The efforts of international organizations such as the UN and EU are prompting anti-corruption agencies to spring up across multiple countries as a useful tool to curb corruption. The success of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau of Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong broadened the horizon for the fight against corruption and built momentum for this movement.

The aims of this study are two-fold: (1) clarification of the conditions of an anti-corruption agency that increase the possibility of investigation and punishment of corruption crimes and (2) identification of policy implications for strengthening Korea’s anti-corruption capacity.

More specifically, this study analyzes how the presence or absence of the right to prosecute in an anti-corruption agency affects its effectiveness. An analysis of dynamic panel data demonstrates that corruption is exacerbated with the power to prosecute given to anti-corruption authorities. The data also show that the lack of such a prosecutorial power reduces corruption, increases prosecutions for office abuse, and strengthens the rule of law.

With the right to prosecute, an anti-corruption agency will weaken its anti-corruption capacity due to collusion or obstruction, and without the power, it will strengthen its function to combat corruption through competition with the prosecutor’s office or police.

Per “double jeopardy,” with the right to prosecute on top of the right to investigate, an anti-corruption body has no choice but to have jurisdiction strictly separate from the prosecutor’s office, so there is no effect of reducing moral hazard through competition. Instead, collusion between authorities with the right to prosecute or obstruction of one another’s investigations may weaken the anti-corruption capacity.

Accordingly, the criminal justice system should be designed based on the principle of checks and balances, taking into account the possibility of conflicts of interest between investigator, prosecutor, potential criminals, or their guardians. The most important thing is that an objective and strict investigation by those who have no interest in the case should always be premised.

Publisher's Note
Summary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Related Literature

Chapter 3 Hypotheses

Chapter 4 Data

Chapter 5 Methodology

Chapter 6 Results

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Policy Implications

References

Appendix

Abstract