The Korean HCI drive provides a valuable case study of
industrial policy and industrial targeting with mixed results and
divided evaluations. Measuring the success or failure of the HCI
drive in a comprehensive and dynamic perspective is a difficult
task. The conflicting evaluations of the HCI drive contribute to
the difficulty of evaluation. It is widely accepted that the HCI
drive was overambitious and resulted in a serious misallocation
of resources(Liepziger 1988, Park 1986m Kwack 1984). It has
also been criticized for negative spillover effects including
inflation, foreign debt accumulation, current account deficits, and
a crowding-out effect on light industries.

Nevertheless, some economists argue that many goals of the
policy were in fact achieved, and that the HCI drive provided a
springboard for upgrading the industrial structure in the 1980s.
the heavy and chemical industry drive in the 1970s provided a
major impetus for structural change in the Korean economy, and
Korea has made significant progress in shifting its export
structure from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, moderately
skill-intensive products. The heavy and chemical industries`
share in exports by 1980, but exceeded the target only a few
years later, reaching 54% in 1983. The value-added structure of
the economy also shifted sharply toward these industries.

Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Historical Overview of the HCI Drive
Ⅲ. Policy Instruments for the HCI Drive
Ⅳ. Results of the HCI Drive in the 1970's
Ⅴ. Adjustment Policies in the 1980's
Ⅵ. Lessons from the HCI Drive