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KDI - Korea Development Institute

KDI - Korea Development Institute



Policy Study Competitive Bottleneck Platform’s Strategies and Policy Intervention November 30, 2020


Series No. 2020-02

Policy Study KOR Competitive Bottleneck Platform’s Strategies and Policy Intervention #Competition Policy #Market Structure #Corporate Studies: Business Strategy #Market Regulation: Entry, Pricing, Quality Regulation
DOI P-ISBN979-11-5932-586-1 E-ISBN979-11-5932-595-3

November 30, 2020

  • 프로필
    CHO, Sung Ick
This research studies a competitive bottleneck market. Reviewing the exiting literature, I try to enhance our understanding of the competitive bottleneck market, and discuss policy intervention tools based on the understanding. I also construct a theoretical model on the business coordination strategy between a platform and seller-side users, to investigate the effect on market competition, market structure, innovation activities, and user welfare. The business coordination, such as exclusive contracts and mergers, can resolve the competitive bottleneck situation, relieve the buyer-side competition, and harm single-homing buyer’s welfare. In the case of merger in which the platform acquires some of the multi-homing sellers, some of sellers can be single-homing. Or seller-side can disappear as the platform internalizes all seller-side users. Then, the (competitive bottleneck) market becomes two-sided single-homing market or the one-sided market. This study shows that the platform has an incentive to adopt the business coordination strategy, to remove the competitive bottleneck and increase the profits.

The policy suggestion in this work can be divided into three groups. The first is industrial policy, the second is regulation policy, and the last is consumer protection. For the industrial policy, I discuss the government assistance to secure users and the innovation support for the sellers, in the view of the long-term productivity improvement. For the regulation / consumer protection, I concentrate on the consumer welfare (or user welfare). When the seller-side users are consist of mid and small size businesses or self-employed businesses, the welfare of seller-side users becomes a policy maker’s concern, as well as the consumer welfare.

To discipline the abuse of market dominance by the competitive bottleneck platform, the large scale modification for the existing regulation tools is needed. In the competitive bottleneck market, the anti-competitive conducts can happen in the competitive side of the market, rather than in monopoly side of the market. Thus, we need new perspectives to regulate the anti-competitive conducts. For the cartel cases, we also need the significant modification in the regulation schemes. The restrained competition on one side can promote the competition on the other side. For the merger investigation, we need to study how the market structure, competition patterns, and user welfare change, as well as the possibility of foreclosing effects and exploitative conducts, which are examined currently.
요 약

제1장 서 론
 제1절 연구의 의의
 제2절 연구의 목적
 제3절 연구 결과 및 보고서 구성

제2장 경쟁적 병목 시장과 플랫폼의 전략
 제1절 양면시장과 플랫폼
 제2절 경쟁적 병목 시장
 제3절 보론: 경쟁적 병목 균형의 존재

제3장 플랫폼의 사업연계 전략과 시장구조 변경
 제1절 배타적 계약
 제2절 플랫폼과 생산자 간 인수⋅합병

제4장 생산자 시장에서의 플랫폼 간 차별성
 제1절 불완전한 경쟁적 병목 모형
 제2절 논의: 플랫폼의 시장구조 변경 전략

제5장 시장제도와 플랫폼 전략에 대한 정부 정책
 제1절 경쟁적 병목 시장과 정부 정책
 제2절 플랫폼의 시장구조 변경 전략과 정부 정책

제6장 결 론

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