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KDI - Korea Development Institute

KDI - Korea Development Institute



Research Monograph Analysis of Public Procurement Contracts: Effectiveness of the APAS December 31, 2020


Series No. 2020-03

Research Monograph KOR Analysis of Public Procurement Contracts: Effectiveness of the APAS #Public Enterprises Studies #General(Other)
DOI P-ISBN979-11-5932-605-9 E-ISBN979-11-5932-608-0

December 31, 2020

  • 프로필
  • 프로필
    LEE, Hwaryung
The Korean government implemented the Average Price Auction with Screening (APAS) in 2016 for construction contracts of a certain size or larger that are ordered by the public sector, including central government offices and public enterprises. The APAS takes into account both price and non-price scores which are tallied using the Average Price Auction (APA), and not the more common First Price Auction (FPA) method. The FPA awards the highest score to the lowest bidder while the APA calculates the average price, and awards the highest score to the closet bid. As such, the APA regulates the bidding competition, and forces bidders to place similar offers. Before being replaced by the APA in 2016, the FPA received harsh backlash for inciting aggressive competition, and awarding contracts to incapable bidders which resulted in frequent contract changes and cost overruns.

This study empirically analyzes whether the APAS produces meaningful effects that achieve the intended goals in regard to price and non-price scores. The outline of the major findings are as follows. Firstly, the bid-hit ratio increased by a statistically significant 6% after the adoption of the APAS. This is in line with expectations that the transition from the FPA to APA keeps competitions in check and raises the bidding ratio. Secondly, no improvements were observed in the resolution of fallouts such as contract changes and cost overruns. In sum, these results indicate that the APAS is not effective, and could place a bigger fiscal burden on the government authorities awarding the contracts.
요 약

제1장 서 론

제2장 최저가낙찰제(FPA)의 경제학적 문제: “Too-Good-To-Be-True”
 제1절 베이스라인 모형(baseline)
 제2절 재협상(renegotiation)
 제3절 계약이행보증금(performance bond)
 제4절 평판효과(reputation effect)
 제5절 요약 및 심사의 중요성
 제6절 평균가낙찰제

제3장 각국의 대응: 최저가낙찰 및 심사제(FPAS) vs. 평균가낙찰제(APA)

제4장 우리나라의 대응: 종합심사낙찰제(APAS)를 중심으로
 제1절 공공부문 계약제도 개괄
 제2절 기존의 최저가낙찰 및 심사제
 제4절 비가격요소에 대한 심사의 강도 비교

제5장 실증분석: 종합심사낙찰제(APAS)의 효과성
 제1절 종합심사낙찰제의 가격효과
 제2절 종합심사낙찰제의 비가격효과

제6장 결론 및 정책적 시사점
 제1절 ‘최저가낙찰 및 강화된 심사’ 방식으로 전환할 필요
 제2절 비가격요소에 대한 심사 강화 방안
 제3절 최저가낙찰 및 심사제로 전환될 경우 약탈적 가격 책정행위를 방지할 필요
 제4절 평균가낙찰제를 고수할 수밖에 없는 경우의 차선책

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