This study aims to find the implications of a separation between ownership and control and the autonomy of the board of directors through an empirical analysis focusing on the management of founding families and control by a professional executive. New databases were established by directly gathering information on the management and board of directors of the top 445 listed non-financial and private companies in terms of sales from 2010 to 2017. Analysis of the data revealed that the incentives for CEOs can vary depending on whether the company is operated by the founding family or a professional executive. It also found that the impact of the autonomy of the board of directors on company performance is also contingent on whether the founding family is involved in management. Generally, an increase in the CEO’s stake improves a company’s operational performance, and such an effect appears to be stronger in companies managed by founding families, or at least similar to those operated by a professional executive. Additionally, having more outside board members who have social ties with the CEO (school, hometown, etc.) was found to adversely affect operational performance, which was observed only in companies run by professional executives. This means that, contrary to the common belief that a ‘friendly’ outside board member can serve as an advisor and expert who has a positive influence on the company, when the autonomy of outside board members is compromised, their role as supervisor weakens significantly when a professional executive is in charge of operations. These findings imply that although it is a common belief that ownership and control should be separated, professional executives should have control and the founding family should be excluded from management, the optimum governance structure can differ based on the conditions of each company.

Preface
Executive Summary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Literature Review
　Section 1 Theoretical Discussions
　Section 2 Empirical Results

Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development on Founding Family Management and Corporate Governance

Chapter 4 Data

Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis of CEO Incentives and Corporate Performance

Chapter 6 Conclusion and Policy Implications

References
Appendix
ABSTRACT