When the US hedge fund management firm, Elliott Management, opposed its takeover of Cheil Industries in 2015, Samsung C&T proceeded to sell its entire treasury holdings to KCC Corporation. Thereafter, using its newly acquired voting rights, KCC Corporation approved the merger. The fact that such a transaction was possible is owed to Korea’s current laws, permitting the sale of treasury stocks with only a board resolution. Essentially, the sale of treasury stocks and issuance of new shares are one in the same. as both increase stock trade volume and secure outside funding. However, a discrepancy exists between the two according to contemporary law, and this, in turn, creates a loophole that can be made by companies to protect their management rights. Still, not all identical economic natures require identical legal regulations. if the positive economic impact generated from the sale of treasury stocks is significant enough, considerations can be made within the legal system. Accordingly, this study examines the economic impact of the protection of management rights through the sale of treasury stock. Take for example, a controlling shareholder who is managing two different companies in two different sectors; companies A and B. Then, an outside managing executive appears with the intent to obtain the management rights of company B. In response, in order to protect his or her managing rights, the controlling shareholder mobilizes company A’s funds to purchase company B’s treasury stocks. If the increased efficiency and reduced transaction costs gained through the integrated management of these two companies, outweigh the damages caused by the sale of the treasury stocks, i.e. the losses incurred from the rushed sale of shares and lost investment opportunities, then the general and minority shareholders will still benefit, even if the controlling shareholder uses treasury shares to protect his or her management rights. Additionally, if the gains plus that from the control premium are larger than the loss, the control shareholder will again use treasury stocks to protect his or her management rights, despite the fact the gains that can be obtained from integrated management are insufficient. In this case, only the controlling shareholder will benefit while the general and minority shareholders suffer from damages. Then, how will the sale of treasury stocks affect general and minority shareholders? Let‘s examine some real cases. In 2003, as foreign investors began to aggressively purchase its shares, Hyundai Elevator sold its treasury holdings to six white knights including KCC Corporation. However, considering that the sale was rushed, it is highly likely that the general and minority shareholders sustained damages, while the controlling shareholders reaped the benefits from maintaining their control premium. Meanwhile, in 2008, Hyundai Motor Company acquired Shinheung Securities to launch HMC Investment Securities. And upon its launch, HMC Investment Securities sold its treasury stocks to Hyundai, Kia Motors, Hyundai Mobis, Hyundai Steel and Hyundai AMCO to increase its holding stake. However, given that little synergy was expected between the affiliated companies, the transaction would have been unwelcomed by the general and minority shareholders while it served as a prosperous opportunity for the controling shareholders who were able to gain the management rights by rallying the funds of affiliated companies. As such, in cases where the sale of treasury stocks is used as a means to protect management rights, the policy considerations must be rational to ensure that management efficiency is enhanced. And, restrictions must be enforced in cases of overprotection, which have unfavorable consequences for the general and minority shareholders. [Interveiw] In the long-term, laws and systems should be reformed so that the sale of treasury stocks reflects the economic nature. Also, before implementing large-scale reforms on the current laws and systems for treasury stock sales, regulations on selling practices that generate damages for general and minority shareholders are urgently needed. For example, the supervisory authority could enforce a screening process for the sale of treasury stocks. But, because voluntary regulation via the markets is more imperative than governmental supervision, an overall systematic revision should be conducted for the independent role of the board of directors and general and minority shareholders’ damage claims, among others.