Using data on personal credit information from the Korea Credit Bureau (KCB), this study examines the long- and short-term impact of Korea’s two representative political microcredit products: the Sunshine (Haetsal) Loan and New Hope Seed (Saehuimang Holssi, NHS) Loan. This study also analyzes the impact of the guarantee ratio level of the Sunshine-Loan on borrowers’ repayment capacity.

Around 2010, the interest rate for unsecured loans to borrowers with low credit scores (7 and below) was as high as 40%, and many were using predatory lending schemes that charge extremely high interest rates. To resolve the situation, the financial authorities put into operation political microcredit products for low-income, low-credit borrowers that charge lower interest than the market rate. But while there have been much criticism and speculation over the actual effects of these programs, they have not undergone any impact evaluations to examine whether those products should be sustained. In particular, the Sunshine-Loan suffers from a considerably high subrogation rate; making performance evaluations even more necessary.

In this context, Chapter 3 analyzes the long-term behavioral patterns of the borrowers of political microcredit products, including their average interest rates, cash advances, credit scores, credit card payments, and whether they filed for debt modification. It also summarizes how Korea’s credit loan market has changed after the launch of political microcredit products.

In Chapter 4 and 5, to discern the causal effects of the provision of political microcredit, this study constructed a control group of non-users who have similar traits to policy loan users through the propensity score matching (PSM) technique, and then analyzed the economic effects and performance of policy loans using the difference-in-difference (DID) method. Specifically, Chapter 4 examines the various aspects of the borrowers of the Sunshine Loan and NHS Loan in 2012 and 2014, such as DTI, credit card expenditure, credit score, average interest rate, etc. Chapter 5 looks into the changes in the use of high-interest rate unsecured loans provided by private money lenders and savings banks among political microcredit borrowers in 2016.

Chapter 6 analyzes the effects of the change in the credit guarantee ratio on the probability of filing for subrogation or debt modification among the borrowers of the Sunshine Loan with a logistics regression analysis.

The chapter can be summarized as follows. Borrowers of the Sunshine Loan and NHS Loan show a larger increase in credit card expenditure than non-borrowers, meaning that the provision of microcredit can reduce borrowing constraints and encourage consumption. However, six months later, borrowers exhibit lower credit scores than non-borrowers as well as an increase in their DTI ratio. Moreover, the likelihood of borrowers filing for debt modification decreases only for a short period. These results suggest that another policy is needed for the borrowers of the Sunshine Loan and NHS Loan to support long-term credit management.

According to the analysis in Chapter 5, the probability of taking out unsecured loans from private money lenders and savings banks was significantly low during the early period of loan issuance. But this increased dramatically, and even exceeded that of non-borrowers after six months among Sunshine- Loan borrowers and after two years among NHS-Loan borrowers. This reaffirms the necessity of a support policy for long-term credit management so that borrowers do not have to take out other loans that charge high interest rates.

The analysis results in Chapter 6 show that when the Sunshine Loan’s credit guarantee ratio is low, the probability of subrogation and debt modification decreases. It is found that borrowers who are given a credit guarantee ratio of 85% are 30%p less likely to choose subrogation and 17%p less likely to file for debt modification, compared to those given a ratio of 95%. This means that a high credit guarantee ratio could actually weaken financial institutions’ efforts such as ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring.

Based on the analysis results of this study, three policy implications can be drawn upon. First, government-funded political microcredit need to be combined with credit management education and credit counseling to help borrowers to manage their credit scores on their own and in the long-term. Second, instead of simply taking out lump sums that are close to the borrowing limit at once, borrowers need to be encouraged to borrow multiple times, and only the amount they can repay at each time, which could help maintain the positive effects of public microcredit in the long-term. Additionally, this method is expected to slash the commission for loan agents and to help borrowers repay their debts on time. Third, the credit guarantee ratio for the Sunshine Loan, which is currently at 95%, needs to be lowered to below 85% so that financial institutions are able to conduct ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring in a comprehensive and timely manner.

발간사
요 약

제1장 서 론

제2장 선행연구 및 서민금융제도 소개
　제1절 선행연구
　제2절 정책성 서민금융 상품 및 제도

제3장 기초자료 분석: 정책성 서민금융상품 이용자의 행태 및 신용대출시장의 특성 추이
　제1절 햇살론⋅새희망홀씨 이용자의 행태 변화
　제2절 정책성 서민금융상품 출시 전후 신용대출시장
　제3절 소 결

제4장 정책성 서민금융상품이 이용자의 경제적 상태에 미친 영향 분석
　제1절 연구의 필요성
　제2절 분석 방법과 자료의 성격
　제3절 햇살론 이용자의 성과분석
　제4절 새희망홀씨 이용자의 성과분석
　제5절 소 결

제5장 햇살론, 새희망홀씨 이용이 고금리 신용대출 이용에 미친 영향 분석
　제1절 문제제기 및 분석방법
　제2절 PSME-DID 회귀분석 결과
　제3절 소 결

제6장 햇살론 보증비율이 대위변제⋅채무조정 신청확률에 미치는 영향 분(사건연구)
　제1절 문제제기
　제2절 연구가설과 분석방법 소개
　제3절 실증분석 결과와 해석
　제4절 소 결

제7장 결론: 종합 및 정책제언
　제1절 연구 결과의 요약
　제2절 정책제언

참고문헌
ABSTRACT