KDI - Korea Development Institute - RESEARCH - Research Areas

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Housing Market Regulations and Housing Supply: Focusing on LTV, DSR, Property Tax, and the Improvement of Pre-Sale Housing

The Korean government often implements financial regulations, such as the Loan-to-Value (LTV) and Debt-Service-Ratio (DSR), ratios, to stabilize the housing market. This study investigates the effectiveness of these policies in the housing market and, if effective, determines whether they enhance the utility for housing consumers.

Additionally, the government employs housing supply policies, which greatly impact the housing market. Housing provision is a lengthy and capital-intensive process. Korea supplies most of the new housing through a system known as the pre-sale policy. In fact, this system has consistently faced the challenge of overheating subscriptions for over 40 years. In light of the current housing market dynamics, Chapter 3 explores possible improvements to the existing housing supply policy.

As for the effect of financial regulation, the policy that lowers the upper limit of the LTV ratio from 70% to 40% reduces household loans by more than 31% while increasing the relative price of housing by 0.005%. If the upper limit on LTV ratios is lowered, households experience a low productivity shock, making it difficult to maintain consumption levels by increasing mortgage lending when incomes fall. As a result, they are motivated to increase savings. When the capital stock in the model economy increases due to the increase in household savings, the real interest rate falls. Wealthy households with relatively large amounts of assets reduce the share of financial assets in their asset portfolios and increase the share of housing because the real interest rate, which is the rate of return on investment in financial assets, has fallen.

The analysis in this study reveals that policies tightening household lending regulations do not effectively curtail housing prices in the long run. If the goal is long-term price stabilization, the study suggests that increasing the supply of new housing is more effective than suppressing housing demand through stricter lending regulations.

Lastly, the study proposes a new policy model for improving housing supply, especially for the younger demographic. This model seeks to address both the housing service and investment needs of younger people. Regarding public offerings and transactions of fractional ownership, housing demand is categorized into the demand for residential services and the demand for investment in housing assets. In the current pre-sale subscription method, the share of the house is divided, and public offering subscriptions are received. This method distributes shares to each subscriber in proportion to the competition rate for subscriptions. In this scenario, new housing is provided to young adults as rental properties in line with the existing subscription method to meet the need for residential demand.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Financial Innovation and Reform in the Era of Digital Transformation

Since the financial sector restructuring after the 1997 crisis and the international financial reform after the 2008 global financial crisis completed with a well stabilized system, the main policy attention has shifted towards financial innovation. In general, financial innovation refers to a series of deregulation or redesigning to enhance the convenience of financial services, strengthening the competitiveness of the financial industry. In contrast, financial innovation in the era of digital transformation is characterized by more specific and practical attempts to drive profound changes in financial services than the general financial innovation. With the convergence of ICT and finance, transaction costs are drastically reduced, and the processes constituting financial services are subdivided into detailed tasks which are combined and synthesized to new services, Such a new type of services are sometimes not subject to or even contradicting to the existing financial regulatory system.

The so called unbundling and rebundling of financial services in the process of financial innovation have brought about a large legal gray zone in financial activities, That is, newly attempted activities are not clearly judged as lawful because of its absence of the stipulated financial codes so as to be often unduly checked. Also, financial innovation where platform and data-based technology companies enter the financial markets makes the boundaries of the financial industry blurred (Big Blur) and shifts customer contact points with non-financial firms, weakening an intermediary function of traditional financial ones. Ultimately, innovation to converge ICT and finance requires changes in the financial markets, industry, and system itself so that financial authorities confronts with a situation in which they must decide switching to a new system. In this sense financial innovation in the era of digital transformation is not just deregulation in the existing sphere, but means a reform and redesign of regulations at the micro and macro level.

When digital finance becomes commonplace, the financial regulatory system will also face serious challenges. For example, virtual assets are not underpinned with a clear legal foundation but are traded like securities and geared with leverage, mimicking conventional banking and brokerage in the name of innovation. The ICT companies, which are ambiguous to be classified as financial firms under the current system, function as service providers in the financial markets, or even pursue a decentralized finance platform where financial service intermediary firms do not necessarily exist. Thus, it is not so early that policymakers set the agenda for financial innovation which is fulfilling and harmonizing with policy objectives such as consumer welfare and protection, financial industry competitiveness as well as systemic stability.

This study examines the development of financial innovations related to recent digital transformation and resulting emergence of new tasks and services, and proposes the direction of financial policies focusing on regulatory and supervisory challenges and reforms. It proposes detailed policy suggestions on how to regulate electronic payment industry and security token markets. It then deals with regulatory and supervisory issues on systemic stability and consumer protection in the prevalence of digital platform. It also argues the divergence of production and sales of financial services in the digital transformation and consequently long-time controversial debates over banking and commerce separation. Finally, it discusses a legal framework and financial policy approaches consistent with regulatory paradigm shift in the digital transformation.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Digital Payment Innovation and Financial Consumer Protection

○ Even with weak legislative support, the digital economy is gaining momentum, propelled by the recent progress in contactless financial services and digital finance’s growing convergence with other sectors.
- As the primary legal framework for digital finance, the Electronic Financial Transactions Act (EFTA) had an amendment proposal in November 2020, but the bill is still pending at the National Assembly.
- Despite its vital importance in the Korean economy as a legal foundation for financial innovation, the EFTA has remained largely intact since its enactment in 2006 and has not been sufficient institutional support for critical technological changes like the rise of fintech and big tech.

○ Key point of the amendment is opening up payment services to non-banking financial institutions, such as tech firms (big tech) and credit card firms.
- Payment services are an essential amenity in our everyday life, encompassing payment for goods and services, cash deposit and withdrawal, salary transfer, domestic and foreign remittance, and utility bill payment.
- The amendment bill introduces a license of Comprehensive Payment Service Provider (CPSP), which is allowed to provide all payment services by directly offering a checking account like banks.
- Once the bill passes, some big tech firms as well as conventional nonbank financial institutions like credit card issuers are expected to get the license of CPSP.

○ The significance of payment services lies in that this sector is the basis for nonbank entities to expand into other areas, such as banking, insurance, and financial investment in the mid-to-long term.
- Because every economic activity involves the act of paying, CPSPs can accumulate vast user data.
- Also, these operators can bring in a massive amount of funds that customers deposit for payment transfers. Such funds can be used to launch new customized investment products or expand their business to other financial markets.

○ In the longer term, opening up digital payment services may thrust the financial industry to the next level by stimulating competition from within.
- A single app or metaverse platform is all it takes for users to carry out the whole array of financial services and e-commerce, not to mention payment transfers. Also foreseeable are crumbling barriers between different subsectors within the broad financial sector and spurring competition across the entire industry.

○ Some are rather pessimistic about the open-up because they perceive it as flinging open the door of banking; however, this study does not regard it as harming financial stability.
- The required regulatory level should be on par with banking regulations when deeming CPSPs as banks, but as nonbank payment service providers the degree of restrictiveness and protection would decrease.
- This study views the core function of banks as financial intermediation, which transfers customer deposits into illiquid loans. Since payment service operators cannot provide loans, it is reasonable to regard them as nonbank payment institutions (refer to Chapter 4).

○ On the other hand, financial consumer protection remains crucial agenda.
- Since most payment service users place their funds in demand deposit accounts, protecting these funds and guaranteeing service users’ rights are critical.
- The amendment bill contains some protective measures, but in the UK, where a similar scheme has been in operation, several payment service providers went bankrupt without returning customer funds.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR A Study on Insurance Resolution

This study theoretically and empirically analyzes key issues to be considered in improving the resolution system for insolvent insurance companies and offers policy implications. The coming adoption of the new International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 17 as well as enforcement of the new capital regulation named Korean-Insurance Capital Stand (K-ICS) will likely expose the latent risk factors in domestic insurance firms and harm their financial soundness. Although a sudden, large rise in bankruptcy filings is improbable, there should be a sound institutional framework that could effectively handle the insolvency resolution in case of a default or bankruptcy of insurance firms considering the importance of the insurance industry in the financial system.

The existing approach for insolvency resolution heavily relies on government support. When an insurance company collapsed in the past, Korea usually responded with the "total portfolio transfer" (or run-off) method. In other words, a reinsurer assumed and accepted the insolvent insurer's contracts without modifications, and in the process, the government provided support like financial bailouts for the losses incurred to the reinsurer. The drawback of this government-dependent process is that it may lead to moral hazards among insurance policyholders and carriers and a fiscal burden to the government. That way, insurance consumers are not sufficiently motivated to care for the financial soundness of their insurers, and thus, the insurers have little incentive to improve their financial health. As a result, the government's fiscal burden increases as the probability and severity of insolvency grow.

The empirical analysis in this study also shows that insurance companies worldwide are highly reliant on their government. Per the analysis, should their countries' sovereign credit rating drop, so will the financial soundness of these insurers due to the accompanying reduction in the government's tacit protection for the insurance carriers. The insurance industry exhibits greater dependence on government in countries like Korea in particular, whose fiscal soundness is projected to deteriorate henceforth, or that do not issue a reserve currency, or whose insurance industry is large relative to the size of the national economy or public finance. The lesson learned is that Korea needs to improve its insolvency resolution system with stronger vigor.

Therefore, this study suggests the adoption of a new insolvency resolution regime in which policyholders are obliged to share some losses in case an insurance company collapses. As insurers' financial condition will become an important factor for consumers to consider before signing an insurance policy, the new regime can induce insurers to race for better financial health.

However, the loss-sharing regime may trigger a phenomenon called "insurance run," in which policyholders terminate their insurance contracts en masse. When a considerable number of policyholders end their contracts and exit the contractual relations altogether, it may negatively affect the business normalization of the insolvent carrier or the financial fitness of the firm acquiring the bankrupt company. The situation may exacerbate when the exit is more prevalent among relatively low-risk policyholders.

This study recommends the following policy responses in an overview of the theoretical and empirical analysis findings. First, caution should be taken not to seriously damage the continuity of original insurance contracts due to the loss-sharing requirement. In essence, insurance contracts are long-term contracts. Insurance premiums are paid at present to prepare for future insurable accidents. Especially for disease risk later in life, people purchase an insurance policy from a young age. The theoretical analysis revealed that it is desirable to set insurance premiums relative to expected risks, higher for younger and lower for older persons, for maximum social well-being. Thus, this premium structure should not be extensively altered under the loss-sharing regime. In this context, loss-sharing measures geared towards contract termination with less-profitable older policyholders in case an insurance firm goes out of business deserve reconsideration. That is to say, rather than terminating original insurance contracts with insolvent insurers, it would be advisable to keep them with minor modifications such as increasing premiums or reducing indemnity payment amounts in order to retain the contract continuity and share the losses.

Second, the loss-sharing ratio should be set at an appropriate level. The theoretical analysis shows that a higher ratio leads to contrary results: insurance firms can bring in more premium income (or pay less insurance money) from consumers retaining original contracts, but some policyholders bring them to an end. Such a trade-off should be taken into account when setting a proper ratio.

Third, a maximum of 10% requirement for loss sharing seems not to cause serious alarm for an insurance run. According to the survey analysis, it is highly probable that many insurance consumers regard the 10% requirement as lower than anticipated. Accordingly, only a few have expressed the intent to terminate their insurance contracts if so required.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Impact of Lowering the Legal Maximum Interest Rate and Policy Implications

This report estimates the effect of a cut in the legal maximum interest rate on loan application rate, loan approval rate, default probability, a ratio of borrowers whose interest rate is lowered, changes in consumer surplus, and changes in financial institution profits.

To this end, I conduct the structural model estimation to establish a demand model for financial consumers' loan application and repayment and a profit maximization model for financial institutions. After that, based on the estimation results, I present the results of a counter-factual analysis for each scenario of lowering the legal maximum interest rate and each scenario of raising the funding rate.

In all scenarios where the maximum interest rate is cut by 2%p from the 24% level to the 10% level, the reduction in consumer surplus of borrowers excluded from the market exceeds the increase in consumer surplus of borrowers whose interest rates decrease. Accordingly, further lowering of the legal maximum interest rate from the 24% level causes an average decrease in consumer surplus. On the other hand, the financial institution's profit also decreases in all scenarios. In addition, even when the funding interest rate increases at the fixed legal maximum interest rate level, consumer surplus decreases as the number of borrowers excluded from the market increases.

This means that the current policy support is essential to minimize the side effects of lowering the legal maximum interest rate. Also, the fact that an additional number of borrowers is excluded from the market when the funding rate of financial institutions rises implies the need to introduce a legal maximum interest rate system linked to the market interest rate.

Summary

Policy Study KOR The Effects of the Exception to Limited Liability on Firm’s Investment

This paper analyzes the impact of exceptions to the shareholders' limited liability principle, which exists only in Korea, on corporate activities. The paper constructs a model of a firm to examine the effect of the exceptions to the limited liability principle on corporate investment activities. It shows that the violation of limited liability increases the firm's expected corporate bankruptcy costs, thereby reducing investment. In the empirical analysis, the paper examines whether firms with the largest shareholder's stake exceeding 50%, which is the condition that the limited liability is exempted, decrease investment. The results show that corporate investment is very concentrated in observations that the largest shareholder's stake did not exceed 50%. The investment decreases sharply in the cases of the largest shareholder's stake exceeding 50%. The results of this study provide implications on how exceptions to the limited liability principle in Korea affect corporate investment activities.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Does Fiscal Instability Cause Financial Instability?

This study analyzes the impact of fiscal instability on the soundness of financial institutions. The IMF's long-term fiscal outlook (2021) forecasts Korea's public finances to weaken over the medium to long term. Deteriorating fiscal stability may undermine the soundness of the financial sector by way of the financing channels of government bonds and guarantees. Through an empirical analysis, this study finds that the higher the risk of sovereign default, as measured by credit default swap (CDS) premiums on government bonds, the higher the risk of bank default, as measured by bank bonds CDS premiums. Moreover, this study looks at other countries sharing similar fiscal and financial features as Korea―without reserve currencies, greater banking sector size relative to national revenue, and huge private sector credit that is rapidly expanding― and finds that for such countries, bank default risk is further amplified when sovereign default risk increases.

The analysis results may have two policy implications. Firstly, it is necessary to build up fiscal soundness, and this is an indispensable policy agenda item for the Korean economy to pursue over the longer term. Secondly, the banking sector needs to become less reliant on public finances and more self-sufficient. In case of a bank failure in contingencies, it is desirable to adopt a bail-in system that requires creditors to share the losses to rescue the defaulted financial institutions rather than bail-out, which provides relief at the expense of government revenue.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Remedies to Korean SOE Debt Problem

□ Benefitting from implicit government guarantees, Korean state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can readily expand their debt at an interest rate as low as sovereign bonds regardless of their ability to repay. In this scenario, Korean SOEs stand vulnerable to ‘double moral hazards’: SOEs have little incentive to improve their financial structure, and the government has a large incentive to assign popular but unprofitable projects to SOEs. In recognition of this, the government should formally acknowledge SOE debt as the ‘national guaranteed debt’ in order to ensure official supervision and regulation. In addition, the government needs to improve SOE debt structure by introducing capital regulation and bail-in bonds.

- KNOC slipped into a state of capital shortfall in 1H 2020.

- In the era of low birth rates and population aging, the financial structure of other SOEs expects a deteriorating trend to persist as well.

- This study reveals that ‘implicit guarantees’ by the government lead to heavier debt for SOEs and recommends remedies to improve the Korean SOE debt problem.

- Compared to their counterparts in the major countries, Korean SOEs have exceptionally high levels of debt.

- For financing public projects, Korea is more reliant on SOE debt than on its government debt.

- Korea’s public enterprises raise debt mainly by issuing bonds.

- Unlike bank loans requiring collateral, SOEs can issue bonds only with good credit ratings, which makes it an accessible tool to expand the debt.

- Public corporations on the brink of default can still debt-finance at a large scale at an interest rate as low as government bonds, thanks to the possibility of sovereign support.

- Owing to implicit guarantees by the government, SOEs can benefit from an interest rate lower than private ones in issuing bonds, and the resulting discount rate effect is around four trillion won per year.

- No matter how weak their fundamentals are, Korea’s public enterprises can borrow money at an interest rate 0.20%p lower than leading domestic private companies.

- Implicit guarantees by the government could lead to double moral hazard on the sides of public enterprises and government.

- First, public enterprises lack incentives to better know their fundamentals.

- Second, occasionally the government assigns infeasible projects to SOEs and mandates their execution by debt financing at a low-interest rate.

- Consequently, public enterprises end up accumulating debt on the one hand and debt capacity exhausted on the other.

- Government-guaranteed obligations need to incorporate SOE debt predominantly incurred by their bond issues, and there should be a fee for the service of a riskbased guarantee.

- Capital regulation on SOEs should be introduced to maintain financial soundness systematically.

- The disciplines on SOEs should be restored by introducing bail-in bonds where creditors share losses in case of emergencies.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Introduction of Internet-Only Banks: Effects and Policy Tasks

This study examines the results of competition promotion in the banking industry due to the introduction of internet-only banks through empirical analysis. It discusses the direction that internet-only banks should pursue to improve consumer welfare in the future through overseas case studies.

The empirical analysis can be divided into two parts. First, this study examines whether the introduction of internet-only banks improved the inclusiveness of the credit loan market in the banking sector. To this end, we determine whether borrowers who were previously unable to receive credit loans from the banking sector increase the probability of successful lending to the banking sector after internet-only banks are introduced. Next, we examine whether the introduction of internet-only banks increased competition in the banking sector’s credit loan market and decreased the interest rate corresponding to the price of loan products.

The above two analyzes find that the introduction of the internet-only bank significantly improved the tolerance of the banking sector loan market, and at the same time, contributed to the drop in interest rates in the banking sector loan market. However, these benefits also tend to be biased towards borrowers with high credit ratings.

The analysis results provide two policy implications.

First, as the purpose of the introduction, internet-only banks need to expand the information combination system to use unstructured information to enhance credit evaluation capabilities. With the recent passage of the Data 3 Act, the legal and institutional framework for using unstructured information in credit evaluation has been laid and as such, the effectiveness of this new system should be bolstered. Next, it is essential that incentives are introduced to induce internet-only banks to focus on the credit loan market rather than the already saturated mortgage market.

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