[summary] Recognizing this, the only true remedy for the crisis is to establish a new order ruled by market principles. The successful recovery will necessarily require painful structural reforms across the board. At the onset of the currency crisis in November 1997, the most urgent national task was to resolve the foreign exchange liquidity problem. The Korean government responded promptly to this task by successfully extending the maturity of short-term foreign debts, which restored stability in the foreign exchange market substantially. In order to address the fundamental cause of the crisis, the government took ambitious steps toward comprehensive structural reform. The following table lists key reform policies that have been announced or implemented since December 1997. Nevertheless, there remain a great deal of uncertainties and challenges. While visible structural adjustments of the financial and corporate sectors not being made at sufficient speed, the real sectors went into a deep recession. Given the vulnerable financial status of conglomerates and the massive amount of non-performing loans outstanding in the financial sector, the Korean economy cannot delay structural adjustments any longer. Today, the sincere leadership of the government is needed more than ever. Drastic reforms are bound to face resistance from various interest groups, and only a government with a clear vision can overcome these obstacles. In addition, only the government can mobilize the huge amount of resources necessary to facilitate the structural adjustments needed at this point of time. The following charts present the overall plans for the structural reforms in the financial market and corporate sector, along with the provision for the social safety net. The next group of charts explain the plans for the government reform not only to enhance its efficiency but also to provide the resources for the financial sector restructuring and social policies. The final group of charts shows projections of the Korean economy with two scenarios for structural reforms, namely, the case of successful reform implementation versus the case of failure to implement reforms.