Firm strategies in a product market are determined by management. Therefore product market competition cannot be free from corporate governance which directly affects the decision-making process of management. To examine the relationship between corporate governance and collusion, a unique data set is collected on cartel case details, board composition and activities, and socio-demographic characteristics of outside directors and CEOs in 155 listed companies in South Korea for 2007-2012. We observed more dissenting votes from outside directors in collusive firms than in competitive firms. Not only that casting a dissenting vote raises the risk of being replaced, the risk increase is found to be significantly larger in collusive firms than in other firms. In addition, CEO turnover sensitivity to relative performance is high in competitive firms while such relationship is not found in collusive firms. Rather, the turnover probability goes down with industry performance in collusive firms. These empirical results suggest that collusive firms have weaker governance than competitive firms.

Preface
Executive Summary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
　Section 1 Literature Review
　Section 2 Hypothesis Development

Chapter 3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
　Section 1 Data Collection and Sample Composition
　Section 2 Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics

Chapter 4 Board Composition and Behavior of Collusive Firms

Chapter 5 Tenure of Outside Directors in Collusive Firms

Chapter 6 Sensitivity of CEO Turnover to Performance in Collusive Firms

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Policy Implications

References
Appendix