KDI - Korea Development Institute - RESEARCH - Research Areas

Summary

KDI FOCUS Improving Regulations on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position by Digital Platforms

Applying the current regulatory framework for abuse of superior bargaining position to abusive conduct (gapjil in Korean) by digital platforms presents two key challenges: identifying harmed parties (victims) and incorporating efficiency considerations. Requiring the identification of each harmed party imposes significant procedural burdens in handling platform abuse cases and may be inadequate to remedy actual harm. In addition, given the intermediary nature of platform services, unfair trading practices may yield direct benefits for other user groups besides victims. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the relevant systems to reduce the burden of identifying victims and to examine possibilities for efficiency gains.

- Concern over platform abuse runs high, yet regulatory frameworks premised on the superior bargaining position of traditional firms fail to capture the inherent nature of platform businesses, which generate both economic harm and efficiency gains.

- Discussions on platform regulation have increasingly focused on ex-ante solutions. However, given the complementarity between new and existing frameworks, strengthening ex-post enforcement against abuse of superior bargaining positions remains crucial to reflect the distinctive characteristics of digital platforms.

- In assessing superior bargaining position, key factors are the extent of dependence by the counterparty (Party B) on the superior firm (Party A) and disparities in their scale or capacity.

- The superior data capabilities of digital platforms increase the potential for abuse of superior bargaining position.

- The rapid pace of market change amplifies the risk of abuse through expanding monopsony power.

- Conversely, the smaller scale of platform-specific investment mitigates the risk of abusing bargaining position.

- Whereas market-dominant position is absolute, allowing firms to change trading terms regardless of counterparties, bargaining position is relative, varying with counterparties.

- Earlier rulings under the Large Retail Business Act imposed a lighter burden in identifying counterparties(Party B) when establishing a superior bargaining position, but the Seoul High Court has recently required individual specification of harm for each victim.

- For platforms, the authority to set and revise transactional rules substantially amplifies the potential for abusing their bargaining position through changing trading terms, but their role as general rulesetters limits their ability to exploit counterparties individually.

- Mandating the specification of Party B in cases involving abuse of a superior bargaining position by platforms is misaligned with the economic realities of platforms with general rule-setting authority.

- The intermediary role of platforms broadens the scope of direct stakeholders in platform transactions, creating the possibility that conduct seemingly exploitative toward certain users may instead yield direct and substantial benefits for users on the opposite side or in related positions.

- Because abuse of superior bargaining position by platforms can cause widespread harm across many parties, the burden of identifying harmed parties should be eased when common circumstances among them are sufficiently established.

- When harm among users becomes widespread, regulation should consider the impact on the trade practice to ensure that it reflects real economic conditions.

- Given the possibility for directly affected third parties to benefit from abusive practices by platforms, efficiency-enhancing effects should be examined during case review.

- Because the authority of platforms to set and revise general rules endows the absolute dominant position, it will be necessary to shift toward regulating
abuses of market-dominant positions in the long term.

Summary

Policy Study KOR A Study on Strategic Procurement

Around the world, public procurement is increasingly being designed to serve broader social objectives ― such as supporting disadvantaged groups or promoting innovation ― alongside its traditional economic goals. This trend is also gaining momentum in Korea. In this paper, we refer to the use of procurement to achieve these secondary aims as “strategic public procurement” and explore its potential benefits and costs. Specifically, we conduct an empirical analysis of strategic procurement practices that prioritize certain companies or products, with a focus on Korea’s purchase target ratio system. Our findings suggest that procurement aimed at fostering innovation can be economically effective, whereas evidence supporting procurement targeted at disadvantaged groups is less consistent.

Summary

Policy Study KOR A Study on the Superior Bargaining Position of Digital Platforms

This report analyzes the superior bargaining position of digital platform companies and their exploitation of this advantage. Two key characteristics underpin this position: (i) their advanced capacity for data collection and utilization compared to traditional firms, and (ii) their role as rule-setters within the marketplaces they have established.

Existing literature identifies three primary sources of their bargaining power: (i) information asymmetry, (ii) demand-side monopoly power, and (iii) hold-up arising from relationship-specific investments. Due to their superior data collection and utilization capabilities, platform firms are better positioned than traditional firms to exploit information asymmetry, thereby abusing their bargaining position. Additionally, the dynamic nature of platform markets often magnifies demand-side monopoly power. Despite a small market share, platforms can still exert significant market influence depending on user behavior. However, hold-up concerns over relationship-specific investments are less pronounced because platforms, which typically offer standardized terms of trade, find it challenging to enforce customized contract terms tailored to individual business users. Under customized contracts, the likelihood and severity of exploitation through hold-ups become most acute.

Theoretical model analysis reveals that platform firms may have incentives to refrain from using even the information they have acquired to capitalize on their superior bargaining position. Regarding relationship-specific investments, the inability to adopt customized contracts can encourage business users to invest despite the absence of a binding commitment mechanism―in sharp contrast with existing studies on relationship-specific investments and investment delays.

In concludion, this analysis highlights several critical issues that must be addressed to improve the short-term effectiveness and long-term consistency of regulatory measures targeting the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platform firms. First, discussions are needed on victim identification and the impact on the trade order. Current legal precedents requiring the identification of specific victims could hinder efforts to regulate the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platforms. For platforms that set rules for a wide range of counterparties, mandating counterparty specification could significantly limit the regulatory scope for addressing the abuse of superior bargaining positions. In the short term, therefore, it is advisable to alleviate the burden of identifying specific counterparties while still requiring evidence of adverse impacts on the trade oreder, consistent with the Geumbo Development precedent. Moreover, given the multi-sidedness of digital platforms, it is important to consider efficiency-enhancing or pro-competitive effects that may arise in adjacent markets or on the opposite side of the platform when examining instances of superior bargaining position abuse. In the long term, it would be preferable to transition toward regulation through competition law enforcement, such as addressing abuses of market-dominant positions. Acts that harm the trade order against unspecified counterparties are inherently subject to competition law. However, the current reliance on market share as a proxy for market dominance should be replaced by direct measure of market power, and legislative reforms, such as amendments to presumptive provisions, may also be necessary. Finally, to deter and promptly detect abuses of superior bargaining positions by platforms, it is essential to establish a dedicated, permanent oversight bodyendowed with the authority to access data or algorithms as needed.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Anticompetitive Practices of Online Platforms: Focusing on App Stores

As economic and daily activities increasingly shift to mobile platforms, concerns are mounting over the excessive influence of platforms that play a central role in the mobile ecosystem. In particular, app stores, primary channels for distributing apps that enable online access via mobile devices, draw significant scrutiny from competition authorities, as platform dominance in the mobile operating systems (OS) market directly transfers to this market.

This study examines recent global regulatory trends concerning the app store market, identifying key anticompetitive practices by app store platforms: monopolization of app distribution, forcing proprietary payment systems, and self-preferencing. Among these, self-preferencing manifests in various forms and occurs when platforms enter adjacent markets they mediate, competing with business users. Thus, one of the critical issues in regulating the app store market is the entry of app store platforms into their own app stores and its implications.

Against this backdrop, the study focuses on analyzing issues related to platform entry into their own app stores. Theoretically, such an entry can have positive and negative impacts, necessitating empirical analysis. A comparative review of prior empirical studies on the app store platforms of Google and Apple reveals mixed effects on competing app developers’ innovation, varying by platform and app in question.

Given the challenge of defining an app market revealed by prior studies, this study conducts further empirical analysis using detailed app classification criteria from data.ai. This approach enables a more granular market definition and examination of multiple platform entry cases. Analysis of 16 Apple app launches, using data on apps available for download in the Korean App Store, finds the impact on competing developers’ innovation inconclusive. The effects likely vary by the platform app’s characteristics, the entered market’s competitive dynamics, and whether anticompetitive behaviors occur post-entry, yet further pathway analysis is needed.

While not providing direct policy implications, this study offers empirical evidence to inform app store market competition policies. Literature and this study’s findings suggest platform entry into app markets may yield positive effects, rendering blanket bans on platforms selling their own apps to prevent self-preferencing inadvisable. Recent competition authority actions targeting self-preferencing have spurred arguments against prohibiting proprietary app sales; however, such sales must be strictly distinguished from self-preferencing practices.

Summary

Policy Study KOR CBDC-based New Banking System, Bank Runs, and Efficient Allocation

Digital financial innovation drives the development of the financial industry, offering new benefits to financial consumers. However, as demonstrated by the 2023 bank run involving Silicon Valley Bank, it also heightens the risk of digital bank runs. In exploring how to prevent bank runs while ensuring the efficiency of financial intermediation, this study examines a new banking system proposed in Europe, the CBDC next-level model: A central bank issues retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) to monopolize demand deposit-taking and supply these funds as pass-through funding to commercial banks. In turn, banks provide loans to private borrowers using these funds. This system removes barriers to entry in the loan market to allow for free competition among commercial banks, fintechs, and Big Tech companies, thereby introducing perfect competition. Rigorous theoretical analysis in this study shows that this novel system could eliminate bank runs while achieving socially optimal levels of financial intermediation. Nonetheless, this model also presents some limitations, such as the centralization of personal information by the central bank and the potential political influence over lending decisions.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Competition Policy in the Digital Platform Economy

Digital platforms have boosted consumer welfare and driven innovation and competition by integrating diverse technological advancements. These online platforms facilitate easier business transactions, instant information and content sharing, and the introduction of new products and services. However, as economic agents increasingly depend on them, concerns are growing about the excessive concentration of economic power in a limited number of platforms. As a result, in the past few years, competition policy related to digital platforms has gained more attention, prompting vigorous discussions for improvement.

Globally, competition authorities have conducted numerous investigations, and there have been several lawsuits regarding the abuse of market power by digital platforms, along with active merger reviews. In addition, major jurisdictions, including Germany, the EU, and the US, have taken legislative actions to bolster regulations over their market dominance outside the purview of current competition or antitrust law. This policy shift stems from recognizing the limitations of existing competition policies, as enforcing such laws against the anti-competitive behaviors of digital platforms becomes increasingly challenging, and there is criticism about the asynchronicity in ex-post regulatory approaches.

Against this backdrop, this report puts forth directions for competition policy reform to effectively address anti-competitive behavior by digital platform firms. The focus is on the abuse of market power and mergers that contributed to acquiring and strengthening their dominance. This report consists of four chapters as follows. The first two chapters deal with the unilateral conduct of digital platforms. Chapter 1 analyzes self-preferencing practices resulting from their dual roles, drawing out appropriate regulatory improvement measures based on their categorization, a review of their economic effects, and empirical analysis results. Chapter 2 examines the issue of platform fees, which has become a significant social concern. While exploring desirable approaches, this chapter assesses whether this issue can be viewed from the perspective of price abuse whenhigh platform fees areproblematic by reviewing price abuse cases.

The next two chapters include studies on platform mergers, focusing on vertical and conglomerate mergers, which are receiving increasing attention as they are actively used to form platform ecosystems and diversify businesses. Chapter 3 analyzes how to consider the potential for self-preferencing by platforms in the merger review process. Self-preferencing is possible only when a platform has a dual role, securing its own or affiliated firms that compete with its business users, and non-horizontal mergers are a primary means of acquiring this dual position. Based on literature reviews and theoretical analysis, this chapter identifies considerations for non-horizontal merger reviews related to self-preferencing. Lastly, Chapter 4 investigates the formation and reinforcement of entry barriers due to platform mergers. Through theoretical analysis and reviews of past cases, this chapter provides recommendations for effectively evaluating entry barrier issues in merger reviews.

The collective conclusions can be summarized in two points. Firstly, competition policy reform should fully reflect the unique characteristics of digital platforms. The analysis of their typical unilateral conduct and mergers indicates that their economic effects and pathways are not fundamentally different from those of traditional companies. However, the distinct features of digital platforms can lead to new or multiple forms of anti-competitive behavior, make certain actions more pronounced or severe, and heighten the complexity and technical challenges in analyzing and judging their anti-competitive effects.

Secondly, caution is needed when introducing or strengthening antitrust regulations that extend beyond existing legal frameworks. This report emphasizes the importance of better market monitoring and industry-led discussions on active regulatory intervention on platform fees. For self-preferencing and platform mergers, it highlights the value of case-by-case reviews with assessment criteria for effectiveness. Without sufficient consideration for the dynamism of the digital market, where rapid technological change and innovation lead to emerging business models and blurred market boundaries, regulations mayend up hindering innovation incentives, ultimately hurting competition in the long run. Digital platform competition policy should achieve a delicate balance between reducing the harms of monopolies and protecting the incentives for innovation and healthy competition. At present, a flexible response approach to competition law is deemed necessary, tailored to the specific context of each case, while enhancing enforcement through improved timeliness and effectiveness.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Competition Policy for Online Platforms’ Self-Preferencing Conducts

Self-preferencing by online platforms encompasses a spectrum of conduct types, all with implications for both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. Therefore, it is desirable to maintain the current ex-post regulatory framework, which applies the rule of reason and intervenes only when such practices are deemed to be unjust or harmful to fair competition, rather than imposing a blanket ban. However, the timeliness and efficiency of enforcement mechanisms should be improved in light of the distinct characteristics of the online environments and self-preferencing conducts.

- Online platforms are increasingly central to daily life, with some experiencing exponential growth to reach enormous scales.

- As concerns grow about the over-concentration of economic power in a small number of online platforms, discussions on improving competition policies related to market dominance have intensified.

- As major countries strengthen regulations on online platform monopolies, self-preferencing practices have become a key area of focus.

- This paper proposes directions for improving competition policy to effectively address self-preferencing practices by online platforms.

- Self-preferencing refers to the conduct of a platform favoring its own or affiliated products and services over those of competitors, arising from the platform’s dual role.

- Self-preferencing encompasses heterogeneous conduct types, so it needs to be categorized and specified for proper discipline.

- In this paper, self-preferencing is categorized into four types.

- First, preferential placement through undisclosed algorithms involves favoring a platform’s own products in search rankings or other prominent positioning.

- Second, identifiable preferential placement involves platforms pre-installing or setting their own software as default.

- Third, discriminatory access to data occurs when a platform exclusively uses non-public data to develop its own products.

- Fourth, discriminatory access to other inputs and markets arises when a platform grants preferential access to inputs and market for its own products.

- The primary impact of self-preferencing conduct on competing business users varies depending on the type, potentially reducing business opportunities, weakening innovation incentives, or lowering quality.

- As a result, price, quality, and innovation competition in adjacent markets may be stifled.

- Preferential placement also has the characteristics of exploitative abuse.

- Conversely, self-preferencing can also have positive effects, such as lowering product prices, maintaining or improving quality, reducing consumer search costs, increasing product diversity, and promoting competition and innovation.

- Self-preferencing can have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects, and the overall impact cannot be definitively determined.

- Self-preferencing by online platforms should be regulated appropriately.

- As overregulation may result in even greater unintended side effects, it would be desirable to apply the rule of reason to self-preferencing, regulating it only when deemed unjust.

- While the current ex-post approach for competition law enforcement does not require material changes, it is necessary to enhance its timeliness and efficiency.

- Undue strictness should be avoided in market definition and assessments of market dominance.

- For the implementation of ex-ante designation, it would be advisable to limit its scope to certain conduct types where efficiency effects are limited and enforcement is difficult.

- Explicitly banning selfpreferencing requires a clear description of the specific conducts involved.

- To mitigate enforcement challenges, it is worth considering granting competition authorities timely access to platform algorithms and data or imposing obligations on platforms to retain relevant information.

- If the burden of proof is to be shifted to businesses to ease the load on competition authorities,

- it should be limited to certain types.

- A commitment decision can be an effective tool to complement the enforcement of competition law.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Restructuring Platform Merger Review

Platform mergers differ significantly from traditional mergers. In platform mergers, foreclosure issues, which are crucial in traditional vertical mergers, carry less significance but may still arise indirectly. Platforms, moreover, can favor their own businesses potentially disadvantaging competitors, and leverage their market power to new businesses. Lastly, entry barriers could increase as a result of platforms’ multi-service provisions. Nevertheless, platforms can enhance consumer welfare, especially through product (service) bundling. Thus, we need to overhaul the merger review system to incorporate the aforementioned characteristics of platform mergers.

- Amidst the escalating debate on platform regulation, there has been a surge in platform mergers, leading to a corresponding increase in the need for platform merger reviews.

- There is a need for new guidelines for platform merger review to reflect the unique characteristics of such mergers. These guidelines should outline the review methodology and the assessment of potential competitive constraints.

- Indirect network externality plays a crucial role in locking in users to specific platforms.

- Platform firms provide a diverse range of services, offering multiple ancillary service platforms that revolve around a few core platforms or other businesses associated with the platforms.

- Platform firms often pursue mergers to expand into new revenue-creating areas or to strengthen their competitiveness in core services.

- One significant concern regarding anticompetitive practices in platform mergers is the potential for excluding competitors via selfpreferencing in the new markets.

- The addition of new ancillary services through a merger can potentially raise entry barriers in both the platform’s core service areas and the overall platform ecosystem.

- If a vertical merger leads to the foreclosure of purchasing or sales channels, it can seriously harm market competition.

- In mixed mergers, leveraging market power from one market to another can occur through tying.

- The determination of whether a merger is vertical or mixed is bound to be confusing when a platform, acting as an intermediary between consumers and small and medium-sized vendors, seeks to merge in order to add an auxiliary service for these vendors.

- Platform operators have the ability to foreclose competitors in other sectors but only indirectly, using accessibility to users.

- Without tying, platform operators can leverage market power from their core business area to ancillary service areas by raising rival’s costs.

- Platform mergers can raise barriers to entry not only in new markets but also in existing core service areas and the overall platform ecosystem. In some cases, the creation and reinforcement of entry barriers may be a deliberate objective of the merging parties.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR An Economic Analysis of Platform Labor: Focusing on Monopsony Power and Social Protection

We study platform labor from the perspective of labor monopsony. We start from exploring the size and trend of the domestic platform labor market and the current status of social protection available to platform workers. Extending the often-discussed nature of platform work, we shift our attention to the defining characteristics of digital platforms and the link between product and labor market competitions, focusing on labor supply elasticity with respect to wage and monopsony power. We conduct empirical studies in two distinct areas: the IT freelance market and the food delivery app market. In the context of the IT freelance market, we estimate the elasticity of labor supply by analyzing data collected from a Korean IT freelance platform via web-scrapping. The findings show that the monopsony power of the freelance platform is relatively minimal, suggesting a positive effect of the platform in fostering thicker markets. In contrast, for the food delivery app market which expanded rapidly during the COVID-19 period, a survey of riders unveils certain limitations related to multi-homing and platform switching, thereby signifying a potential for monopsony power in this sector. Extended analyses using app-use data combined with large-scale labor surveys show a downward wage trend with an increase in market concentration―despite stable or even growing employment levels. This pattern contradicts the traditional expectations under labor monopsony, which usually involves negative impacts on both employment and wages. Instead, our findings suggest an asymmetry in bargaining power. We conclude with overarching implications on competition and labor policies, focusing on platform’s monopsony power.

Summary

KDI Policy Forum The SME-Suitable Industry Reservation Policy: Economic Effects and Policy Direction

■ After marking the ten-year milestone since the adoption of the SME-suitable industry reservation policy, this study investigates whether the policy has enhanced the competitiveness of SMEs by safeguarding them as intended and offers implications for its future implementation.

- This SME policy involves the selection of specific products to protect the business territories of SMEs and limit the entry or expansion of large enterprises; however, evidence-based discussions on its effectiveness have been limited.

- While the production and employment of large businesses decreased after the adoption, the business activities of SMEs did not change much.

■ This reservation policy aimed to "ensure the competitiveness of SMEs through their protection." It successfully fulfilled its protective role by reducing the likelihood of SMEs exiting the market. However, the reservation policy had limited impact in terms of improving their performance or competitiveness.

- Following the designation of a set of industries (products) reserved for SMEs, the probability of exit for SMEs engaged in the production of those specific products significantly decreased. However, these SMEs did not show significant differences compared to other product producers in terms of most performance and input indicators.

- The industry-level analysis shows that the policy contributed little to the performance of overall industries to which the designated products belong.

■ The disappointing outcomes of the policy’s stringent measures highlight its limited effectiveness, as the restrictions on the expansion or entry of large enterprises did not lead to significant improvements in the performance of SMEs.

■ Based on the findings, it is recommended to suspend new applications for the designation of SME-suitable industries and gradually phase out the already designated reserved industries.

- In any business field, when there is greater uncertainty about future market restrictions, firms are less incentivized to engage in that market and invest in domestic production facilities.

- A policy that restricts production activity in a specific business area solely based on firm size may inadvertently undermine the efficiency of resource allocation in the broader economy.

■ Instead of protecting specific business areas, a win-win policy between SMEs and large firms should prioritize providing effective support for the growth of capable SMEs through appropriate regulatory measures to address anti-competitive and unfair practices.

SITEMAP

HOT ISSUE

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Law and Economics

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary