In this study we show that a politician’s local public good provision such as large-scale public projects funded by central government has positive impact on his reelection. This result confirms widely-held belief that hosting large-scale public projects is effective for electoral campaign. It also implies that politicians are trying to attract large-scale public projects to their own electoral districts for their political interests. Hence decision on whether to invest in a large-scale project and its location is much more likely to be affected by political interests. Ideally such a decision must be objective and based on which project and location is most effective and efficient to achieve policy goal. More importantly, it should not be based on personal interests. In order to reduce excessive competition among local governments and minimize unnecessary political influence, we suggest the following institutional changes: central government needs to (1) enhance fiscal accountability of local politicians, (2) increase cost share ratio of large-scale public projects by local government depending on project characteristics, (3) require detailed financing plan for local government’s share.

발간사
요 약

제1장 서 론

제2장 대규모 공공투자사업과 예비타당성조사
　제1절예비타당성조사의 법적 체계
　제2절예비타당성조사 추진절차
　제3절예비타당성조사의 주요 분석내용
　제4절예비타당성조사의 성과

제3장 실증분석
　제1절데이터 개요
　　1.자료 설명
　　2.사용 변수 설명 및 기초통계량
　제2절분석모형
　제3절실증분석 결과

제4장 정책적 논의 및 결론

참고문헌
[부 록] 분석대상 선거별 주요 특성
ABSTRACT