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KDI - Korea Development Institute

KDI - Korea Development Institute



Policy Study Candidate Selection Systems and Legislative Incentive May 30, 2020


Series No. 2020-01

Policy Study KOR Candidate Selection Systems and Legislative Incentive #Corporate Studies: Organizations, Corporate Governance #General(Other)
DOI P-ISBN979-11-5932-553-3 E-ISBN979-11-5932-596-0

May 30, 2020

  • 프로필
    Jaehoon Kim
  • KDI
    KIM, Dohyung
We explore theoretically and empirically the implications of the political party's candidate selection systems on politicians’ incentives. Through a contract theory model for the problem of multiple principles and an agent with multi-task, we have shown that the bottom-up nomination system is socially optimal, and the politician's effort for re-election under the top-down nomination system is much less than social optimal. By utilizing the partial introduction of the bottom-up nomination system in the 17th general election, we empirically have found that the legislative effort of politicians elected through bottom-up nomination is greater than that of politicians elected through top-down nomination.
요 약

제1장 머리말

제2장 공직후보자 선택방식과 정치적 책임성: 이론
 제1절 문 헌
 제2절 모 형
 제3절 사회적 최적해
 제4절 공천과 재선 메커니즘
 제5절 결론 및 정책적 시사점

제3장 공천 제도와 입법 노력: 증거
 제1절 배 경
 제2절 문 헌
 제3절 방법 및 자료
 제4절 공천방식과 의원 특성
 제5절 공천방식과 국회의원의 노력
 제6절 결 론

제4장 맺음말

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