In a free and competitive financial market, resources are efficiently allocated via interest rates—i.e, the price of money—not only enhancing total output, investment and employment but also driving out or restructuring inefficient firms. Indeed, a well-functioning financial market, by allocating financial resources, fosters new firms consistently to enable competition between efficient firms, promotes investment to enhance productivity and increases employment to nurture economic growth. However, there is the possibility that private financial institutions will take unduly high risks driven by excessive profit seeking, and such a practice, if unchecked or poorly managed, can pose a serious threat to the entire financial system. This is why financial regulations and supervision are needed.

As such, certain premises are assumed for an efficient and stable financial market, which include an advanced private financial market, minimized government role and guaranteed independence of the financial supervisory authority. Nevertheless, governments are often tempted to intervene in the private financial market for a range of reasons—underdeveloped financial market, pressure from concerned interest groups/political parties, industrial upgrading, short-term economic stimulus and so on. Given the high information asymmetry in the financial market, government intervention will disrupt the allocation of credit into where it could be used most efficiently, meaning a loss of the financial market’s functional efficacy. Even in such cases, if the government remains only as a ‘regulator,’ the supervisory authority―independent from the government―would be able to put certain restrictions on government intervention, but if the government holds the authority to supervise, too, its intervention in the financial market would be like a car without brakes.

This study adopts various angles to address the structural problems within the financial market in which conflicts of interest reside over pressure from interest groups/ political parties, industrial upgrading and short-term economic stimulus. Furthermore, the ultimate purpose of this study is to redefine the role of government in the financial market and to draw upon measures to minimize the problems arising from conflicts of interest.

발간사
총론 및 요약

제1장 정부 금융시장 개입의 정치경제학 (김재훈)
　제1절 서 론
　제2절 관련 문헌
　제3절 연구 질문
　제4절 분석자료
　제5절 공기업 신용의 영향 분석
　제6절 공기업 신용의 결정요인 분석
　제7절 결론 및 정책적 시사점
　참고문헌

제2장 구제금융 보증을 통한 정부개입의 경제적 효과 (황순주)
　제1절 서 론
　제2절 구제금융 보증(bailout guarantee)의 중요성과 베일인(bail-in) 체제
　제3절 구제금융 보증의 후생효과: 이론분석
　제4절 분석 결과에 관한 논의
　제5절 결론 및 정책적 시사점
　참고문헌

제3장 금융관료 출신 임원의 고용이 금융회사 경영에 미치는 효과 (이기영·황순주)
　제1절 서 론
　제2절 금융부문에서 회전문 인사 현상이 존재하는가?
　제3절 회전문 인사는 사회적으로 바람직한가?
　제4절 결 론
　참고문헌

제4장 금융 사이클에 대한 분석과 거시건전성 관리체계의 개선방향 (김영일)
　제1절 서 론
　제2절 금융 사이클과 거시건전성정책에 대한 논의
　제3절 거시건전성 위험에 대한 분석: 금융 사이클을 중심으로
　제4절 거시건전성 관리체계의 취약성
　제5절 거시건전성 관리체계의 개선방향 논의
　제6절 결 론
　참고문헌

제5장 정부소유은행과 금융감독 독립성의 관계 (정대희·김재훈)
　제1절 서 론
　제2절 기존 연구
　제3절 실증분석
　제4절 사례연구: 한국산업은행에 대한 자본확충
　제5절 정책적 시사점
　제6절 결 론
　참고문헌
　부 록

ABSTRACT