Economic Outlook KDI Economic Outlook 2024-1st Half May 16, 2024
The Korean economy is forecast to grow by 2.6% in 2024, driven by strong exports, and by 2.1% in 2025 as domestic demand improves but export growth moderates.
- Headline inflation is projected to record 2.6% in 2024, down from 2023, due to weak domestic demand, before reaching a near-target level of 2.1% in 2025.
- Reflecting sluggish domestic demand amid a shrinking working-age population, the growth in the number of employed persons is expected to gradually slow from 330,000 in 2023 to 240,000 in 2024 and 170,000 in 2025.
- Private consumption is forecast to grow by only 1.8% in 2024, following 2023, due to high interest rates, and then increase by 1.9% in 2025 as the sluggishness eases.
- Equipment investment is expected to rise by 2.2% in 2024, higher than in 2023 (0.5%), due to an upturn in the semiconductor market, and then record a high growth rate of 3.1% in 2025 as high interest rates ease.
- Construction investment is forecast to decrease by 1.4% and 1.1% in 2024 and 2025, respectively, due to shrinking construction orders received that emerged in 2023 following the downturn in the real estate market.
- Exports are expected to lead the economic recovery with high growth, mainly in semiconductors.
- The current account is projected to show an increased surplus as the terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices) improve amid a resurgence in exports.
Ⅰ. Current Economic Conditions
- □ The Korean economy is exhibiting a continuous alleviation of the economic slowdown, bolstered by high export growth.
- · In the first quarter, GDP grew by 3.4% year-on-year, driven by the sustained recovery in exports and a base effect, and also recorded a robust 1.3% growth on a seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter basis.
- · However, considering that the monthly industrial production indicators remain on a modest growth trajectory, there is a possibility that the exceptionally high growth in the first quarter may be unsustainable.
- □ Due to persistently elevated interest rates, domestic demand has not shown a clear recovery trend in consumption and investment.
- · While high interest rates have negatively impacted domestic demand with a time lag, the stagnation in real purchasing power caused by rapid inflation hikes has also contributed to the sluggish consumption.
- · Private consumption and equipment investment saw minimal increases, while construction investment experienced a narrowed decline due to the temporary surge in construction projects. Yet, the downturn in construction orders received indicates that the slowdown in construction is likely to persist.
- □ Conversely, exports are sustaining the recovery trend, particularly in semiconductors, leading to the alleviation of the economic downturn.
- · As global semiconductor transactions (amount) surged and the slowdown in world trade volume eased, Korea’s exports also rose significantly, particularly in semiconductors.
- · Accordingly, the current account surplus has been expanding, and net foreign assets have remained high, nearing 50% of GDP, indicating favorable external soundness.
- □ The slowdown in inflation continues due to sluggish domestic demand, and the growth in the number of employed persons has also moderated gradually.
- □ Externally, favorable export conditions are expected to continue as the global economy sustains its moderate growth from 2023 into 2024-2025, with semiconductor activity also maintaining growth momentum.
- · The global semiconductor transaction (value) is expected to rebound significantly in 2024 and show relatively high growth in 2025.
- · Moreover, concerns over a hard landing of the Chinese economy have eased, mitigating short-term risks to the Korean economy.
- · However, as geopolitical tensions in the Middle East remain high, there is a possibility that the economic recovery could be somewhat delayed if international oil prices surge in the future, leading to increased production costs and weakening real purchasing power.
- □ Given these domestic and international economic conditions, the Korean economy is expected to gradually enter a phase of recovery, driven by strong export growth.
- · With the easing of the global trade slowdown and continued growth in semiconductor activity, exports are projected to surge, driving economic recovery.
- · Domestic demand is expected to see a gradual alleviation of sluggishness as the lagged impact of prolonged high interest rates dissipates and income conditions improve supported by the recovery in export volumes and prices.
- □ Given these economic circumstances, macroeconomic policies need to be gradually normalized within the framework of pursuing inflation stability.
- · The sluggish domestic demand emerged since last year was somewhat an inevitable consequence of monetary tightening aimed at stabilizing inflation; inflation has been shifting to a clear stabilization trend since the second half
of last year. - · With the inflation rate expected to further stabilize near the target by the second half of this year, gradually easing the tight monetary policy toward a neutral stance may be feasible.
- · It is also desirable for fiscal policy to gradually reduce the deficit, which expanded following the COVID-19 crisis, to a level that complies with the government’s proposed fiscal rule (within 3% of GDP).
Ⅱ. Domestic Economic Outlook for 2024~2025
1. Major Assumptions on External Conditions
- □ The global economy is assumed to continue its modest growth trend in 2024-2025, following 2023.
- · Despite downside risks to the economy such as geopolitical risks, the IMF recently projected that the global economy will maintain a modest growth rate of 3.2% in 2024-2025, unchanged from 2023.
- · This projection, however, falls below the pre-COVID-19 average growth rate of 3.5% from 2011 to 2019.
- □ The import price of crude oil (Dubai) is assumed to record $85 per barrel in 2024, higher than in 2023 ($81 per barrel) due to geopolitical risks, and then slightly decrease to $82 in 2025.
- □ The Korean won, in terms of the real effective exchange rate, is assumed to remain constant, showing no significant fluctuations from current levels.
2. Domestic Economic Outlook for 2024~2025
- □ The Korean economy is forecast to grow by 2.6% in 2024, driven by strong exports, and by 2.1% in 2025 as domestic demand improves but export growth moderates.
- · Although the growth rate in 2024 is expected to be somewhat high, it merely compensates for the economic downturn in 2023. Therefore, a recovery to a neutral level is expected in 2025.
- · Private consumption is forecast to grow by only 1.8% in 2024, following 2023, due to high interest rates, and then increase by 1.9% in 2025 as the sluggishness eases.
- · Equipment investment is expected to rise by 2.2% in 2024, higher than in 2023 (0.5%), due to an upturn in the semiconductor market, and then record a high growth rate of 3.1% in 2025 as high interest rates ease.
- · Construction investment is forecast to decrease by 1.4% and 1.1% in 2024 and 2025, respectively, due to shrinking construction orders received that emerged in 2023 following the downturn in the real estate market.
- · Exports are expected to lead the economic recovery with high growth, mainly in semiconductors.
- · The current account is projected to show an increased surplus as the terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices) improve amid a resurgence in exports.
- □ Headline inflation is projected to register at 2.6% in 2024, down from 3.6% in 2023, due to weak domestic demand, before maintaining a near-target level of 2.1% in 2025.
- · Core inflation is also expected to align with the target, falling from 3.4% in 2023 to 2.3% in 2024 and 2.0% in 2025 as demand slows.
- □ Amid the consistent decline in the working-age population and sluggish domestic demand, the growth in the number of employed persons is expected to gradually slow from 330,000 in 2023 to 240,000 in 2024 and 170,000 in 2025.
- · The unemployment rate is projected to be 2.8% in 2024 and 2.7% in 2025, similar to the 2023 level (2.7%).
3. Risks to the Outlook
- □ Should international oil prices surge due to escalating geopolitical conflicts, or should the sluggishness in China’s real estate market spread to the real economy, the recovery of the Korean economy may be delayed.
- · If international oil prices soar as conflicts in the Middle East region escalate, the economic recovery may be delayed owing to increased production costs and weakened real purchasing power.
- · If the financial deterioration of Chinese construction companies leads to a slowdown in the Chinese economy, it could potentially result in negative spillover effects on the Korean economy.
- · Furthermore, if global trade contracts due to the intensification of protectionist trade measures following the U.S. presidential election in late 2024, it is challenging to rule out the possibility of a weakening growth trend, particularly in exports.

Ⅲ. Policy Recommendations
1. Fiscal Policy
- □ Given the anticipated gradual recovery of economic activity, it is necessary to maintain fiscal soundness by gradually reducing the deficit in the operational fiscal balance.
- · The need for additional economic stimulus naturally diminishes during a phase of anticipated gradual economic recovery.
- · The deficit in the operational fiscal balance has exceeded the government’s proposed fiscal rule of 3% of GDP in recent years; it is essential to initiate efforts to reduce the deficit even before the introduction of the fiscal rule.
- □ In normal times, fiscal space should be secured by expanding tax revenue and managing total expenditures, while simultaneously reforming the expenditure structure to accommodate rapid demographic shifts.
- · To ensure that fiscal policy supports economic stability during challenging times, such as recessions, it is crucial to secure sufficient fiscal space during normal times.
- · It is necessary to establish a plan to restructure the expenditure structure, considering the anticipated increase in fiscal demands driven by demographic shifts, such as an aging population.
2. Monetary Policy
- □ The monetary policy needs to gradually ease from the current tight stance to a neutral level in line with the pace at which inflation converges to the target level.
- · With the core inflation rate, indicative of underlying inflation trends, steadily declining toward the target of 2%, concerns over persistently high inflation have been significantly alleviated.
- · Moreover, with persistently high interest rates pressuring domestic demand, as evidenced by rising delinquency rates on household and business loans, it is advisable to consider a gradual adjustment of monetary tightening once the inflation rate converges to the target level.
- · Given that monetary policy aims for medium-term inflation stability, there is less need for it to respond sensitively to temporary price fluctuations in highly volatile items, such as agricultural and petroleum products.
- □ Korea’s monetary policy needs to be conducted with consideration of the specific inflation and economic trends of the Korean economy.
- · The U.S., the Eurozone, and other countries operate their monetary policies differently according to their respective economic and inflation conditions.
- · Rather than synchronizing Korea’s monetary policy with the policy stance of specific countries like the U.S., which have different economic conditions, Korea’s policy should be operated based on its own macroeconomic conditions.
3. Financial Policy
- □ Given that concerns over systemic risk in the financial market are currently not significantly high, financial policy should be conducted in a direction that reinforces the principle of self-responsibility among economic agents.
- · Prudential indicators for both the banking and savings bank sectors significantly exceed regulatory requirements, suggesting that the possibility of systemic risk in the financial market is not considerably high.
- · However, the delinquency rate is rising, particularly for household and individual business loans, and the delinquency rate for real estate project financing also remains high in the securities industry, indicating that the risk of insolvency persists for some financial institutions.
- · Preventing moral hazard and strengthening the principle of self-accountability are necessary; insolvent companies and financial institutions should be encouraged to achieve financial normalization through asset liquidation.
- □ While continuing to improve regulations to manage borrower-level financial soundness, policies that may distort the inherent function of efficient resource allocation in the financial market should be avoided.
- · To prevent borrowers from holding debt levels that exceed their repayment capacity, it is necessary to curtail the exceptions to the debt service ratio (DSR) regulation and to consider the possibility of future income shocks when calculating the stress DSR.
- · It should be noted that restricting the use of important information for credit assessment, such as loan repayment history, may limit the evaluation of a borrower’s repayment ability and could undermine the efficiency of resource allocation.
Analysis of current economic issues
-
High Inflation and Consumption Stagnation: Focusing on the Relative Price between Income and Consumption
■ In South Korea, real private consumption appeared lethargic in 2023 due to the stagnation in real purchasing power, driven by a sharp rise in consumer prices (3.4%) and a decline in the real economic growth rate (1.4%). - In both 2022 and 2023, the growth rate of real purchasing power stagnated due to falling real income relative to consumption. This slump resulted from the sharp rise in international oil prices in 2022 and the marked decline in semiconductor prices in 2023. - Additionally, the steep upward trend in consumer prices triggered the adoption of a high-interest rate policy, further exacerbating sluggish private consumption (see Current Affairs I). ■ Going forward, the conditions for real private consumption are projected to gradually improve as the real economic growth rate expands and the value of income relative to consumption increases. - A majority of forecasting agencies project the economic growth rate to rise to the mid-2% range in 2024, bolstered by a rapid increase in exports, higher than the 2023 figure (1.4%). - Furthermore, in 2024, the capacity to spur private consumption is expected to experience meaningful expansion as real purchasing power substantially improves due to the marked rise in semiconductor prices. - However, high interest rates, outside the purview of this report, are still expected to act as a delaying factor for the recovery of private consumption. ■ Therefore, it is assessed that the current situation does not require short-term macroeconomic policies to stimulate private consumption. - Given the high probability of gradual moderation in consumption stagnation propelled by improving real purchasing power, it is not advisable to consider stimulus measures as requiring urgent action. It is also noteworthy that such policies could disrupt the ongoing trend toward inflation stabilization, potentially delaying interest rate cuts. - In addition, given that the trends of private consumption and income eventually sync up, the policy focus should be structural reforms that improve income-generating capacity by boosting medium- to long-term economic dynamism.
-
High Inflation and Consumption Stagnation: Focusing on the Relative Price between Income and Consumption
■ In South Korea, real private consumption appeared lethargic in 2023 due to the stagnation in real purchasing power, driven by a sharp rise in consumer prices (3.4%) and a decline in the real economic growth rate (1.4%). - In both 2022 and 2023, the growth rate of real purchasing power stagnated due to falling real income relative to consumption. This slump resulted from the sharp rise in international oil prices in 2022 and the marked decline in semiconductor prices in 2023. - Additionally, the steep upward trend in consumer prices triggered the adoption of a high-interest rate policy, further exacerbating sluggish private consumption (see Current Affairs I). ■ Going forward, the conditions for real private consumption are projected to gradually improve as the real economic growth rate expands and the value of income relative to consumption increases. - A majority of forecasting agencies project the economic growth rate to rise to the mid-2% range in 2024, bolstered by a rapid increase in exports, higher than the 2023 figure (1.4%). - Furthermore, in 2024, the capacity to spur private consumption is expected to experience meaningful expansion as real purchasing power substantially improves due to the marked rise in semiconductor prices. - However, high interest rates, outside the purview of this report, are still expected to act as a delaying factor for the recovery of private consumption. ■ Therefore, it is assessed that the current situation does not require short-term macroeconomic policies to stimulate private consumption. - Given the high probability of gradual moderation in consumption stagnation propelled by improving real purchasing power, it is not advisable to consider stimulus measures as requiring urgent action. It is also noteworthy that such policies could disrupt the ongoing trend toward inflation stabilization, potentially delaying interest rate cuts. - In addition, given that the trends of private consumption and income eventually sync up, the policy focus should be structural reforms that improve income-generating capacity by boosting medium- to long-term economic dynamism.
-
Weather Condition Changes on Prices: Effects and Implications
■ Weather shocks raise consumer prices in the short term, primarily affecting fresh food prices. However, their impact on core prices appears marginal. - Among various types of weather shocks, precipitation has a greater impact on prices compared to temperature, especially during summer. - As global warming increases summer temperatures and intensifies weather volatility both in frequency and severity, such as through heavy rainfall and droughts, short-term price instability, especially for fresh food, may become more prevalent. ■ Despite the initial divergence between consumer and core prices, driven by volatile prices for food (fresh food) and energy, consumer prices tend to revert to core price levels over the medium term. - This observation suggests that although temporary spikes in fresh food prices can elevate consumer prices in the short term, they have little impact on the underlying price trend. ■ Therefore, it is not advisable for monetary policy to sensitively respond to short-term fluctuations in fresh food prices. - To reduce the impact of localized weather shocks on consumer prices, it would be prudent to explore structural measures, such as diversifying supply sources by increasing agricultural imports. - In addition, strengthening climate resilience through measures like crop variety improvement is necessary to prepare for and mitigate the effects of climate change.
-
Weather Condition Changes on Prices: Effects and Implications
■ Weather shocks raise consumer prices in the short term, primarily affecting fresh food prices. However, their impact on core prices appears marginal. - Among various types of weather shocks, precipitation has a greater impact on prices compared to temperature, especially during summer. - As global warming increases summer temperatures and intensifies weather volatility both in frequency and severity, such as through heavy rainfall and droughts, short-term price instability, especially for fresh food, may become more prevalent. ■ Despite the initial divergence between consumer and core prices, driven by volatile prices for food (fresh food) and energy, consumer prices tend to revert to core price levels over the medium term. - This observation suggests that although temporary spikes in fresh food prices can elevate consumer prices in the short term, they have little impact on the underlying price trend. ■ Therefore, it is not advisable for monetary policy to sensitively respond to short-term fluctuations in fresh food prices. - To reduce the impact of localized weather shocks on consumer prices, it would be prudent to explore structural measures, such as diversifying supply sources by increasing agricultural imports. - In addition, strengthening climate resilience through measures like crop variety improvement is necessary to prepare for and mitigate the effects of climate change.
We reject unauthorized collection of email addresses posted on our website by using email address collecting programs or other technical devices. To access the email address, please type in the characters exactly as they appear in the box below.
Please enter the security code to prevent unauthorized information collection.