This paper estimates the early effect of the Chinese economic sanction on North Korea based on the United Nations Security Council resolution 2270 in 2016. Specifically, we examine the change of the Chinese government policies and perceptions on North Korea before and after the fourth DPRK nuclear test, discussing how it led to the Chinese economic sanction. Then we estimate the sanction effect between April and August 2016 using the Chinese custom’s monthly trade statistics since July 2010. The main findings of the paper are summarised as follows.

First, it is observed that the Chinese government changed to some degree its policies and attitudes toward North Korea since the fourth DPRK nuclear test. China agreed with the UN resolution 2270 applying many tough sanction measures to North Korea. And the Chinese government repeatedly emphasised its strong will to realize the measures, announcing specific trade items on which the Chines government would impose restrictions regarding the China-DPRK trade.

Second, it is however also observed that the Chinese economic sanction has clear constraints. The basic direction of the Chinese policies toward Korean peninsular has not changed fundamentally aveb after the fourth DPRK nuclear test. China still tends to see that the US is more threatening in terms of East Asian security environments than North Korea’s nuclear ambition. Indeed China has pursued ‘denuclearisation of North Korea by stabilsation of Korean peninsular’, rather than ‘stabilsation of Korean peninsular by denuclearisation of North Korea’. In this context China has emphasised the US repsonsibilities on the DPRK issues, simultaneous negotiation process of both denuclearisation and peace treaty on the Korean peninsular, so-called DPRK peoples’ lives and its strong resistance against the deployment of THHAD system to the ROK.

Third, the Chinese government announced 25 commodities in HS 10 digits as the specified objects of its economic sanction on North Korea. These items could be aggregated into 20 commodities in HS 8 digits for the purpose of data analysis. Of those 20 commodities, however, 12 commodities had not been traded between China and North Korea at all. It means that the Chines economic sanction could work only for the 40 percent of the announced sanction objects.

Fourth, a variety of econometric tests were carried out in oder to identify whether there were statistically significant changes in the China-DPRK trade since the Chines government announced to implement its sanction measures in March 2016. And the results are ① there were no such changes in terms of total trade between the two countries, ② no such changes in terms of the specified sanction objects in general, ③ no such changes in terms of each of the sanction objects with only one exception: North Korea’s export of Gold asnd Gold Ores. To sum up, data analysis suggests that there was no significant effect of Chinese sanction between April and August 2016.

Preface
Executive Summary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 China's Implementation of Sanctions Against North Korea After the Fourth Nuclear Test
　Section 1 Xi Jinping Administration’s Basic Stance on Sanctions Against North Korea
　Section 2 China’s Perception and Response to North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test
　Section 3 China’s Sanctions Measures Against North Korea
　Section 4 Assessment of China’s Willingness to Enforce Sanctions and Policy Implications

Chapter 3 Characteristics of China's Sanctions and Preparatory Work for Data Analysis
　Section 1 Key Features and Scope of China’s Sanctions Against North Korea
　Section 2 Technical Challenges in Analyzing China’s Sanctions and Solutions
　Section 3 Formalization of China’s Sanctions for Data Analysis

Chapter 4 Analysis of the Effectiveness of China's Sanctions Against North Korea
　Section 1 Scope of Analysis
　Section 2 Methodology
　Section 3 Results and Discussion
　Section 4 Conclusion―Comprehensive Results and Revalidation

Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Implications

References
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