North Korea's retention of its useless and outdated methods
of ideological mass mobilization will contribute significantly to
the prolongation of its military endeavor. If the north Korean
leadership only decides to employ it, the potential of its
operational system will not impede the continuation of an
intensive military endeavor over the short range.

Rather, it is sure to encourage such an endeavor. The north
Korean hierarchy refuses to recognize the burden its heavy
military spending imposes upon its shaky economy. Even if it
feels the pinch, Pyongyang is liable to react negatively to such a
perception by further stepping up its armament production and
vent the escalating pressure within by means of a military
adventure directed against an external target.

North Korea does not display an evident cause- and - effect
relationship between economic potential and arms expenditure as
the general model implies- with reference to the doctrines it
espouses, the method of economic management it uses and the
capacity for sustaining the behavior and military endeavor of the
state.

The gross volume of economy of south and north Korea can
be compared by the following figures. The average annual GNP
growth between 1966 and 1970: South Korea-- 10.3 percent;
north Korea-- 5.6 percent. Between 1976 and 1980 the figure
registered 6.9 percent for the south and 2.3 percent for the north.

Ever since 1975, south Korea has maintained GNP growth
rates much higher than those of north Korea. The gap in the
scale of GNP kept widening in the meantime form 2.9:1 in 1960
to 3.9:1 in 1981 and 5.5:1 in 1984.

South Korea started outpacing north Korea is per capita
GNP in 1960 with a 1.2:1 ration. The gap grew to 1.8:1 in 1981
and further to 2.6:1 in 1984. These figures are indicative of the
progressing deficiency in the productivity of north Korea's
socialist economy compared with the dynamic and efficient
economy of south Korea.

This discrepance will like continue to widen further in the
years ahead. North Korea's second 7-year economic plan
(1978-84) fell far short of its original goals which had been
rather conservatively set in view of the general economic
slowdown in the north.

Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Economic Systems and Basic Policies
Ⅲ. An Evaluation of the Second 7-Year Plan(1978-84)
Ⅳ. A Comparison of the Economic Powers of South and North
Korea
Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks