilities and equipments to provide comprehensive services for SMEs, iv) strengthen regional capacities of planning, evaluation, and brokering, and v) encourage cooperation between SMEs in the fields of R&D and human resources development.


12. A Study to Search for an Appropriate Corporate Form for Closely Held SME in Korea: Focusing on the Limited Liability Company and the Close Corporation | Inho Cho

A substantial portion of SMEs in Korea appears to be closely held firms. However, these firms seem to prefer the stock corporation form over the Yuhan hoesa form, which
was originally designed to meet the needs of closely held SMEs. Some critics indicate that the reason for this phenomenon is that business owners perceive the Yuhan hoesa form as inferior to the stock corporation form in terms of credit standing. Since the Korean Commercial Code provisions on stock corporations were written to regulate public corporations, closely held firms, which choose the stock corporation form, are required to satisfy the formalities and red tape originally intended for public corporations. When SMEs choose an inappropriate corporate form, the inevitable result is inefficiency in incorporating and managing the business. This study recommends a guideline on choosing an appropriate corporate form which would eliminate or reduce the inefficiency in the operation of SMEs, after reviewing the limited liability company and the close corporation of the United States and Japan, respectively.

This study concludes that the limited liability company form is not suitable for Korea for the following three reasons.

One, in light of the fact that owners of SMEs previously rejected the Yuhan hoesa form as being less prestigious than the stock corporation form, it is doubtful that they
would enthusiastically embrace this new type of corporate organization.

Two, according to the experience of the U.S., it is important to hire competent lawyers and accountants to draft customized operating agreements and articles of incorporation that will satisfy the specific needs of constituent members of the limited liability company. In order to utilize the expert’s service, limited liability company owners in the U.S. spend a considerable amount of money. However, many Korean SME owners have much difficulty in raising money.

Three, although the U.S. has allowed limited liability companies to have pass-through taxation, Korea would face obstacles in following this system because Korea would
have to change the fundamental principle concerning corporate taxation and reexamine which corporate forms (among the four currently available) are subject to passthrough taxation. This factor is particularly crucial because any adoption of a passthrough taxation benefit for limited liability companies would first require a significant
change in Korea’s corporate taxation principles, which cannot be accomplished in a short period of time.

This study concludes that given the fact that most closely held SMEs in Korea prefer the stock corporation form, Korea should replace the current Yuhan hoesa form to a
close corporation form similar to the one that is available in the U.S. This could be accomplished by creating a special subchapter for the close corporation form in the stock corporation chapter of the Korean Commercial Code and by deleting the Commercial Code chapter concerning the Yuhan hoesa form.

제1부 중소기업 구조의 개관

　제1장 중소기업의 구조조정과 혁신능력의 제고
　　제1절 세계화와 산업구조의 양극화
　　제2절 경제위기 이후 구조조정의 특성
　　제3절 혁신형 중소기업군의 출현과 육성과제
　　제4절 전체 보고서의 구성

제2부 중소기업 구조변화의 실증분석

　제2장 중국의 시장침투가 한국의 중소기업에 미치는 영향:제조업에서의 진입과 퇴출을 중심으로
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 분석모형 및 변수
　　　1. 산업별 분석모형
　　　2. 사업체별 분석모형
　　　3. 데이터 및 변수
　　제3절 실증분석 Ⅰ: 산업별 진입ㆍ퇴출 분석
　　제4절 실증분석 Ⅱ: 사업체별 폐업 및 업종전환 분석
　　　1. 기업의 생존게임과 중국효과
　　　2. 업종전환 확률의 결정과 중국효과
　　　3. 사업체의 요소집약도: 생존, 퇴출, 업종전환과 그 이후
　　제5절 결 론

　제3장 제조업의 양극화와 중소기업의 영세화 실태에 관한 실증분석
　　제1절 연구의 목적
　　제2절 분석절차
　　　1. 부문 분류
　　　2. 국민소득통계의 가공
　　　3. 산업연관표의 가공
　　　4. 광공업통계 미시자료의 가공
　　　5. 분석 지표
　　제3절 분석결과
　　　1. 국민경제에서의 제조업의 위치
　　　2. 사업체 규모별 구성비의 변화－중소기업의 영세화
　　　3. 사업체 규모별 격차의 확대
　　　4. 총량통계와의 비교
　　　5. 부문별 구성비의 변화
　　제4절 결 론

　제4장 제조업의 사업체 규모별 생산성 격차에 관한 실태분석
　　제1절 연구의 목적
　　제2절 분석절차
　　　1. 분석 지표
　　　2. 통계자료
　　제3절 실증분석 결과
　　　1. 노동생산성
　　　2. 총요소생산성－성장회계방식
　　　3. 총요소생산성－다변지수방식
　　　4. 자본소득률과 부가가치율
　　제4절 결 론

　제5장 중소기업의 진입과 성장에 대한 실증분석
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 신규 진입업체들의 생존과 성장
　　　1. 분석방법
　　　2. 분석결과
　　제3절 고성장 중소업체들의 산업별 분포와 특성
　　　1. 분석절차
　　　2. 분석결과
　　제4절 회귀분석을 통한 중소기업 성장요인 검토
　　　1. 분석의 기본방향
　　　2. 분석방법
　　　3. 분석결과
　　제5절 결 론

　제6장 중소기업의 R&D 투자 분석 및 정책적 시사점
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 R&D 투자에 관한 주요 논점
　　제3절 중소기업 투자패턴의 변화
　　　1. 설비투자 대 R&D 투자
　　　2. 중소기업 R&D 투자 추이
　　제4절 R&D 투자의 자금조달 결정요인
　　　1. 선행연구의 검토
　　　2. 분석모형 및 데이터
　　　3. 추정결과
　　제5절 결론 및 정책적 시사점

제3부 중소기업의 혁신성 제고를 위한 정책과제

　제7장 중소기업 구조조정 촉진을 위한 정책과제
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 중소기업 워크아웃제도
　　　1. 중소기업 워크아웃 개요
　　　2. 중소기업 워크아웃 현황
　　제3절 중소기업 워크아웃의 성과
　　　1. 워크아웃기업의 경영성과 및 부채구조
　　　2. 실제 사례
　　제4절 정책 제안
　　　1. 공적 신용보증기금의 구조조정 참여
　　　2. 사업구조조정을 위한 자금지원
　　　3. 채권금융기관과 금융감독당국의 역할 제고
　　제5절 요약 및 결론

　제8장 중소기업 고용 및 능력개발 지원정책 개선방안
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 규모별 중소기업 능력개발사업 실태와 정책시사
　　　1. 중소기업 근로자 능력개발 실태
　　　2. 능력개발정책에의 시사: 능력개발 전달체제 혁신의 필요성
　　제3절 중소기업 인력지원사업 평가와 정책 시사점
　　　1. 중소기업 친화적 직업 및 진로지도사업
　　　2. 중소기업 고용환경개선 지원사업
　　　3. 중소기업에 대한 고용보조금(wage subsidy) 사업
　　　4. 중소기업 근로자 능력개발 지원사업
　　제4절 중소기업 인력지원정책 개선방향
　　제5절 중소기업 능력개발정책 개선과제
　　　1. 능력개발 전달체계(delivery)의 혁신
　　　2. 중소기업 친화적 훈련프로그램(programme)의 개발
　　　3. 중소기업 친화적 능력개발 인프라(infrastructure)의 구축

　제9장 벤처기업의 현황과 지원정책 개선방안
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 벤처기업 지원정책의 필요성
　　　1. 경제학적 근거
　　　2. 외국의 벤처기업 지원정책 사례
　　제3절 벤처생태계 현황 및 벤처기업 지원제도 개요
　　　1. 벤처생태계 현황
　　　2. 벤처기업 지원제도 개요
　　제4절 벤처기업의 경영성과 분석
　　　1. 분석자료
　　　2. 성과분석
　　제5절 벤처기업 성장요인에 관한 실증분석
　　　1. 모 형
　　　2. 자료 및 변수처리
　　　3. 분석결과
　　　4. 분석의 한계
　　　5. 정책적 시사점
　　제6절 벤처기업 지원정책 개선방안
　　　1. 기존 지원제도 유지의 장?단점 분석
　　　2. ‘벤처기업 확인제도 개편방안’에 대한 평가
　　　3. 지원제도 개선을 위한 대안 선별기준
　　　4. 대안 평가
　　　5. 최적대안의 도출
　　　6. 추가적 정책과제

　제10장 창업보육센터의 운영실태와 개선과제
　　제1절 문제의 제기
　　제2절 창업보육정책의 중요성
　　제3절 창업보육센터의 역사적?이론적 고찰
　　　1. 창업보육센터의 연원과 전개과정
　　　2. 창업보육센터의 보육효과에 관한 연구
　　제4절 우리나라 창업보육센터의 운영 실태
　　제5절 창업보육센터 운영에 관한 실증분석
　　　1. 설문의 구성 및 표본의 특성
　　　2. 설문결과의 분석
　　　3. 설문결과의 요약
　　제6절 결론 및 정책적 시사점

　제11장 혁신클러스터와 중소기업의 혁신역량 배양을 위한 정책과제
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 혁신클러스터와 지역혁신체제
　　　1. 혁신클러스터와 지역혁신체제의 개념 및 구조
　　　2. 혁신클러스터의 외부성과 진화
　　　3. 산업집적지 분류 및 유형별 특성
　　　4. 소결: 논점의 정리
　　제3절 기술환경 변화와 중소기업의 대응
　　　1. 중소기업의 혁신역량 발전과정
　　　2. 중소기업 유형별 특성 및 정책 대응
　　　3. 소 결
　　제4절 지역혁신지원정책의 현황 및 문제점
　　　1. 지역혁신지원정책의 배경 및 필요성
　　　2. 지역혁신지원정책의 전반적인 현황 및 문제점
　　　3. 주요 지역혁신지원사업별 현황 및 문제점
　　　4. 지역혁신지원정책의 개선방향
　　제5절 기업설문조사 분석결과
　　　1. 설문조사의 일반현황
　　　2. 기업혁신능력 발전단계와 국가연구개발과제 유형화
　　　3. 국가연구?기술개발과제의 부가성
　　　4. 인력확보 관련 항목
　　제6절 중소기업 혁신역량 배양을 위한 정책과제
　　　1. 산업체 수요에 부응하는 인력양성?공급체계 구축
　　　2. 연구개발과제 수행을 통한 연구?기술인력 양성
　　　3. 시설?장비의 집적 및 연계 촉진
　　　4. 정부부처 간 지원사업의 통합?연계체계 구축
　　　5. 지역의 기획?평가역량 및 중개기능의 강화
　　　6. 기업 간 숙련향상을 위한 협력 촉진

　제12장 한국에서 폐쇄적인 중소기업(벤처기업 포함)에 적합한 회사형태의 모색: Limited Liability Company와 주식회사로서의 폐쇄회사를 중심으로 609
　　제1절 서 론
　　제2절 Limited Liability Company 형태와 한국에서의 도입타당성 검토
　　　1. 미국에서의 Limited Liability Company
　　　2. 일본에서의 Limited Liability Company(合同會社)
　　　3. 한국에서의 도입타당성 검토
　　제3절 주식회사로서의 폐쇄회사형태와 한국에서의 도입타당성 검토
　　　1. 미국에서 주식회사로서의 폐쇄회사
　　　2. 일본에서의 株式讓渡制限株式會社
　　　3. 한국에서의 도입타당성 검토
　　제4절 결 론

결 론